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The main concern of a construction client is to procure a facility that is able to 
meet its functional requirements, of the required quality, and delivered within an 
acceptable budget and timeframe. The cost aspect of these key performance 
indicators usually ranks highest. In spite of the importance of cost estimation, it is 
undeniably neither simple nor straightforward because of the lack of information 
in the early stages of the project. Construction projects therefore have routinely 
overrun their estimates.  
Cost overrun has been attributed to a number of sources including technical error 
in design, managerial incompetence, risk and uncertainty, suspicions of foul play 
and even corruption.  Furthermore, even though it is accepted that factors such as 
tendering method, location of project, procurement method or size of project 
have an effect on likely final cost of a project, it is difficult to establish their 
measured financial impact. Estimators thus have to rely largely on experience and 
intuition when preparing initial estimates, often neglecting most of these factors 
in the final cost build-up. The decision-to-build for most projects is therefore 
largely based on unrealistic estimates that would inevitably be exceeded. 
The main aim of this research is to re-examine the sources of cost overrun on 
construction projects and to develop final cost estimation models that could help 
in reaching more reliable final cost estimates at the tendering stage of the project.  
The research identified two predominant schools of thought on the sources of 
overruns – referred to here as the PsychoStrategists and Evolution Theorists. 
Another finding was that there is no unanimity on the reference point from which 
cost performance could be assessed, leading to a large disparity in the size of 
overruns reported. Another misunderstanding relates to the term “cost overrun” 
itself. 
The experimental part of the research, conducted in collaboration with two 
industry partners, used a combination of non-parametric bootstrapping and 
ensemble modelling with artificial neural networks to develop final project cost 
models based on about 1,600 water infrastructure projects. 92% of the validation 
predictions were within ±10% of the actual final cost of the project. The models 
will be particularly useful at the pre-contract stage as they will provide a 
benchmark for evaluating submitted tenders and also allow the quick generation 
of various alternative solutions for a construction project using what-if scenarios. 
The original contribution of the study is a fresh thinking of construction “cost 
overruns”, now proposed to be more appropriately known as “cost growth” based 
on a synthesises of the two schools of thought into a conceptual model. The 
second contribution is the development of novel models of construction cost 
estimation utilising artificial neural networks coupled with bootstrapping and 
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“Somewhere, something incredible is waiting to be known.”   
Carl Sagan 




Nine out of ten construction projects overrun their budget. 
Infrastructure projects have an 86% probability of outrunning their set 
cost targets. The size of these overruns can on average be as high as 
45% for rail projects, 34% for bridges and tunnels and 20% for road 
projects. These are some of the staggering conclusions of the seminal 
works by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, 2004).  
Love et al (2012) report overruns of up to 70% more than the initial 
estimate while Odeck (2004) reports a cost overrun up to 183% of 
original cost. The total cost of 20 projects assessed by the Auditor 
General of Western Australia (2012) was A$6.2 billion, an astonishing 
A$3.3 billion (114%) more than the total original approved budget 
estimates. At least four of these projects were expected to experience 
overruns well beyond 200% of the original cost. These statistics might 
suggest that overruns are the normative, rather than the exception in 
the construction industry.  
Overruns occur irrespective of the type of project - roads, bridges, rails, 
houses, schools and tunnels all suffer the same fate (Hinze et al. 1992, 
Love et al. 2014). Is it a small or mega project? Size really does not 
matter either (Bordat et al. 2004, Love et al. 2014). Flyvberg et al.’s 
(2002) database of 285 projects studied had cost values ranging from a 
small $1.5 million to a mega $8.5 billion. 
Interestingly, this endemic phenomenon is not limited to developing 
countries that might arguably be stereotypically characterised by poor 
management, ineffective project delivery or corruption. In happens in 
the UK, Europe, Australia, the Americas, Africa, Asia. Everywhere. It is 
global. 
Sounds like a sweeping generalisation? Perhaps. Well, maybe not. 
Boston’s Central Artery in the US, dubbed the “Big Dig”, was to cost 
US$2.6 billion but was completed at US$14.8 billion (Gelinas 2007). The 
New Children Hospital in Australia was approved at A$207 million. It 
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was delivered 365% over budget at A$962 million (Auditor General of 
Western Australia 2012). Edinburgh’s recently completed tram project 
costs a reported £776 million instead of the initially estimated £375 
million (City of Edinburgh Council 2014). Depending on which figures 
used, every Olympic Game since 1960 has experienced cost overruns - 
179% on average (Flyvbjerg and Stewart 2012). 
Unfortunately, it would seem that construction projects tend to make 
the news headlines, not for being remarkable engineering 
accomplishments that will support and stimulate economic growth and 
social integration of communities, but rather for being poorly managed 
and grossly over budget. The industry may have well earned itself the 
unenviable repute of delivering  projects  late and over budget, again 
and again, leaving clients dissatisfied and the tax-payer often out of 
pocket (Egan 1998, Audit Scotland 2004, Auditor General of Western 
Australia 2012).  
Oddly though, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) observed that the size of overruns 
have not improved over the 70 years that they studied. The trend 
continues to the present day with the Edinburgh Trams and the World 
Cup stadiums in Brazil still making the news headlines currently (City 
of Edinburgh Council 2014, Stadium Database 2014). Flyvbjerg et al 
(ibid, pp 290) thus controversially concluded that “no learning that 
would improve cost estimate accuracy seems to take place.” 
Why are cost overruns so prevalent in the industry? Why has there not 
been much improvement in the reliability of initial cost estimates over 
the years? Surely the industry has become a lot better at managing 
projects. Procurement systems have greatly evolved from traditional 
adversarial design-bid-build to different forms of collaborative and 
relationship contracts. There are more measures now for accountability 
and cost control for project procurement. Information Technology for 
construction has also improved significantly with the advent of 
Computer Aided Designs (CAD) and Building Information Modelling 
(BIM). There are now online collaborative platforms for effective 
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communication, design, visualisation, simulation, control and 
coordination of the entire construction process. There is growing take-
up of digital 3D design and even 4D models that integrate the spatial 
and temporal aspects of a project to understand, predict, evaluate and 
manage even the most complex projects. Most of these IT systems 
support project cost estimation as well as allow for the use of 
estimation software and advanced costing methods like feature-based 
estimation, Monte-Carlo simulations, genetic algorithms or fuzzy logic. 
It is against this backdrop that this research seeks to revisit the 
problem of cost overruns, to prompt a rethink of its sources, scale and 
provide some avenues for dealing with the problem.  
 
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The main concern of a construction client is to procure a facility that is 
able to meet its functional requirements, of the required quality, and 
delivered within an acceptable budget and timeframe. The cost aspect 
of these key performance indicators would seem to rank highest most 
times, especially in difficult financial periods such as the present. The 
estimates prepared at the initial stages of the project can play several 
roles - they can form the basis of cost-benefit analysis, for selection of 
potential delivery partners and very often as a benchmark for future 
performance measure. This stage in a project life-cycle is particularly 
crucial as decisions made during the early stages of the development 
process carry far more reaching economic consequences than the 
relatively limited decisions which can be made later. Effective cost 
estimation is therefore so vital; it can seal a project’s financial fate. 
However, construction and infrastructure projects have, historically, 
cost more at the completion of the construction phase than was 
anticipated at the conception phase. This causes concern for clients as 
they are unable to forecast their total financial commitment for the 
project and often have to secure extra funds as well as find themselves 
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suffering from significant reputational detriments. It is also a concern 
for virtually every other stakeholder on a construction project 
particularly financers, contractors, designers and project operators. 
Understandably, projects overrunning their budgets cause disquiet to 
the tax payer when public money is used to finance the project. Perhaps 
the only beneficiaries of such events are the media, particularly the 
print media1. 
It is not difficult to appreciate the need for a solution to this problem, 
for greater estimate reliability at all stages of a project and for greater 
assurance that initial cost expectations are met. But, as the subsequent 
discussions in this thesis will show, the problem extends to the 
definition of what “budget overrun” actually means. There is also a 
misunderstanding of the actual size of overruns as well as the sources 
of these overruns on projects. 




1 For the Edinburgh public, the cost overruns of their Tram project and the Scottish 
Parliament have been a regular feature of both of the city’s newspapers, who have 
delighted in revealing the latest catastrophes and misfortunes, giving a concerned 
view, while of course reveling in the greater distribution of print. Some of the news 
headlines included Edinburgh Tram “out of control again”, ”Edinburgh's tram fiasco...”, 






1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
The aims of this study, alongside the objectives to achieve these aims 
are stated as follows: 
1. To provide a better conceptual understanding of “cost overruns”. 
Specific objectives: 
a) ascertain through a critical review of the literature, the 
factors that contribute to the difference between the 
initially estimated cost and the resulting final costs at 
project completion;  
b) explore the different theoretical schools of thought on the 
cost overruns; 
c) synthesise the different schools of thought into a holistic 
conceptual model to help properly understand overrun. 
 
2. To develop final cost estimation models to forecast likely total cost 
of projects based on historical cost and project details of 
completed project.  
Specific objectives: 
a) identify and collect a reliable dataset for the cost 
modelling process; 
b) establish a neural network modelling protocol for 
developing the cost models; 
c) validate the models using new project cases. 
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1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A preliminary review of the literature on cost overruns and estimation 
led to the following research questions that will guide the research in 
order to achieve the stated aims: 
1. Is the current understanding of construction cost overruns 
adequate? 
An initial literature review suggests that there is no unanimity 
on the reference point for measuring assessing cost performance 
on construction projects thus leading to a large disparity in the 
size or range of overruns reported. 
2. What are the predominant schools of thought on the sources of 
construction cost overruns? 
There also seems to be conflating theoretical explanations on the 
sources of cost overruns in the literature. While one school 
seems to explore the issue from an organisational and strategic 
point of view, the other tackles overruns from a technical and 
engineering perspective. 
3. Is there a conceptual difference between cost underestimation and 
cost overruns? 
This question is closely linked to the previous. There does not 
seem to be distinction between these two terms when cost 
escalation is being discussed, especially by the media. If not 
correctly understood, they might lead to misleading conclusions 
and misplaced accusations when projects seem to outrun their 
budgets. 
4. Is neural networks an appropriate method of estimating the cost 
of construction projects? 
While neural networks has been widely used for problems like 
foreign exchange prediction, medical diagnosis, flight and robot 
control and loan applicant assessment, it is yet to find 
widespread use in construction management research, 
particularly for cost estimation. Why is this the case? Initial 
answers include the large data requirements of neural networks. 
8 
 
Requisite data was not a problem for this research as a large 
database was secured. The effectiveness of using neural 
networks for final cost estimation will thus be explored as part 
of this research. 
 
1.5. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH APPROACH 
The critical considerations when choosing a research approach often 
revolve around the type of problem under study and how to maximise 
the chances of adequately answering the research question(s) of the 
study. The research reported in this thesis largely adopts a quantitative 
approach with some elements of qualitative approach especially in the 
early stages of the research. A thorough exploration and critique of 
existing literature on construction cost overruns laid the basis on which 
to conduct a quasi experimental model development to estimate likely 
final cost. 
After defining the aims and objectives, the research begun with a 
thorough review and critique of existing literature and theories on the 
cost overrun phenomenon. An experimental approach was then 
designed to provide the framework for data collection, analyses and 
subsequent model validation. The results of the model development 
were then discussed before reaching conclusions and recommendations 
for achieving more reliable cost estimates in the early stages of 
construction projects. A greater discussion on the research approach, 




1.6. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The contributions of this research to the field of construction project 
management are closely aligned with the research aims described 
previously. But the reader of this thesis deserves to understand the 
intentions, the argument and the original contribution of the work, and 
while the research is yet to be demonstrated and disseminated in the 
remainder of this thesis, there is no harm in stating the contributions in 
advance. These are summarised as: 
 New understanding of construction cost overruns  
Construction cost is not a new research area in any sense and 
has been investigated by many outstanding researchers in the 
past. But this current research has demonstrated conflation and 
confusion of existing understanding of cost overruns from two 
predominant schools of thought. The contribution here is a fresh 
rethinking of construction ‘cost overruns’, now proposed to be 
more appropriately known as ‘cost growth’. 
 
 Novel models of construction cost estimation utilising 
Artificial Neural Networks coupled with Bootstrapping and 
Ensemble Modelling 
As far as can be ascertained this combination of modelling 
approaches has rarely been used in any modelling problem and 
never in the field of construction cost. It is possibly naïve to 
expect such subtle modelling approaches to be embraced and 
utilised immediately by practitioners but the academic field is 
healthy and active – the work here undoubtedly makes an 
original contribution to it. 
Page | 10 
 
1.7. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis is organised into five chapters as illustrated in Figure 1. 
1.7.1. Chapter One - Introduction 
This chapter sets out the background and context of the research, laying 
the basis for the problem statement along with the aims and objectives 
of the research. The research questions have also been stated in this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 1: Thesis Structure 
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1.7.2. Chapter Two -  “My Cost Runneth Over” 
This chapter forms the critical spine of the research where the thesis 
statement is clearly identified. It briefly presents an overview of the 
scale of cost overruns in construction before critically evaluating the 
theoretical explanations of the causes of the phenomenon. Two notable 
schools of thought, referred to in this thesis as the PhychoStrategists 
and Evolution Theorists will be presented.  
A conceptual model that attempts to balance the tension between these 
two schools is later presented in a section captioned Rethinking Cost 
Overruns, forging a platform that will allow for focussed development 
of more detailed cost forecasting models covered in the later parts of 
this thesis. 
1.7.3. Chapter Three - Research Approach and 
Experimental Design 
This section presents the considerations for adopting the research 
approach used as well as the experimental framework that will guide 
the modelling aspect of the research. The background, applications, 
strengths and weakness of artificial neural network are also evaluated 
in this chapter. 
1.7.4. Chapter Four - Putting Construction Data to Work 
This is the experimental chapter of the thesis where the data collected 
from two construction organisations will be ‘put to work’ to develop 
cost models for forecasting final cost. A small dataset of 98 completed 
projects will be used to develop trial models and experiment with 
different modelling strategies. Neural networks, data bootstrapping and 
ensemble modelling will then be used to explore a larger dataset of 
1,600 projects in search of consistent patterns, correlations and 
systematic relationships between variables. The aim here is 
straightforward: to make data ‘work’ for construction organisations by 
extracting useful information embedded in them to predict cost.  
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The data analysis and the results achieved have intentionally not been 
split into different chapters so as to improve the readability of the 
thesis.  
1.7.5. Chapter Five - Conclusions and Recommendation 
In the closing chapter, conclusions will be made based on the findings 
from the literature review and data modelling chapters. The aims and 
objectives set out in the initial chapter of the thesis will be revisited and 
a judgement made on whether these have been achieved, and to what 
extent.  
Finally, theoretical and practical contributions of the research will be 
usefully summarised while detailing implications of the findings for the 
procurement and management of projects. Some considerations of 
future research will then be provided along with limitations of the 
current research. 
1.7.6. References 
The list of all works cited in the thesis. 
1.7.7. Appendix 
Supplementary materials including publications and data collection 
form. 
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CHAPTER TWO 





When we mean to build, 
We first survey the plot, then draw the model; 
And when we see the figure of the house, 
Then must we rate the cost of the erection; 
Which if we find outweighs ability, 
What do we then but draw anew the model 
In fewer offices, or at last desist 
To build at all? 
 ~ Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 2 
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2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Effective cost planning relates the design of buildings to their cost, so 
that while taking full account of quality, risks, likely scope changes, 
utility and appearance, the cost of a project is planned to be within the 
economic limit of expenditure. This stage in a project life-cycle is 
particularly crucial as decisions made during the early stages of the 
development process carry far more-reaching economic consequences 
than the relatively limited decisions which can be made later in the 
process. Despite the importance of cost estimation, it is undeniably not 
neither simple nor straightforward. To achieve satisfactory accuracy 
and reliability of estimates, the estimator has to be able to reckon all 
future chain of events from project inception to its eventual delivery.  
Apart from costing materials and labour, the estimator also has to take 
into consideration factors such as the type of project, likely design and 
scope changes, ground conditions, duration, type of client, tendering 
method. Trying to work out the cost influence of most of these variables 
at the inception stage of a project, where cost targets are normally set, 
would be an exhaustive task, if not at all futile. Ignoring most of them 
altogether creates a perfect recipe for future cost overrun. 
This chapter will present a thorough discussion of the problem of 
construction cost overruns, more appropriately termed cost growth in 
some sections. First, a brief overview of the scale of cost growth is 
presented before discussing the theoretical explanations of the causes 
of the phenomenon, mainly from the perspective of two notable schools 
of thought, referred to in this thesis as the PhychoStrategists and 
Evolution Theorists. A conceptual model that attempts to balance the 
tension between these two schools is later presented in a section 
captioned Rethinking Cost Overruns, creating a platform that will allow 
for focussed development of more detailed cost forecasting models 
covered in the later parts of this thesis. 
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2.1. CONSTRUCTION COST OVERRUN: THE SCALE 
 OF THE PROBLEM 
The statistics on construction cost overruns have been well 
documented in the literature, official government publications and 
popular media. This section only presents an overview of the scale of 
the problem as a prelude to the discussion on how and why cost 
overruns actually occur. 
The Auditor General of Western Australia assessed the management 
and performance of 20 capital intensive projects including sports 
venues, schools and hospitals, undertaken in Australia. The expected 
cost of all the projects at the time was A$6.157 billion, a staggering 
A$3.275 billion (114%) more than the total original approved budget 
estimates. 15 of the 20 projects were expected to exceed their original 
approved budgets, of which four were expected to exceed their budgets 
by more than 200% (Auditor General of Western Australia 2012). 
The 2012 London Olympics bid was awarded at circa £2.4 billion in 
2005. This was adjusted to about £9.3 billion in 2007 after significant 
scope changes. The project was eventually completed at £8.9 billion in 
2010 (Cf. National Audit Office 2012).  
The Edinburgh Trams project in Scotland exceeded its initial budget 
leading to significant scope reduction to curtail the ever-growing cost 
(Miller 2011, Railnews 2012). The project, was initially expected to cost 
about £375 million, but was completed three years late at a reported 
£776 million (City of Edinburgh Council 2014). 
The City of Boston’s Central Artery project (popularly referred to as the 
Big Dig) was to cost US$2.6 billion but was completed at US$14.8 billion 
and 7 years late in 2006 (Gelinas 2007).  
The UK Government commissioned report in 1998 on construction 
industry performance indicated that over 50% of projects overspent 
their budget (Egan 1998). A similar report around the same time in the 
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US suggested that about 77% of projects exceed their budget, 
sometimes to the tune of over 200% (General Accounting Office 1997).  
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) sampled 258 infrastructure projects worth 
US$90 billion from 20 different countries and found that 90% of the 
projects experienced budget escalation and that infrastructure projects 
in particular have an 86% likelihood of exceeding their initial estimates. 
Alex et al. (2010) report up to 60% discrepancy between actual and 
estimated costs of over the 800 water and sewer projects examined in 
their research.  
Table 1 shows some other examples of projects that have gone over 
budget. These statistics have often led to extensive claims, disputes and 
lawsuits in some cases within the industry.  
Table 1: Some Examples of Cost Overrun in Construction Projects 





Sydney Opera House A$7 A$102 1357 
Nat West Tower £15 £115 667 
Thames Barrier Project £23 £461 1904 
Scottish Parliament £195* £414 112 
British Library £142 £511 260 
*September 2000 estimate. Initially stated cost was about £40 million Source: 
Audit Scotland (2004) 
2.2. SOURCES OF COST OVERRUN 
Many contracts are signed every day for some form of building work. It 
may be a completely new building, refurbishment or maintenance 
project. Some projects are simple, others complex; still, some take a 
couple of weeks and others, several years. Yet, they all have one thing in 
common - they can all go wrong. Causes of cost growth have been 
attributed to several sources including unidentified or improperly 
managed risk and uncertainty (Okmen and Öztas 2010), scope creep 
and rework (Love et al. 2005), optimism bias (Lovallo and Kahneman 
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2003, Flyvbjerg 2008) to suspicions of foul-play and corruption (Wachs 
1990, Flyvbjerg 2009).  
Without duplicating the extensive literature available on the subject or 
trying to provide an exhaustive list of the causes of cost overrun, this 
section of the thesis is only concerned with a synthesis of the 
mainstream arguments found in the literature. The review will draw 
particularly on the works of some of the contemporary authorities on 
the subject, such as Peter Love and Bent Flyvbjerg, to provide a holistic 
understanding of the cost overrun phenomenon. 
2.2.1. Risk and Uncertainty 
The terms risk and uncertainty are often used interchangeably although 
they do not necessarily mean the same thing. In an early seminal work, 
Knight (1921), describes “risk” as a word ordinarily used in a loose way 
to refer to any sort of uncertainty viewed from the standpoint of the 
unfavourable contingency but later insists that “uncertainty must be 
taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of risk”. More 
recently, Ross and Williams (2013) describe risk as “the threat or 
possibility that an action or event will adversely or beneficially affect an 
organisation's ability to achieve its objective.” They further qualified this 
by suggesting that risk is “the consequence of a hazard, measured as the 
likelihood of the hazard and its severity”, should that hazard occur. 
Uncertainty is generally considered as a situation where the likelihood 
or measure of exposure of an event is unknown. As this thesis is 
concerned with construction cost, the bounded and simple definition of 
risk as the measure of exposure and likelihood to financial loss will be 
used.  
The nature of construction projects makes them particularly prone to 
the effects of risk and uncertainty – they are unique, complex and 
dynamic; each project has many parties with differing business and 
project objectives; projects are exposed to the weather (not in a 
controlled environment); ground conditions are largely unpredictable 
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and total project duration can spread over several years. It is no 
surprise then that risk has been heavily cited as one of the main causes 
of failure to meet cost targets on construction projects (Akintoye and 
MacLeod 1997, Creedy 2006). Arguably, the construction industry is 
perhaps one of the most risk prone industries, with project cost being 
one of main areas susceptible to its effects. Almost all types of risk 
(including scope changes, inclement weather, unsuitable ground 
conditions, contractual arrangements, disputes, client’s cash flow 
problems, etc.) present some financial ramifications.   
Even though risk and uncertainty seems to pervade the construction 
industry, both Baccarini (2005) and Burger (2003) suggest that all too 
often, they are either ignored or dealt with in a completely arbitrary 
manner using rules-of-thumb or percentages - the so-called 
contingency fund. Flanagan and Norman (1993) thus assert that the 
task of risk management is often so poorly performed, that far too much 
risk is passively retained, ultimately resulting in cost escalation during 
project delivery. 
However, can a process that combines intuitive judgement and 
forecasting of future events ever be precise or unbiased? A qualified 
“no” is probably the answer to that question, according to Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), formulators of Prospect Theory – decision making 
under risk and uncertainty. This theory suggests that with little or 
equivocal information, people tend to make decisions based on the 
likely gains, or loss, of a venture, and not necessarily based on the real 
outcome of the decision. Kahneman, a Noble Prize winner for his works 
on decision making and behavioural economics, delineates decision 
making and the illusion of understanding, stating that we often exhibit 
an excessive confidence in what we believe we think we know about 
any situation, and that our inability to acknowledge the full extent of 
our ignorance and the uncertainty of the world we live in makes us 
prone to overestimate how much we really understand (Kahneman 
2011). We generally tend to disregard or underestimate the likelihood 
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or severity of possible risk events. Kahneman’s theory holds profound 
extensions for decision making in the construction industry, especially 
for large public projects where the cost of risk and uncertainty are 
particular heightened. It would also provide large support for Bent 
Flyvbjerg’s recent works on strategic misrepresentation and optimism 
bias.  
2.2.2. Strategic Misrepresentation 
Some authorities on the subject of cost overrun, including Flyvbjerg et 
al. (2002, 2005) and Wach (1989, 1990), collectively referred to in this 
thesis as the PsychoStrategists1, propose more depressing explanations 
to the phenomenon of cost overruns. They suggest that strategic 
misrepresentation, the deliberate distortion or misstatement of the 
amount of time and resources necessary to deliver the project, is 
possibly the main source of cost overrun, particularly on large publicly 
funded projects. Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) conducted a desk study analysis 
of the cost performance of 258 transportation projects worth US$90 
billion and categorised the sources of cost overruns on construction 
projects into four groups: technical (error), psychological, economical 
and political. They compared the cost of projects at the time of the 
decision-to-build to the cost at completion and found apparent 
discrepancies in cost forecasts for transportation infrastructure 
projects to be on average 45% for rail, 34% for bridges and tunnels, 
20% for roads. Nine out of ten projects in their sample outrun their cost 
targets with infrastructure projects having an 86% probability of 
overrunning their cost targets.  




1 This term PsychoStrategists is coined here to collectively refer to the proponents of 
the psychological contributors (e.g. optimism bias) and business strategy (e.g. strategic 
misrepresention) as the main sources of cost overruns.  
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They also observed that cost overruns in their sample were not 
randomly distributed but were systematic, leading them to rather 
controversially conclude that the cost estimates used to decide whether 
projects should be given the go-ahead were “highly and systematically 
misleading”(Flyvbjerg et al. 2002: page 279), with strong claims of foul 
play by project promoters. In order to get a project approved, Flyvbjerg 
claims that sponsors and estimators, especially on public works, tend to 
intentionally underestimate the true cost of the project.  
Accordingly, only projects that fit the formula, 
“Underestimated costs + overestimated benefits = funding” 
are able to secure approval, and therefore funding (Flyvbjerg 2009). 
They posit that  
“by routinely overestimating benefits and underestimating costs, 
promoters make their projects look good on paper, which helps get 
them approved and built” (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005).  
Wach (1989) was even more forthright in his paper ‘When planners lie 
with numbers’ and later advocated for better ethics in forecasting for 
public works (Wachs 1990).  
There was strong evidence in support of strategic misrepresentation on 
the Scottish Parliament. This is subject of the paper “Exploring 
escalation of commitment in Constuction project management: Case study 
of the Scottish Parliament project” (see Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2014c) 
[attached as Appendix A4]. Five weeks after their election in 1999, the 
new Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) had to vote on whether 
or not to continue the project. At this stage, Alex Salmond MSP, leader of 
the main opposition party wrote to Sir David Steel MSP, the Presiding 
Officer of the Scottish Parliament, requesting that the project be 
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suspended and that an estimate of possible cancellation cost be 
produced “in order to properly debate the future of the Holyrood project 
or other alternatives”1. He wrote in a follow-up letter,  
“It is now possible that we may have to consider cancelling the 
Holyrood project; in the circumstances it is essential that no further 
actions should be taken which would add to the cost of cancellation 
if this were the decision which Parliament reached.”2 
Faced with the dire prospect of possible project cancellation, civil 
servants in the Scottish Office, led by the Project Sponsor, decided to 
cover-up the fact that costs were going to be significantly higher than 
what the MSPs were to vote upon. In a classic example of strategic 
misrepresentation, the Project Sponsor did not include an extra 
£27million for risk in the estimates submitted to the MSPs.  
The proposed vote urging a termination of the project was defeated by 
only three votes. Alex Salmond MSP, later told the public enquiry that 
followed the controversies surrounding the project that the vote was 
based on false information, adding that  
“it is inconceivable that had the proper information been given to 
the members of the Scottish Parliament, that there wouldn't have 
been at least a delay for taking stock and reassessment... the figures, 
the facts, the timeline shows that when the Parliament were told 
they were inheriting a project of £109 million, it was actually well 




1 Documentary evidence number MS/1/083, submitted to the Public enquiry 
following the controversies that surrounded the delivery of the project in 2003. 
2 Documentary evidence MS/1/084 
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over £200 million and was totally out of control... Parliamentarians 
being misled and misinformed is a very serious issue indeed.”1 
Lord Fraser, who chaired the enquiry, backs a case for strategic 
misrepresentation on the Holyrood Project by stating: 
“As at the point of hand-over, where there is a very tight vote in the 
Parliament on whether to proceed with this particular project or 
not, that figure was specifically kept away from them. It looks 
rather as though, those who were involved in this were determined 
to keep the figure down as low as possible, even to the point of 
concealing it from the Parliament, in the hope that the project 
would go ahead.”  
2.2.3. Optimism Bias 
Further developments of the strategic misrepresentation perspective 
by Flyvbjerg led to theories on optimism bias, after Weinstein (1980). 
Optimism bias can be explained as the cognitive disposition to evaluate 
possible negative future events in a fairer light than suggested by 
inference from the base rates. Flyvbjerg (2008) draws on this concept 
and suggests that decision making in policy and infrastructure planning 
is flawed by the fact that we think we know, or at least are in control of 
all possible chain of events from project inception to completion. This 
only leads to unjustifiable confidence in the prospects of the project and 
unrealistic estimates. Unlike strategic misrepresentation, optimism bias 
might not be buoyed by deceptive intent, but also often leads to 
underestimating true cost, overestimation of benefits, and overlooking 
the potential effects of error and uncertainty. The potential gains of the 




1 Transcript of the Public Enquiry on 13th November 2003 [Available at 
www.holyroodinquiry.org] 
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project thus become overwhelmingly enticing and almost blinding to 
likely pitfalls.  
According to the PsychoStrategists, deception (strategic 
misrepresentation) and delusion (optimism bias) are complementary 
explanations of the failure of large infrastructure projects leading to the 
underestimation of likely final cost of project. It might be easy to reckon 
how strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias work in tandem 
with business competition embedded in the lowest-bidder culture to 
often create an unrealistic low cost target of projects at the pre-
construction phase of projects. This line of diagnosis of the problem of 
cost overrun might seem appealing, at least on cursory examination, 
especially in terms of large capital intensive public projects or those 
that are likely to make high political statements.  
There is some evidence to support this supposition on the Scottish 
Parliament project. The unrealistic cost ceiling of £40million in the 
Government's devolution White Paper (Scotland's Parliament 1997) 
turned out to be a rather optimistic estimate, or better still, a 
guesstimate of final cost of the project by non-construction 
professionals. A member of the Scottish Parliament Corporate Body, 
Andrew Welsh MSP, stated that “right from the very start, the budgets 
were totally unrealistic. The original budgets we inherited were for a 
fictional building”1. Rusell Hillhouse, former Permanent Under-
Secretary at the Scottish Office and a member of the team that 
estimated the cost of the project at £40million said: 




1 Transcript of Public Enquiry on 11th February 2004, [Available at 
www.holyroodinquiry.org]  
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 “we couldn't possibly have done a thorough job, and this was very 
difficult because it was a time when people were working extremely 
hard on other aspects of the White Paper”1.  
Sam Galbraith, former Under-Secretary of State at the Scottish Office 
also told the public enquiry,  
“the figure of £40million in the white document, was never for 
Holyrood. That was for a bog-standard building on a greenfield 
site.”2 
The 14,000 capacity entertainment and sports complex, Perth Arena in 
Australia also experienced considerable cost growth during its delivery. 
The project was approved at a cost of A$160 million but was eventually 
completed three years behind schedule at a reported A$550 million 
(Auditor General of Western Australia 2012). Citing optimism and poor 
project governance as causes of this apparent cost growth and delay, 
the Auditor General said in media statement, “the initial estimates of the 
cost and opening date for the Arena were unrealistic and made before the 
project was well understood or defined.” (Auditor General 2010, pg. 1). 
Similarly, the Fiona Stanley Hospital project in the same country was 
approved at A$420 million, but experienced a staggering cost growth of 
A$1300 million. In a similar diagnosis, the Auditor General again stated 
that “the original estimates were unrealistic.” (Auditor General of 
Western Australia 2012, pg. 50).  
2.2.4. The Evolution Theorists 
Another school of thought on cost overruns, referred to here as the 
Evolution Theorists1, include Love et al. (2012, 2014), Osland and 




1 Transcript of Public Enquiry on 30th October 2003 
2 Transcript of Public Enquiry on 28th October 2003 
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Strand (2010) and Odeck (2004). Their thesis statement is 
straightforward - projects change, and when they do, they often come 
with increasing costs. They argue that projects essentially evolve 
significantly between conception and completion so that it might be 
misleading in most cases to make a direct comparison between the 
costs at start and end of the project. 
Love et al. (2012) provide a rebuttal to Flyvbjerg's perspective on cost 
overruns in their paper “Moving beyond optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation” suggesting that industry should rather embrace a 
more holistic understanding of the escalation phenomenon that 
includes some level of the process and the social construct. Love et al. 
(2012) introduce the concept of ‘pathogens’, the many events and 
actions that could not be accounted for at the initial stages of the project 
that eventually add-on to expected cost as the drivers of cost growth. 
They further argue that Flyvbjerg's analyses are perhaps rather too 
simplistic and not generalisable to all projects undertaken within the 
industry. Love et al's (2012) case study of social infrastructure projects 
suggests that foul-play might not be the best explanation of cost 
overruns and that the fingers point at other events that occur before 
and during the project delivery stage, including rework and design 
changes. 
Osland and Strand (2010) were also very critical of the strategic 
misrepresentation perspective of cost overruns. They questioned the 
theoretical and methodological validity of Flyvbjerg's work, claiming 
that the strategic misrepresentation framework “does not offer any 




1 The term Evolution Theorists is used here to describe the school of thought that is 
predominnantly concerned with changes that occur during project development, from 
inception to completion. The central argument of the supporters of this school is that 
projects change (i.e. evolve). The changes then lead to the differences betweeen 
expected and actual final cost of the project.  
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variation on the institutional variable nor when it comes to variation in 
planners (actors) motives and rationality.”  
They further argued that for 
 “Flyvbjerg and other proponents for the hermeneutics of suspicion, 
the actors actually admitting telling lies can be seen as the ‘tip of 
the iceberg’. However, it is also a perspective that would not be 
falsified if no examples of actors admitting lying were found. On the 
contrary, it could easily be interpreted as a verification that they 
were lying also for the researchers.”  
Osland and Strand's rebuttal is probably sustainable as it is almost 
impossible to draw valid distinctions, along a continuum of motivation, 
between reasonable optimism, over-enthusiasm to deliberate deceit or 
culpable error using statistical analysis, as adopted in Flyvbjerg’s 
works. Furthermore, adopting a positivist perspective to understand a 
complex issue like construction project governance, which usually 
involves a complex interplay of construction professionals, planners, 
business strategy, institutional framework and politics, would merely 
be superficial at best and never actually provide substantial evidence to 
support the kind of conclusions reached by Flyvbjerg et al.  
Odeck (2004) invested the size and causes of overruns for road projects 
in the Norwegian construction industry. The study reported an average 
cost overrun of 7.9% with a maximum cost overrun of 183%. The study 
however attributed these overruns to project specific factors such as 
project duration, location, estimated cost at contract award and size of 
projects. An interesting observation from this study is that cost 
overruns appear to be more predominant among smaller projects just 
as larger ones. 
Love et al. (2005) previously conducted a questionnaire survey of 161 
construction professionals in the Australian construction industry and 
found that rework was one of the main contributors to escalation of 
cost. The main sources of rework as found in their work are ineffective 
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use of information technology, staff turnover/allocation to other 
projects, incomplete design at the time of tender, insufficient time to 
prepare contract documentation and poor coordination between design 
team members. This conclusion is similar to that reached by Bordat et 
al. (2004) who found that the “dominant” source of cost overrun was 
change order due mainly to “errors and omissions” in design. In a more 
recent research, Love et al. (2014) challenged Flyvbjerg's strategic 
misrepresentation and optimism bias perspective as lacking in 
verifiable causality, and therefore limited in their application.  
2.2.5. Relay Races and Project Governance 
Research on leadership and governance of construction projects by Gil 
and Lundrigan (2012), perhaps offers a more holistic assessment of 
cost growth that aligns with the views of Love, et al. above. That 
projects evolve is essentially the core of their defence. Very often, 
construction projects change considerably in scope and design between 
conception, to inception and completion, often due to a client’s 
proposed changes or technically imposed changes. This suggests that it 
might be erroneous to simply compare the cost of a project at inception, 
A, with the cost at completion, B, and wherever B>A, then overruns 
have occurred and estimators of A either lied or were incompetent. A 
and B are essentially very different. More robust explanations of 
overruns need to factor-in process and product, as well as sources of 
changes to scope. For Love and Gil et al. (op. cit.), project overruns are 
not really a case of projects not going according to plan (budget), but 
the other way round – plans not going according to project. 
Gil and Lundrigan (2012) propose a “relay race” framework for 
understanding cost growth, particularly on mega projects such as the 
London Olympics Project, Scottish Parliament or Terminal 2 project at 
Heathrow Airport, all of which seemed to have suffered the curse of 
cost growth, at least on a perfunctory examination. In the relay race of 
construction delivery, the baton of project leadership is passed on from 
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one person(s) or organisation at the different stages of the project 
delivery. The aims and scope of the project, as well as skills and 
competencies of the project sponsors and promoters (project 
governors) at the conceptual stage, are often very different from their 
counterparts at the project design or delivery stage. Also, it is not 
unusual for most public projects to have long gestation periods, 
stretching over several years before final approval is reached, by which 
time project budget would also have changed a number of times. The 
Scottish Parliament Building is a paragon in this respect – the circa £40 
million submitted by the Scottish Office as likely final cost did not take 
into consideration project location, VAT, fees, inflation or the building of 
a completely new parliament building. It is no wonder the final cost of 
the project was 10 times this initial proposed estimate. 
2.3. RETHINKING COST OVERRUNS 
The literature is clear: in the arena of cost escalation there are 
essentially two prevalent schools of thought, referred to in this thesis as 
the PsychoStrategists and the Evolution Theorists. Much debate in the 
existing literature concerns which is the correct view of the cost 
overrun phenomenon, which is the most practical, or most relevant. 
Could both actually be valid and complementary? Or maybe they are 
just different facets of the same problem? Some of these issues are 
explored in the papers “Dealing with construction cost overruns using 
data mining” (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2014b) and “Rethinking 
construction cost overruns: Cognition, learning and estimating” (Ahiaga-
Dagbui and Smith 2014a) which were published in Construction 
Management Economics and the Journal of Financial Management of 
Property and Construction [attached as Appendix A1 and A2 
respectively]. 
Hitherto, the term “overruns” has been used as though it conveyed an 
unequivocal meaning. Existing literature on cost overrun seems to 
conflate two related, but different issues – overruns and 
underestimation. This may largely be due to the fact that there is no 
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unanimity on the reference point used to measure what is loosely 
referred to as overruns in different studies. Much of the media hype on 
supposed cost overruns hardly makes this differentiation as well and 
thereby would often base their reportage on a simple comparison 
between cost at inception and cost at completion of a project, ignoring 
the mediating phases of project gestation and definition. It is therefore 
unsurprising that there is often a rather large disparity in the level of 
cost overrun reported in these researches.  
For example, while Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) report an average cost 
overrun of 45% for tunnels and bridges, Hinze et al. (1992) and Love et 
al. (2012) report lower averages of 4.24% and 11.89% respectively. 
Furthermore, Odeck (2004) reports an average of 7.9% overrun for 420 
road projects while Vidalis and Najafi (2002) report an average of 
10.52% for 708 road projects. Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) however report a 
higher average of 20% for 167 road projects. This is because Flyvbjerg 
et al. use a reference point of cost at when project was approved while 
the other studies generally lean towards cost at contract award. 
As already pointed out, most large publicly funded projects tend to go 
through a long definition period after project inception during which 
many changes to scope and accompanying costs occur. Sometimes the 
initial scheme bears little likeness to the defined project, as was the 
case of the New Children Hospital in Australia. The initially approved 
budget for the hospital was A$207 million. The scope at this stage was 
to relocate the Princess Margaret Hospital to the Royal Perth Hospital. 
However, this scope completely changed during project definition to the 
construction of a totally new Medical Center at A$962 million, a cost 
increase of A$755 if taken on cursory examination (Auditor General of 
Western Australia 2012). The Holyrood Project in Edinburgh also 
experienced a similar significant scope change, and thereby the 
astonishing cost growth recorded (see Audit Scotland 2000, 2004). It 
seems erroneous therefore to make direct comparisons between the 
initial “estimate” A and its final completion cost B – they are 
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comparisons between two very different projects. More robust 
explanations of cost growth would need to factor-in process and 
product, as well as sources of change to scope. Flyvbjerg's works make 
a direct comparison between costs A and B, and wherever B>A, 
overruns are reported. 
In Figure 2, a conceptual model that divides the project delivery cycle 
into three sequential stages is presented. In practice, some projects are 
now procured with the definition and construction phases occurring 
concurrently. Suffice for now though that most projects follow Figure 2. 
As noted by Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014a), the scope of the project 
at the inception is often just rough ideas, schemes and concepts 
drawings, lacking any firm information for reliable cost estimation. This 
stage in some cases can be several years in advance of contract award 
and eventual construction. Typically, an estimate can only be as good as 
the information it is based on so that, ceteris paribus, the level of 
accuracy of the estimates produced also increases as more information 
becomes available. The estimate at this stage often does accommodate a 
lot of details and information, largely because much of these are not yet 
available or uncertain. 
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However, it is often at the inception stage that project sponsors garner 
for green-lighting and funding. Arguably, it is perhaps at this stage the 
effects of uncertainty, lack of information, optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation might be particularly heightened, to keep cost at an 
attractive low to secure project approval. Significant cost growth 
usually occurs soon after project approval when the project business 
case is being developed and the project scope and costs were more 
accurately defined (Definition stage in Figure 2). In the case of the 20 
capital intensive project analysed by the Auditor General of Western 
Australia, approximately 90% of the cost variance recorded, equivalent 
to A$2.95 billion, occurred before the construction phase (Auditor 
General of Western Australia 2012). In Figure 2, the difference between 
the cost estimated at project inception, where the decision-to-build is 
taken, and the estimated cost at the end of the project definition stage is 
referred to as cost underestimate. The main contributors to cost 
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Figure 2: Conceptual model for understanding cost growth 
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scope changes, estimation error, strategic misrepresentation or 
optimism bias.  
Overruns, however, are more appropriately described here as the 
difference in cost at project completion and project definition stage (see 
Figure 2). This is usually as a result of further scope changes, normally 
not as significant as those at project definition stage, rework, ground 
conditions, technical and managerial difficulties, material price changes 
or estimation error. These are the factors that Love et al. (2012) 
describe as “pathogens”. So, whereas the PsychoStrategists (Flyvbjerg 
et al.) mainly deal with underestimation, the evolution theorists (Love 
et al.) focus on the latter phases of the construction project that 
contribute to overruns. Both perspectives are actually two 
complementing sides of the same coin.  
Herein lies the dilemma then: which baseline should be used to 
measure project performance - the initial cost target at project approval 
and decision-to-build, or the cost at contract award after project 
definition stage? From the overwhelming statistics already presented in 
this thesis, it would seem that the cost estimate at the time of the 
decision-to-build is of little value to actual project delivery, at least from 
a theoretical point of view, as scope and design of projects seem to 
change very quickly after this milestone. From a practical perspective, it 
should also be noted that the cost at project approval is very crucial: it 
is upon this figure that funds are allocated, among competing 
opportunity costs. Therefore, even though there is good reason to 
justify using the cost estimates after project scope definition and 
contract award as the reference point for performance measurement, 
there could be a real risk to accountability if scope changes 
automatically led to resetting of the baselines. It is therefore crucial for 
the industry to find more effective ways of project approval and 
governance that better deals with underestimation of true cost and the 
setting of unrealistic cost targets. 
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Furthermore, focussing only on one side of the debate in dealing with 
overruns will do little to effectively tackle cost overruns in the 
management of construction projects. PsychoStrategic theorists neglect 
well documented prominent issues like design problems, unforeseen 
ground conditions, scope changes and rework that drive up cost during 
the actual project delivery. The unfortunate consequence of this 
perspective will be to brand planners, project promoters and 
estimators as unethical and suspicious without sufficient evidence to 
sustain the supposition. An evolutionary theorist perspective alone, on 
the other hand, would also rather naively not fully accommodate the 
strong influence and dynamics of business strategy, competition, power 
and organisation politics in setting unrealistic cost targets that will 
inevitably be unattainable.  
2.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented an overview of the scale of the problem of 
construction cost overruns as a global phenomenon that is indifferent 
to the size of the project under construction, the geographical location, 
duration or type of project.  Two predominant schools of thought on the 
causes of construction cost overrun have been presented, referred to in 
this thesis as the PhychoStrategic and Evolution Theorists. The tension 
between these schools was discussed before presenting a conceptual 
model that holds the two perspectives as different sides of the same 
coin. It is unlikely that the construction industry will be able to 
adequately deal with the problem of cost overruns if only one of these 
perspectives is focussed upon. The way forward is to find ways of 
construction procurement and project governance that effectively 
circumvents intentional underestimation and unjustifiable optimism at 
the project definition stage which only ends up setting unrealistic cost 
targets. This must however be carried out in tandem with 
considerations of the adequacy of detailed project design before 
construction and thorough quality assurance regimes during project 
delivery to curb the cost of rework and unwarranted scope creep. 
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CHAPTER THREE 








“Research is formalized curiosity.  
It is poking and prying with a purpose.” 
~ Zora Neale Hurston  
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3.0 INTRODUCTION 
No thesis that is concerned with the use of Artificial Neural Networks to 
model construction cost can be anything other than predominantly 
quantitative. So while the philosophical position of this research is post-
positivisit and the  approach  primarily quantitative as it concerns  
numbers and models, it is important to place the study in the context of 
all research methodology. Indeed it may be that not all the work is 
quantitative, some elements needing a more qualitative approach, with 
an interpretive analysis. Even in the straightforward positivist world of 
numerical researchers there are numerous approaches and modelling 
techniques that can be utilised. Once the approach is established, the 
experimental design must be set out and the nature of the data 
modelling technique, in this cases Artificial Neural Networks, must be 
described. 
This chapter will therefore present the considerations for adopting the 
research approach used as well as the experimental framework that 
will guide the modelling aspect of the research. The background, 
applications, strengths and weakness of artificial neural network will 
also evaluated in this chapter. 
3.1. RESEARCH APPROACH 
When choosing which approach to use, the critical considerations are 
the type of problem under study and how to maximise the chances of 
adequately answering the research question(s) of the study. There are 
essentially two traditional research approaches: quantitative and 
qualitative. According to Fellows and Liu (2008), “quantitative 
approaches tend to relate to positivism and seek to gather factual data, to 
study relationships between facts and how such facts and relationships 
accord with theories and the findings of any research executed previously 
(literature).” The quantitative approach thus adopts a scientific method 
where the study of theory and existing literature on the subject results 
in precise aims and objectives with propositions and hypotheses to be 
tested by examining the relationship between different variables. 
Page | 37 
 
Creswell (2009) prescribes three criteria for choosing a quantitative 
approach; if the problem calls for: 
a) the identification of factors that influence an outcome; or 
b) the measureable utility of an intervention; or 
c) understanding the best predictors of an outcome. 
The central tenets of the quantitative approach are measurement, 
causality, generalisation and replication, according to Bryman (2012). 
Measurement concerns the quantification of the degree of relationship 
between concepts or variables while causality refers to the connection 
between a set of variables (causes) and an observation or phenomenon 
(effect). Generalisation on the other hand deals with the extent to which 
the inferences and findings in a particular sample can be extended to 
other populations and settings while replication involves the ability to 
repeat a study using the same methods, different subjects and different 
experimenters. Replication is essential to lend credibility, or otherwise, 
to the results achieved in a study and to test the generalisability of the 
findings. This requires that the results of the initial research must be 
unaffected by the researchers special characteristics or expectations or 
biases.  
In qualitative study however, there are usually no a priori propositions, 
so that the objective of the study is to gain understanding that may lead 
to formulation of theories. The qualitative study seeks to find out what 
people's perception are of different issues, or what meanings people 
might ascribe to different social or human phenomena (Creswell 2009). 
It might involve ethnographic strategies where the researcher studies 
an intact cultural group in their natural setting over a prolonged period 
by collecting observational or interview data. Alternatively, for 
example, it could take the form of a discourse analysis, where the 
researcher studies and analyses written or vocal work in an attempt to 
extract meaning and understanding for theory building. Fellows and Liu 
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(2008) thus note that in some way, a good qualitative study often forms 
a prelude to quantitative methods.  
Somewhere between these two traditional classifications of research 
approach lies the mixed method. Creswell (2009) notes that the mixed 
method essentially combines elements of both the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in order to adequately address a particular 
problem, and observes it is more than just simply collecting and 
analysing both kinds of data. It is used so that the overall strength of a 
particular enquiry is greater than if only the quantitative or qualitative 
approach is employed.  
The research reported in this thesis largely adopts a quantitative 
approach with some elements of qualitative approach especially in the 
early stages of the research. A thorough exploration and critique of 
existing literature on construction cost overruns laid the basis on which 
to conduct a quasi experimental model development to estimate likely 
final cost of water infrastructure projects. The research framework 
adopted in this research has been mapped out in Figure 3. As seen in 
Chapter 1, the research began by defining the aim and objectives of the 
research before a thorough review and critique of existing literature 
and theories on the cost growth phenomenon. The literature review led 
to firming-up and clarifying the initial aim and objectives. An 
experimental approach was then designed to provide the framework 
for data collection, analyses and subsequent model validation. The 
results of the model development were then discussed before reaching 
conclusions and recommendations for achieving more reliable cost 
estimates at the tender stage of construction projects. 
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Figure 3: Research Approach adopted 
3.1.1. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Yin (2009) describes research design as the structure that guides the 
collection and subsequent analyses of data. It enables the researcher to 
connect empirical data and conclusions to the initial research question 
of the study in a logical sequence. The research reported in this thesis 
follows a quasi experimental approach with the collection of historical 
cost data on 1,600 water infrastructure projects followed by the 
development of cost models mainly using artificial neural networks.  
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3.1.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
After an initial exploration of the problem of cost overruns and clearly 
defining the aim and objectives of the research, a data mining approach 
was adopted for the actual cost modelling stage. Data mining allowed 
for the conversion of information embedded in historical cost data into 
decision support tools for final cost estimation at the tender stage of a 
project.  
StatSoft Inc. (2008) describe data mining as an analytic process for 
exploring large amounts of data in search of consistent patterns, 
correlations and/or systematic relationships between variables, and to 
then validate the findings by applying the detected patterns to new 
subsets of data. Data mining attempts to scour databases to discover 
hidden patterns and relationships in order to find predictive 
information for business improvement.  
As already identified in earlier chapters in this thesis, early cost 
estimation is often hampered by the paucity of reliable information of 
accurate estimation. Project approval also tends to precede the 
availability of detailed designs and contract award. Using data mining 
techniques, it is possible to use the information that is already available 
in a construction firm's database to build cost models to support the 
estimation process in the early stages of a project. Producing reliable 
estimates at this stage is crucial because project feasibility, approval, 
budget allocation and contract award usually occurs at this stage of the 
project.  
Figure 4 details the various stages followed in the experimental phase 
of this research to develop the final cost models. 
3.1.2.1. Data and Business Understanding 
It is always important to understand the application domain of the 
problem under study. If the data mining is being carried out within the 
context of a particular firm and its business structure, it is crucial to 
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understand the data within the framework of that firm. For example, 
one of the collaborating firms in this current research uses a stage case 
system called CAPEX. The CAPEX codes range from 1 to 6, 
corresponding to rough estimates and final account costs in more 
traditional terms.  
 
Figure 4: Experimental Design Procedure 
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3.1.2.2. Selection of Target Data 
After understanding the application domain and database for the 
research, the next stage usually involves the selection of target data 
from the main database. Some level of experience, intuition and 
expertise is usually required to guide the initial decision of variables 
that are likely to be influential in predicting final cost. As a rule of 
thumb though, it is important that any factor with even the slightest 
likelihood of explaining the variability in the data is included in the 
model at the start. Part of the modelling process will involve pruning 
these variables down to an optimum number.  
3.1.2.3. Data Pre-processing 
The target data is then pre-processed before the modelling proper. The 
aim of the pre-processing is to structure and present the data to the 
model in the most suitable way as well as to offer the modeller the 
chance to get to know the data more thoroughly. Pre-processing might 
involve simple steps such as removing of duplicate entries and missing 
data treatment to more advanced techniques like clustering, 
transformation and de-noising1. It might be important at this stage to 
evaluate basic statistics such as means, modes, cross-tabulations and 
standard deviations, or use plots such as histograms, bi-variate and 
scatter plots to provide an initial understanding of the nature of data 
that is being used for the modelling. The importance of the pre-
processing stage to the success of the final model cannot be 
overemphasised as it offers the modeller the opportunity to have a 




1 Noise is unexplained randomness or variations in data. Noise results in the loss of 
generalisation as data patterns are not constant or replicable (Statsoft, 2008). 
Construction cost data, for example, is particularly noisy as even the same building 
built at different locations might have appreciably different costs. 
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good understanding of the problem under investigation, explore the 
kind and type of data that is available for the modelling, and identify 
problems within the data such as missing data or outliers. 
3.1.2.4. Actual Data Modelling 
The next stage of the data mining approach involves the actual 
modelling for the discovery of patterns, clusters or relationships within 
the dataset. This is often an elaborate process, sometimes involving the 
use of competitive evaluation of different models and approaches and 
deciding on the best model by some sort of bagging system (voting or 
averaging) (StatSoft Inc. 2011a). Some of the available modelling 
techniques include case-based reasoning, principal component analysis, 
regression, neural networks, decision trees, genetic algorithm and fuzzy 
logic. Table 2 provides a guidance for some issues and options to 
consider when selecting a particular modelling technique. The main 
issues to consider are usually around the aim of the modelling exercise, 
the predictive performance required or the type of data available.  
Each modelling technique can also be evaluated in terms of its 
characteristics. For example, regarding 'interpretability', while 
regression models generate an equation whose physical properties can 
be easily interpreted in terms of the variables used, neural networks on 
the other hand, do not produce any equation. Neural networks have 
thus been derided as 'black-boxes' by some researchers – for instance 
by Sarle (1994) who is a statistician. However their ease of use, power 
and ability to model complex non-linear relationships between 
predictors make them particularly desirable for hard-to-learn problems 
and where a priori judgements about variable relationships cannot be 
justified (Adeli 2001).  
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Table 2: Some issues to consider when selecting a data modelling technique 































Ease of deployment 
Artificial Neural Network, discussed in more detail in the next section, 
was the main modelling technique used in this thesis. This was 
combined with fuzzy sets theory to develop Neuro-Fuzzy Hybrid 
models in further iterations of the model development. Data 
bootstrapping, sub-sampling and ensemble modelling were also 
experimented with in this research. Details of all these techniques with 
their accompanying results are provided in later sections of the thesis. 
3.1.2.5. Result Evaluation and Presentation 
After the actual data modelling stage, the results achieved are then 
evaluated and presented in a meaningful form to aid business decision-
making. This step might involve graphical representation or 
visualisation of the model for easy communication.  
3.1.2.6. Model Validation and Feedback 
Reliability and confidence in the use of the model can be improved if it 
can be shown that the model performs satisfactorily when new queries 
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or situations are presented to it. This can be achieved through testing 
and validation of the models using unseen1 data before deployment in 
real life situations. For continuous improvement purposes, model 
performance is usually fed back to the database so that incremental 
learning can be achieved in the model.  
3.2. ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS  
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) is a simplistic abstraction of the 
biological neural networks of the brain with the capability for 
information processing. The cost prediction models developed in this 
thesis are based on neural network techniques. This section of the 
thesis provides a brief overview of ANN, its application in civil 
engineering and construction management, as well as some advantages 
and limitations.  
3.2.1. Brief Background  
The development of neural networks was motivated by the desire to 
both understand and emulate how the brain functions. Often just 
referred to as Neural Networks (NN), with artificial implied, NN 
importantly retains two important features of the biological neural 
network, i.e. the ability to learn from experience (Hinton 1992) and 
make generalisations based on this acquired knowledge (Haykin 1994). 
McCulloch and Pitts (1943) are generally credited for outlining the first 
formal model of a basic computing neuron after which Hebb (1949) 
identified how information can be stored in a NN. Hebb also proposed 
how the neuron’s connection weights can be updated through different 
learning schemes. Rosenblatt (1958) thereafter developed the 




1 Unseen data is data that has not been used in the model development and therefore 
can be used as independent assessment of the models predictive performance. 
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perceptron, a hypothetical nervous system that is capable of learning so 
as to be able to store, recognise and influence behaviour or decisions.  
3.2.2. Neural Network Structure 
Figure 5 shows a basic neural network structure with 1 input layer with 
3 units, a hidden layer and an output layer with 2 units. The input layers 
accept data presented to the network and assigns weights (w1, w2, w3) 
according to the relative importance of the information. In the case of 
cost data, weights are apportioned according to the sensitivity of each 
factor to the overall cost estimate. Neural network’s computations 
happen within the hidden layer, which also becomes the permanent 
memory of the model after training for predicting new cases. The 
predictive performance of the neural network can be increased by 
increasing the number of hidden layers or nodes in the hidden layer, 
although this must be kept as low as possible to ensure the network 
does not just memorise the data instead of learning the underlying 
patterns and correlations within it. Memorising in model development 
is called overfitting (Haykin 1994). An overfitted model generally tends 
to perform very well during training, but performance drastically 
deteriorates when new data is presented to the network to validate it.  
The output layer receives and stores or transfer processed data from 
the network (Fausett 1994). The output of the neural network is a 
function of the weighted sum of all neurons in the network, a 
completely deterministic result. 
 
Figure 5: Basic neural network architecture. 
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3.2.3. Training 
Similar to the brain, NN learn by examples. Learning in NN terminology 
has been defined by Haykin (1994) as “a process by which the free 
parameters of a neural network are adapted through a continuing 
process of stimulating by the environment in which the network is 
embedded.” Training the neural network is thus a process of iteratively 
adjusting the network weights and threshold until it is able to learn, i.e. 
approximate the underlying functional relationship between inputs and 
target(s). The learning period of a NN is bounded by rules that govern 
how weights adapt in response to a learning example, how many times 
the learning process is carried out, etc.  
A training dataset, consisting of input-target pairs are presented one 
after another to the network during training for learning. It might be 
easier to view training as a question and answer session, with inputs as 
‘questions’ and targets as ‘answers’. During learning, the network is 
effectively being asked questions (inputs). Given the current question, 
the network error is measured by comparing the answer produced by 
the network (output) with the actual expected answer (target). Should 
the performance not be satisfactory, the network weights are adjusted 
to produce a more correct answer on another attempt, a process called 
back-propagation in NN terminology (Fausett 1994). 
The type of learning paradigm adopted is determined by the manner in 
which the network weights and threshold changes take place during 
training. There are essentially two main training techniques for 
learning in neural networks, i.e. supervised and unsupervised. In a 
supervised learning technique, the NN is supplied with both inputs and 
desired response (target). As illustrated in Figure 6, the output of the 
network is measured against the desired response (target) using a 
predefined performance criterion, e.g. Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE), and the connecting weights are modified to minimise the 
model error, ∑. Learning is completed when an optimal solution has 
been found and ∑ is no longer modified significantly, or when a 
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previously specified number of iterations have been run. This is the 
learning paradigm used in this research.  
 
Figure 6: Supervised Learning Process 
Anderson (1995) notes that no desired output (target) is given to the 
network in the unsupervised training regime. Instead, the network has 
to make sense of the data by itself without external assistance. The 
neural network adjusts its own weights so that similar inputs cause 
similar outputs. The Self-Organising Maps (SOM) for clustering and 
pattern recognition are some of the main application for this type of 
training (Haykin 1994). 
Neural networks do exact their own demands however. Bode (2000), 
warned that NN would only be able to produce superior results in 
comparison with other methods of cost estimation if there is sufficient 
and reliable data available for both the training and validation of the 
network. Anderson and McNeill (1992) note that NN are desperately 
dependent on plenteous, representative and reliable data to be able to 
make accurate predictions and generalisations. Furthermore, there is 
no consensus within the literature on what represents a satisfactory 
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3.2.4. Application of Neural Networks 
Neural network lends itself to application in different problem domains 
largely because of its power and ease of use (StatSoft Inc 2008). It has 
been applied to a wide breadth of problems that involve pattern 
association, classification, recognition, clustering, reasoning with 
imprecise and incomplete data, forecasting and control. In Finance, it 
has been widely used for loan applicant assessment (Handzic et al. 
2003), foreign exchange prediction (Wang et al. 2010), stock price 
prediction (Cao et al. 2011) among others. It has also been used for 
medical diagnosis research (Kodogiannis et al. 2008, Dreiseitl et al. 
2009) as well as for speech and character recognition (Dahl et al. 2010, 
Pradeep et al. 2011). 
The earliest civil engineering application of neural networks can be 
traced back to Adeli and Yeh (1989) on engineering design and machine 
learning. It has since been applied in civil engineering to estimate the 
elastic modulus of normal and high strength concrete (Demir 2008); 
estimating the compressive strength of concrete (Topcu and Saridemir 
2008, Saridemir 2009); forecasting the cost of rail transit and metro 
track works (Gunduz et al. 2011) and passenger flow forecast (Zandieh 
et al. 2009, Wei and Chen 2012). See Adeli (2001) for a detailed review 
of neural network applications in civil engineering research.  
3.2.4.1. Neural Networks in Construction Management 
In the field of construction management, Portas and AbouRizk (1997), 
as well as Sonmez and Rowings (1998) conducted experimental studies 
to estimate construction productivity using neural networks. Portas 
and AbouRizk estimate labour productivity using input factors collected 
from the literature, primary data from formwork activities, in addition 
to factors from a survey involving superintendents and project 
managers. They compared their model results to those used by the 
participating firm and reported improved quality of the estimates 
attained. Sonmez and Rowings (1998) developed neural network 
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models for quantitative evaluation of labour productivity for concrete 
pouring, formwork, and concrete finishing tasks, using data compiled 
from eight building projects. Among others, they used factors such as 
gang size, temperature, humidity and precipitation at the time of the 
work activity to develop their models. They compared the neural 
network models to regression models and found that the neural 
network models were superior to the regression models in all except 
the formwork task. 
In a similar research to that reported in this thesis, Bousabaine and 
Elhag (1997) explored the use a hybrid of neural networks and fuzzy 
logic to predict the duration and cost of construction projects. They 
attempted to exploit the ability of neural networks to generalise 
solutions from past events and combine that with fuzzy logic’s ability to 
deal with impression and uncertainty of future events. They used a 
rather small dataset of only 12 projects from the BCIS database for the 
training regime and tested the model with 7 unseen cases. Although 
they demonstrated a robust approach to modelling project duration and 
cost, their models did not achieve satisfactory results, possibly due to 
the small dataset used in training the model. 
 Al-Tabtabai and Alex (1999) present a neural network approach to 
estimating the preliminary cost of highway projects using 9 project 
factors including type of road, soil nature, location and hauling distance. 
They first used case-based reasoning to collect relevant project factors 
on 40 different projects before modelling these factors using NN. They 
reported a mean square error of 9% when the models were validated 
with new data. In a similar research, Wilmot and Mei (2005) present a 
neural network approach that estimates the escalation of highway 
construction costs over time. The model relates overall highway 
construction costs to the cost of construction material, labour and 
equipment as well as the characteristics of the contract and the 
contracting environment prevailing at the time the contract was let. 
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They report that their model was able to replicate past highway 
construction cost trends with “reasonable accuracy.” 
Emsley et al (2002) developed neural network models to estimate the 
tender cost of building projects using about 288 project cases in the UK. 
They collected primary data from project files, supplementing this with 
details from the Building Cost Information Service (BCIS) and responses 
from a questionnaire survey. Their models include such project factors 
as number of floors below/above ground, type of stairs, gross internal 
floor area, project duration and number of lifts within the building. 
They report that their NN models were able to model the non-linear 
relationships within their data with a mean absolutely percentage error 
of 16.6%. 
It is generally accepted that the success of the early stage planning of a 
construction project plays a crucial role in determining the success, or 
otherwise, of a project during its delivery. Wang et al (2012) developed 
neural network and Support Vector Machine (SVM) classification 
models to predict project cost and schedule success, using status of 
early planning as the model inputs. They adopted a simplistic measure 
of success of projects that report a lower actual final cost than was 
awarded. The same measure is used in terms of project durations. They 
collected early planning and project performance information from 92 
building projects in Taiwan using questionnaire survey. Their NN 
models produced 76% and 68% accuracy for cost and duration 
prediction respectively. The SVM models achieved 76% and 72% 
accuracy at classifying successful projects.  
“My Cost runneth over: Data mining to reduce construction cost overruns” 
is one of the publications from this current research which also uses 
artificial neural networks to estimating the likely final cost of 
construction projects (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2013).  The modelling 
is based on information from almost 1,600 water infrastructure 
projects completed between 2004 and 2012 within the UK. The models 
were then developed using a combination of data mining techniques 
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such as factor analysis, optimal binning, and scree tests with neural 
networks. The best model achieved an average absolute percentage 
error of 3.67% with 87% of the validation predictions falling within an 
error range of ±5%. 
3.2.5. Neural Network Criticism 
One major criticism of the NN approach to data modelling is that it 
offers little explanation on the complex relationships between the 
variables it is modelling (Ripley 1993, Sarle 1994). As previously 
mentioned, it is thus often derided as a ‘black box’ technique because 
the network parameters (i.e. transfer functions, learning rules, network 
architecture, weights, etc.) do not show casual explanations, making it 
difficult to elucidate what is learnt from the neural network model. In 
regression analysis, for example, an equation whose physical properties 
that can be easily interpreted is produced. There is no such equation or 
coefficients in neural networks - the model in essence is the equation.  
In an attempt to illuminate the ‘black box’, Olden and Jackson (2002) 
demonstrated the possibility of understanding variable contributions 
by using a randomisation test called connection weight method, a 
process somewhat similar to statistical pruning techniques to 
eliminating connection weights that do not contribute significantly to 
the network output. In a breast cancer related research, Ravdin and 
Clark (1992) excluded one variable at a time from their model to find 
out that particular input’s contribution to the final model. Another 
approach to reducing the vagueness of the prediction process of neural 
networks is to combine it with qualitative causal descriptors of fuzzy-
logic theory to create neuro-fuzzy hybrid systems. This was the 
approach adopted in the by Ahiaga-Dagbui et al (2013) for predicting 
the final cost of water infrastructure projects. Neuro-fuzzy hydrid 
models were also by Boussabaine and Elhag (1997) for tender price 
forecasting. Overall, as there are several modelling techniques, all with 
different capabilities and weaknesses, it could be argued that neural 
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networks should be selected for modelling when the goal is ‘how well?’ 
a model performs and not just ‘how?’ it actually reaches those results.  
Another neural network criticism is the unique models, best models, 
good models argument (StatSoft Inc 2008). Models that are generated 
may not necessarily be the best models that could be found, nor is it 
necessarily true that there is a single best model. After training, several 
models with similar performance quality may result. Each model can be 
regarded, in this case, as a unique solution. It is not unusual that even 
models with the same number of hidden units, activation function, etc., 
may actually have different performance when validated. This is due to 
the nature of neural networks as highly non-linear models capable of 
producing multiple solutions for the same problem. Even though this 
may not necessarily be a problem, it always leaves the modeller 
wondering if the model could get any better, even if very good 
generalisation is being achieved with the present model. 
3.2.6. Why Neural Networks for this research? 
Neural networks was chosen for this modelling based on the following 
key considerations: 
 high number and type of variables 
There were at least 20 variables to model during the prototyping 
stage of this research. Most of these variables had at least 3 
options to choose from. Site access, for example, had options of 
unrestricted, restricted and highly restricted whiles tendering 
method had options of selective competitive, open competitive, 
negotiated and serial tendering. Furthermore, there was a wide 
mix of types of variables and their scales of measurement. In 
particular, most of the variables were categorical, instead of the 
more usual continuous type. Anderson (1995) suggests that 
neural networks cope better with categorical variables, the curse 
of dimensionality and multicollinearity, statistical conditions 
where two or more variables are highly correlated or dependent 
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on each thereby resulting in spurious predictions when both of 
those variables are included in the model (Hair et al. 1998). 
 non-linear relationships 
Neural networks is a sophisticated modelling technique that is 
capable of modelling extremely complex functions. Linear 
modelling, typically regression, has been the commonly used 
technique in most modelling domains since linear models have 
well-known optimization strategies. These linear functions 
usually take the form of y= mx + c and illustrated in Figure 7. 
However, where the linear approximation is not valid (which is 
frequently the case) the models suffer accordingly. Instead of 
trying to model all data to a “best-fit” line in regression 
equations, neural networks attempts to model the non-linear 
relationship between the variables, in a manner shown in the 
illustration in Figure 8 . As will be demonstrated in the data 
exploration stage in the next chapter, non-linear relationships 
were identified between most of the variables and final cost of 
the project. 
 
Figure 7: Linear Relationship 
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Figure 8: Non-linear relationship modelling 
 
 relationships between variables are vaguely understood or 
difficult to describe by conventional approaches 
It may be straightforward to guess the likely relationship 
between type of cost and risk level on a project for example. 
Normally, low risk begets lower cost. However, it is more 
difficult to estimate the final cost of a project should the size of 
the project, duration, type of contractor, ground condition, 
operating region or purpose of project be added to the list of 
variables. Combine this with the cost of risk and inflation and the 
possible variable relationships get murkier. Unlike regression 
for example, Elhag and Boussabaine (1998) observe that neural 
networks do not require any prerequisite establishment of rules 
about how variables combine or the relationships between them. 
They essentially seek underlying relationships between 
variables and are particularly suited for complex, hard-to-learn 
problems where no formal underlying theories or classical 
mathematical and traditional procedures exist (Adeli 2001).  
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3.3. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided details of the research approach adopted in 
this thesis. A rationale for this approach has been detailed, along with a 
framework to guide the experimental exercise in this research. An 
overview of artificial neural networks, with some applications in 
construction management research has also been provided. Some of the 
strengths and potential weakness of ANN has also been discussed.  
In the next chapter, the experimental design framework described in 
this chapter will be applied to construction cost estimation using a 
database of about 1,600 water infrastructure projects completed in 
Scotland. Neural networks will be used as the main modelling 
technique, combining it with data bootstrapping, ensemble modelling 
and fuzzy set theory. All this is carried out as an attempt to extract 
information embedded in historical project data to build cost 
estimation models that can help circumvent the problem of lack of 
information at the early stages of a construction project for accurate 
estimation.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 






“We need to think harder and smarter.  
What we really need is holistic analysis, not holistic data. 
We need to make better use of what we have.  
We need to dig deeper...” 





“...We need to dig deeper” aptly sums up the purpose of this chapter. 
Quite simply, it is making data work for an organisation by exploring 
available data in search of consistent patterns, correlations or 
systematic relationships between variables in a process called data 
mining. The discovered information is then used to improve business 
performance.  
As already identified in earlier chapters, early cost estimation is often 
hampered by the unavailability of reliable information for estimation. 
In the absence of the detailed design and project information, 
construction clients still require reliable estimates upon which they can 
base their feasibility studies, budget allocation, tender evaluation, 
eventual contract award and project control. 
This chapter is structured to first introduce the concept of cost 
modelling and the modelling philosophy adopted in this research.  A  
description of the data to be used for the modelling, as well as the  the 
data processing techniques used for training and validating the 
developed cost models are then presented. The aim in this chapter is to 
extract information embedded in historical project data to build cost 
estimation models that can help circumvent the problem of lack of 
information for reliable early cost estimation. 
4.1. COST MODELLING 
Seeley (1999) describes cost modelling as a procedure developed to 
reflect, by means of derived processes, a procedure developed to reflect, 
by means of derived processes, adequately acceptable output for an 
established series of input adequately acceptable output for an 
established series of input data”. Similarly, Ferry et al. (1997) define 
cost modelling as a symbolic representation a system, expressing the 
content of  that  system in terms of the factors which influence its costs 
system in terms of the factors which influence its costs. For the 
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purposes of analysis and forecasting, Raftery (1998) adds that the 
symbolic representation must be “manipulable”. 
The models may be in the form of mathematical equations (e.g. 
Regression models) or a set of defined steps to estimate the cost of a 
particular item (e.g. Storey enclosure method). The developed models 
have several potential applications in industry and construction 
management. Some models can easily be converted to a desktop 
package that construction professionals could use in rapid prediction of 
final cost of projects using only factors that are readily available or 
measurable at planning stage of the project. It is also very useful at the 
design stage of a project when information is incomplete and detailed 
designs are not available. The use of the model could also greatly 
reduce the time and resources spent on estimation as well as provide a 
benchmark to compare detailed estimates. It will further allow the 
generation of various alternative solutions for a construction project 
using ‘what if’ analysis for the purposes of comparison.  
Skitmore’s (1986) early research broadly classified cost models into 
high and low level models. Low level models either based their 
estimates on the elements of a completed building (i.e. functional 
unit/storey enclosure methods) or a work-in-place model such as Bills 
of Quantities.  The high level models include statistical methods such 
multiple as regression functions that are based on a number of 
priceable variables that contribute to final cost of the built asset. 
 
Ashworth (1999) classified the development of cost models over that 
time: 
 1960-1970: traditional or single point deterministic models 
such superficial (costs per m2), elemental analysis and 
approximate quantities. 
 1970-1980: mathematical models such as expert judgement, 
parametric modelling and process models. 
 1980-1990: value related models such as life-cycle models, 
Monte-Carlo simulation and  risk analysis. 
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 1990-2000: integrated knowledge-based models such as in-
house expert systems.  
Fortune and Cox (2005) however, classified cost models into four, 
namely:  
1. Traditional Methods 
These models are based on comparable cost of projects in the past 
based on either similarities or differences in their function or geometric 
and spatial arrangements. It also includes the traditional bottom-up 
estimating methods which are usually based on some of standard form 
of measurement. Examples include:  
a. Functional unit method 
b. Superficial method 
c. Bill of quantities. 
These methods are perhaps the most popular in the construction 
industry, probably because they are usually straight-forward, well 
established and familiarity.  For a long period, bills of quantities based 
on the Standard Rules of Measurement, published by the Royal Institute 
of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) remained the most popular method of 
estimation. First published in the 1922, it is now in its Seventh Edition 
(SMM7) and provides detailed information, classification tables, and 
most importantly, a uniform basis of quantifying building works in an 
attempt to facilitate consistency and best practice in the construction 
industry. Its civil engineering counterpart is the Civil Engineering 
Standard Method of Measurement (CESMM), published by the 
Institution of Civil Engineers.  
The SMM7 was recently superseded by the New Rules of Measurement 
(NRM2) in January 2013, which perhaps better reflects how the 
construction industry works now. It allows for better consideration for 
costs centers such as cost of acquiring land, planning costs, contingency, 
cost of finance, fees, marketing costs and risk.  
The Building Cost Information Service (BCIS) has recently proposed the 
of a functional approach to costing of civil engineering works called 
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Standard Form of Civil Engineering Cost Analysis (BCIS 2012). The aim 
of this approach is to support cost estimation based on equivalent 
functions in other projects, such that, information from existing projects 
can inform the budgeting and benchmarking of current and future 
projects. It is the analysis of the cost of a project in terms of its 
functions. The Standard is organised into Elements of a project , defined 
as a major physical part of an entity that fulfils a specific function 
irrespective of its design, specification or construction. Some specific 
elements include pavements, retaining structures, pipelines and ducts.  
2. Mathematical Models 
Examples of the mathematical traditional methods include: 
a. Statistical modelling (e.g. Regression analysis), 
b. Life-cycle costing models 
c. Parametric models 
Regression models are perhaps the most popular in the literature 
(Williams 2003, Lowe et al. 2006). This modelling technique establishes 
a general relationship between dependant and independent variables. A 
linear model, line of best fit, is produced which either expresses the 
exact functional relationship between predictor and dependant 
variables or an acceptable approximation of a more complex 
relationship. 
Lowe et al. (2006) developed linear regression models to predict the 
construction cost of buildings, based on 286 data cases collected in the 
United Kingdom. The performed both forward and backward stepwise 
analyses, producing a total of six models. Forty-one initial independent 
variables were used with five significant influencing variables in each of 
the 6 models. These factors are gross internal floor area (GIFA), 
function, duration, mechanical installations and piling. They reported 
the best model performance of 19.3% Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE) with R2 of 0.661.  
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3. Knowledge-based models 
Knowledge-based models include 
a. Expert systems 
b. Case-based reasoning 
c. Price 
Expert systems use domain specific knowledge and heuristics to 
simulate the reasoning of an expert in that field in order to perform an 
intelligent task (Adeli 2003). Skitmore (1986) is probably one of the 
earliest to introduce the use of expect systems in construction 
management research. The paper examines who construction experts 
produce their cost forecasts for new projects and further developed an 
expertise scale to identify common methodologies and practices 
amongst experts. The research interestingly suggested that the 
reliability of the estimators ‘first guess’ of likely cost based on project 
size and type could be the most distinguishing quality between different 
levels of experts.  
In the case-based reasoning (CBR) approach, a knowledge-base 
containing past cases is created from which a case similar to a proposed 
project is retrieved and revised in order to estimate the cost of that 
proposed project [see Figure 9 ].  
 
Figure 9: Case-based reasoning approach (Aamodt and Plaza (1994) 
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Marzouk and Ahmed (2011) developed CBR models to estimate the cost 
of pump station works, based on 14 cost-influencing factors from 44 
completed projects. Some of the factors used in the their model include 
the size and length of pipes, the distance between pump station and 
water source, number of pumps, capacity of the pumping station and 
population size to be served by the pump station.  
 
4. New-wave models: 
These models are based on developments in the field of artificial 
intelligence and include neural networks, genetic algorithm and fuzzy 
logic. They also include new modelling paradigms that encompass 
sustainability themes and Computer-Aided Design (CAD). Fuzzy logic 
models attempt to address the imprecision and uncertainty in decision 
making and the boundaries of different classes or rankings used in 
costing. First developed by Zadeh (1965), variables in fuzzy logic have 
set of values, which are characterised by linguistic expression, such as 
very high £/m2, average £/m2, low £/m2 etc. These linguistic 
expressions are represented numerically by fuzzy sets, more 
appropriately termed membership functions.  
Genetic algorithms (GA) are general algorithms based on an 
evolutionary mechanism, where natural evolution and survival-of-the-
fittest are simulated to perform a random search for the optimal 
solution to a problem. Kim et al (2004) combined GAs optimisation 
qualities with the learning abilities of neural networks to develop cost 
estimation models. GA was adopted in their research to determine the 
optimal parameters for the back-propagation neural network 
architectures based on 530 residential building projects completed in 
Korea between 1997 and 2000. They report improved efficiency and 
accuracy in the final models when GA was incorporated into the neural 
network learning process.  
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In a similar research, Kim et al (2004) also compared the performance 
of multiple regression, neural networks and case-based reasoning 
models for construction cost estimating based on the results of 530 
completed projects. They found that although neural networks 
generally out-performed the other modelling approaches,  the case-
based reasoning models were preferable for long-term use, quantity of 
data requirement as well as time versus accuracy trade-of. 
Artificial neural network has been adopted in this thesis for the cost 
model development. As seen in Figure 10, this is a new wave type of 
cost model. Further details of artificial neural networks, along with the 
rationale for using this approach is provided in Section 3.2.]  
 
 
4.2. MODELLING PHILOSOPHY  
Models are reductions of reality. They represent the critical aspects of a 
complex system in simple forms using variables within those systems. 
They might take mathematical forms like statistical models and 
differential equations or be in the form of neural network models and 
regression trees.  
The use of models for construction cost estimating is appealing for a 
number of reasons including potential savings in time, resources and 
effort. For example, consider using only four different parameters that 
might influence the final cost of a project, each with three alternative 
values. Varying one parameter at a time in a what-if analysis could 
generate up to 81 different project solutions or alternatives (i.e. 34). 
This can be done rather rapidly using a computer-based model but will 
Figure 10: Classification of Cost Models 
Traditional Non-Traditional New-wave 
Neural Network 
Models 
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undoubted be a laborious task using traditional cost estimation. The 
time, effort and resource level required for this task would mostly be 
unjustifiable at the planning stages of a project, perhaps a strong 
suggestion that detailed cost estimates at strategic level are often far 
from optimal solutions because of time and resource constrains.  
The modelling in this research is carried out as structured in Figure 11. 
The concept and approach of using artificial neural networks for 
construction cost modelling is initially piloted using a small dataset 
collected from a civil engineering company in the UK (Dataset 1). 
Having achieved successful results with this dataset, the lessons, 
experience and approach used were then expanded to a larger database 
of 1,600 project cases with a major client organisation in Scotland 
(Dataset 2).  
During the actual modelling using each of the datasets, three sub-
samples of each dataset was created for training, testing and validation 
of the developed models. Further details of the data splits will be 
provided later in the thesis. 
Three different modelling strategies, vis, standard neural networks, 
data boostrapping and ensemble modelling were experimented. Each 
new strategy was designed in an attempt to deal with the possible 
weaknesses of the previous. Judgement was then made on each 
strategy’s predictive performance, the complexity of the model, the 
effort and data requirements for each strategy and the ease of 
deployment of that strategy in practice. The overall aim of the 
modelling is to help “dig deeper, and smarter” into existing construction 
data to produce cost models that could aid the estimation process in 
early stages of the project. 
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Figure 11: Model training procedure 
4.3. THE DATA 
The data used in this research was collected from two sources:  
Dataset 1: 98 project cases, with a total value of about £99 million, 
completed in Scotland between 2007 and 2011 by 
Morrison Construction, a UK Civil Engineering contractor; 
Dataset 2: Approximately 1,600 projects from a major public utility 
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4.3.1. Dataset 1 
Dataset 1 was used to develop trial models to experiment with using 
neural networks for cost modelling. This allowed for several trials with 
different neural network architectures, algorithms, transfer functions 
and data transformation.  
The data collection process with Morrison involved an initial 
shadowing of the tendering and estimation procedure as a quasi 
member of the tendering team. This provided the opportunity to gain a 
first-hand understanding of how the data to be used for the modelling 
was generated and what different variables meant. It was followed by 
completing the datasheet in Appendix B for each project with details on 
the estimated and final costs, compensation events and duration, as 
well as qualitative information such as tendering method, location, type 
of project, fluctuation measure and type of deadline.  
The nature of these projects were rather varied, ranging from 
construction of water mains, water treatment plants, combined sewer 
overflows, installation of manholes or water pumps and upgrades and 
repairs to sewers. All the projects were target cost contracts with 
values between £1,000-£14 million and durations from 1-22 months. 
Full details of the analysis and results from this dataset has been 
reported in the paper “Neural networks for modelling the final target 
cost of water projects” (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2012) and attached as 
Appendix A5. An overview is provided below to give an indication of 
some of the analysis  carried out and the lessons to carry forward to the 
main analysis with dataset two. 
First, after normalising the cost values across different years using cost 
indices for infrastructure resources from the Building Cost Information 
Services (http://www.rics.org/uk/knowledge/bcis), separate cost 
models were developed for the untransformed normalised target cost 
and the common log of target costs. However, the results from using the 
untransformed normalised target cost were mostly inconsistent and 
unreliable. This was possibly due to the wide range in the cost values 
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that the models had to learn, from £1,000 to £14million. It was found 
that neural networks generally require that numerical inputs be 
transformed into a small range of variability before training the models. 
If one input has a range of 0 to 1, while another has a range of 1,000 to 
14,000,000, the model will expend most of its effort learning the second 
input to the possible exclusion of the first. Log transformations were 
therefore used in further iterations for the model development as this 
reduces the range of the cost and duration input.  
The common log models showed significant improvement in the error 
values but slightly deteriorated in correlation. It was hypothesised at 
this stage that even though the log transformations reduced the cost 
inputs to a smaller range, making them more sensitive to the training 
algorithms of neural networks, they possibly imposed a logarithmic 
scale on the data, which might not actually be true of the real data. 
Standard values (zScores), explained later, were to be used to overcome 
this problem in dataset 2. 
Furthermore, two different network architectures, the Multilayer 
Perceptron (MLP) and the Radial Basis Function (RBF), were 
experimented at this stage. RBF models the relationship between inputs 
and targets in 2 phases: it first performs a probability distribution of 
the inputs before searching for relationships between the input and 
output space in the next stage (StatSoft Inc. 2011b). MLPs on the other 
hand model using just the second stage of the RBF. They usually thus 
complete their learning a lot quicker and tend to be used for most 
regression type problems. RBFs are usually applied to classification 
problems. The MLP models were superior to the RBF networks for the 
analysis in dataset 1 and so the rest of the modelling was carried out 
using just MLPs.  
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Additionally, the effect of using weight decay regularisation in the 
hidden1 and output layers of the neural networks was also investigated. 
This was an attempt to encourage the network to develop smaller 
weights to reduce the problem of over-fitting2, thereby potentially 
improving generalization performance of the network. Weight decay 
modifies the network's error function to penalise large weights. The 
result thereof is an error function that compromises between 
performance and weight size (StatSoft Inc. 2011a). The models showed 
improvement in both the error and correlation coefficient for the 
validation samples. This was to be carried out on the main modelling as 
well.  
The final stage of the modelling with dataset 1 involved a test for 
parsimony, termed here ‘survival of the fittest’ test. Ockham’s Razor 
principle, attributed to 14th century logician, William of Ockham, posits 
that one should not increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of 
entities required to explain anything and that all things being equal, 
preference should always be given to the simplest hypothesis (Chase et 
al. 1996). This principle of simplicity is used to prune down the number 
of variables required in the model to predict the final cost, thus 
reducing possible inconsistencies, ambiguities and potential 
redundancies in the model.  
To implement this strategy, a relative importance list of the variables 
used in the modelling was developed to indicate each factor’s 
contribution to predicting final cost of the project (see Table 3). Then, 
model performance was measured, while deleting one variable at a 
time, starting from the least important until the model showed no 




1   Explained later in the actual model development section of this chapter. 
2 Over-fitted models tend to just memorise the data without actually learning the 
underlying patterns and correlations. They perform very well during training but fail 
to generalise satisfactory when new data is used to validate them.  
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improvement or begun to decay. The final model’s prediction did 
significantly improve after the bottom three factors were removed from 
the input space. The similar analysis was later carried out on the larger 
dataset as well. 
Table 3: Relative Importance of Variables in Dataset 1 
       Factor Weighting Ranking 
logTC 5.91 1 
Project Frequency 2.55 2 
Tendering Strategy 2.52 3 
Need for Project 2.00 4 
Ground Condition 1.45 5 
Project Type 1.38 6 
Duration 1.20 7 
Location 1.16 8 
Soil Type 1.05 9 
Site Access 1.00 10 
 
Figure 12 shows the performance of the final model from dataset 1, 
validated over 9 project cases. The error range of the model was 
between -2% (underestimation) to 7.9% (overestimation) with an 
average error of -1.8% underestimation. This compares favourably with 
the -10% to +15% estimation error commonly found and accepted in 
practice (Potts 2008). This result demonstrates the potential of using 
neural network and data mining to increase the reliability of early cost 
estimates using historical cost data. 
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Figure 12: Performance of the final model from Dataset 1 
Although not extended to dataset 2 because of time constraints, a 
neuro-fuzzy modelling approach was experimented with dataset 1 as 
well. This approach allows the learning and generalisation capabilities 
of neural networks to be combined with the capacity for tolerance and 
imprecise knowledge representation of fuzzy set theory. It has the 
possibility of increasing the reliability and flexibility of the models. A 
three-point fuzzy lower, upper and mean estimate of likely final cost 
was generated to provide a tolerance range for final cost rather than the 
traditional single point estimate. The performance of the final models 
ranged from -3.3% underestimation to +1.6 % overestimation. The 
conference papers “A neuro-fuzzy hybrid model for predicting final cost 
of water infrastructure projects” and “Mapping Relational Efficiency in 
Neuro-Fuzzy Hybrid Cost Models” [Appendix A6 and A7] were published 



































4.3.2. Dataset 2 
The lessons learnt from developing the trial models using Dataset 1 
were then extended to the larger database collected from the utility 
company. This company oversees the construction, operation and 
maintenance of water infrastructure in Scotland. Their asset base 
includes over 47,000km of water pipes, 50,000km of sewer pipes, 1,837 
waste water treatment works and 297 water treatment works plus 
pumping stations, sludge treatment centres, and reservoirs.  
The company has an in-house costing team that is directly in-charge of 
producing estimates and letting projects out for tender. It develops a 
series of Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) estimates at various stages 
before and after contract award. CAPEX1 estimate is usually just a 
rough estimate based on previous similar works. It is usually not based 
on any design drawings. CAPEX3, however, is based on about 50-60% of 
scope design and is used as benchmark for evaluating tenders after 
which detailed design is carried out by the selected contractor in, most 
commonly, a variant of a design-and-build contract framework. To 
ensure that they are getting value-for-money and awarding contracts at 
the most economically advantageous prices, as well as estimate their 
likely final financial commitment, Dataset 2 was supplied by the 
collaborating firm in this research for the development of cost models.  
4.3.2.1. Project Cost and Duration 
As shown in Table 4, Dataset 2 contained nearly 1,600 project cases 
with a total value of over £800 million. These projects were completed 
fairly recently between 2009 and 2012. The project costs range from a 
mere £1,000 on typical replacement projects to £30 million on large 
water treatment plants.  
About 99% of the total number of project cases cost less than £25 
million with only 3 projects costing more than this figure. On a cursory 
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level, this might suggest that the models developed from the database 
will be more sensitive to projects costing up to about £25 million.  
Furthermore, 80% of the projects were completed within 3 years, with 
only 64 projects completed after 5 years. The average duration of the 
projects was about 24 months.  
Table 4: Frequency Table of Final Cost of Projects 
Project Final  
Cost  
(in millions, £) 
Count Cumulative  
Count 
Cumulative %  
0<x<=5m 1,535 1,535 97.77 
5m<x<=10m 24 1,559 99.30 
10 <x<=15m 7 1,566 99.75 
15m <x<=20m 1 1,567 99.80 
20m <x<=25m 1 1,568 99.87 
25m <x<=30 2 1,570 100.00 
 
Table 5: Frequency Table of Duration of Projects 
Duration  
(Months) 
Count Cumulative  
Count 
Percent % 
0<x<=20 557 557 35.48 
20<x<=40 700 1,257 80.06 
40<x<=60 249 1,506 95.92 
60<x<=80 46 1,552 98.85 
80<x<=100 18 1,570 100.00 
 
A plot of project duration and final outturn cost in Figure 13 does not 
show a  linear relationship between the two factors. This is perhaps an 
indication that linear modelling techniques like multiple linear 
regression might not be appropriate modelling this data. 
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Figure 13: Scatter plot of final cost versus project duration 
 
Unlike Dataset 1 that had details up to project level of each individual 
case, Dataset 2 contained only strategic and management level details. 
These variables are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Input factors for modelling exercise 
 Input Factor Input Options 
1  Primary Purpose Wastewater Water General - 
2 Project Scope Upgrade Replace Refurbishment New-
build 
3 Delivery Partner X Y Z - 
4 Operating Region North South East West 
5   Project Duration 
(months) 
 
6  Estimated Cost  (CAPEX 
3), £ 
 
4.3.2.2. Purpose of the project 
The projects can be categorised into wastewater, water and general 
purposes. Wastewater projects refer to projects that concern the 
construction or maintenance of pipework systems and other physical 
infrastructure required for the transport or treatment of waste effluent 
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from homes and industries through combined or sanitary sewer. These 
represent 44% of the total number of projects in Dataset 2 and might 
take the form of combined sewer overflows, wastewater treatment 
plants or installation of pipes. Water projects on the other hand, are 
concerned with infrastructure works relating to collection, treatment, 
storage and distribution of drinkable water. These might be pumping 
stations, storage tanks or pipes which represent 55% of the project 
cases used in this research. General projects are ancillary works like 
upgrades for health and safety or environmental compliance or minor 
repair works that would not merit the classification of major water or 
wastewater projects.  
Figure 14 shows the sensitivity of final outturn cost to the different 
project purposes. Wastewater projects are generally the more 
expensive projects with general projects averaging about £350,000. 
 
Figure 14: Histogram showing distribution of the purpose of projects 
 
Histogram of Primary Purpose
Cost Modelling 39v*1570c
Exclude cases: 1,42,227























 Primary Purpose:  N = 1564




Figure 15: Mean Plot of Cost Variation with Primary Purpose 
4.3.2.3. Delivery Partner 
The construction division of the collaborating firm is divided into three 
sections, referred to here as X, Y, Z for confidentiality. These delivery 
partners directly oversee the procurement and administration of the 
contract with the eventual construction company that will undertake 
the project. The mean plot in Figure 17 shows the change in average 
cost of projects depending on the different delivery partners. It can be 
observed that even though Delivery Partner Y was in charge of most of 
the projects, Z mostly carried out the more expensive projects. 
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Figure 16: Histogram showing distribution of delivery partners 
 
Figure 17: Mean Plot of Cost Variation with Delivery Partner 
4.3.2.4. Scope of Project 
The projects are further classified according to their scopes, as seen 
from Figure 18. These are upgrade, replacement or refurbishment 
projects. As Scotland already has an extensive existing water and 
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wastewater system, there are no ‘new built’ projects in the database 
used. Most of the projects are instead appropriately classified as 
upgrades to this existing network as seen in Figure 18. Replacement 
projects are usually simple component replacement at, maybe a 
pumping station or treatment works, whereas refurbishments are 
usually more extensive, consisting of a number of different job centres. 
As shown in Figure 19, the upgrade type of works were on average 
more expensive than the other classes under project scope category. 
 
Figure 18: Histogram showing distribution of scope of project 
 
Figure 19: Mean Plot of Cost Variation with Project Scope 
Histogram of  Project Scope
Cost Modelling 39v *1570c
Exclude cases: 1,42,227
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4.3.2.5. Operating Region 
Previous research suggests that location of the project tends to affect its 
eventual cost. This was evident during the trial model development in 
early stages of this research reported in Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 
(2012). The generic location categorisation of the projects in this 
database as West (W), East (E), South (S) and North (N) of Scotland 
allowed for the testing of the location hypothesis.  In  Figure 20, the 
highest number of projects (i.e. 36%) were completed in the South of 
Scotland around the Edinburgh region, although the projects in the 
Eastern parts of Scotland (Aberdeen and Aberdeenshire) appeared to 
be more expensive in Figure 21.   
 
Figure 20: Histogram showing location of project in Scotland 
 
Figure 21: Mean Plot of Cost Variation with Operating Region of the Project 
Histogram of Operating Region
Cost Modelling 39v*1570c
Exclude cases: 1,42,227
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Mean Plot of  Outturn Cost grouped by   Operating Region
Cost M delling 39v *1570c
Exclude cases: 1,42,227
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4.3.3. Data pre-processing 
Real data is ‘dirty’, inconsistent, and incomplete. They often, according 
to Pyle (1999), contain errors, outliers, wrong measurements or 
aggregate data. Pyle further writes that “correct data preparation 
prepares both the [data] miner and the data. Preparing the data means 
the model is built right. Preparing the miner means the right model is 
built.” Data pre-processing therefore allows the data to be ‘cleaned’, 
structured and presented to the model in the most suitable way in 
order to develop reliable models as well as offer the modeller the 
chance to get to understand the data thoroughly. The importance of 
data pre-processing is thus very crucial to the success and reliability of 
the models generated. Pre-processing might involve simple steps such 
as removing duplicate entries and missing data treatment to more 
advanced techniques like clustering, data transformation and de-
noising (treatment of unexplainable randomness and variability in the 
data). The data used in this research was pre-processed as follows: 
4.3.3.1. Data Integration 
Data integration usually involves the merger of multiple databases and 
the removal of conflicting information from these different sources. The 
data used for this research was extracted from two different internal 
databases of the partnering organisation. While both databases 
contained the same number of project cases, one recorded project 
information such as delivery partner, project location and scope while 
the other was used for the cost control of projects and thus contained 
the cost targets and CAPEX estimates. These two sources were merged-
up while removing duplicated or aggregated information. 
4.3.3.2. Data Cleaning 
Data cleaning unusually involves the removal of duplicate cases, 
identifying or removal of extreme cases, treatment of missing or 
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incomplete data and resolving inconsistencies within the data. Instead 
of removing incomplete cases from the data modelling, missing fields 
were replaced with the mode or mean of the distribution, depending on 
whether the entry type was categorical or continuous in nature. Rare 
values can create biases in data analysis as they often might appear as 
more important than they really are. There were three extreme cases of 
projects costing more than £25 million as shown in Figure 13. These 
have the potential of resulting in inconsistent predictions if included in 
the model as 99% of the data cases cost less than £25 million. On the 
other hand, if they were excluded, chances are the model would not 
adequately capture all possible range of cases that would be 
encountered in practice. At this stage of the research, the extreme 
values were not removed. The model’s sensitivity to the extreme values 
would be tested at the modelling stage before deciding whether to 
include them in the final model. 
4.3.3.3. Data Transformation 
Another important step in data pre-processing is to transform the data 
into a small specified range. Some modelling techniques like neural 
networks require that numerical inputs are normalized into a small 
range of variability  before training the models. Using raw values or log 
transformations for the trial models did not prove very effective as 
already explained in the analysis using dataset 1. The log 
transformations imposed an s-shape curve on the cost values, which  
upon scrutiny, does not truly fit the data (see Figure 13). Numerical 
predictors were thus standardized using the linear transformation of 
scores. This is defined as  
         
    
 
                             Equation 1 
Where: score is the standardized value of a numerical input, xi 
  µ is the mean of the numerical predictor 
  σ is the standard deviation of the numerical predictor 
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Apart from maintaining the shape of the numerical predictors because 
of the linear transformation, scores also lend themselves to easy 
interpretation as they measure how much a score deviates from the 
mean value of the distribution (Hair et al. 1998). A zScore of 2.0 for the 
final cost of any project would mean that the project is twice more 
expensive than the average project in the database. 
Furthermore, all cost values were normalised to a 2012 baseline using 
the infrastructure resources cost indices by the Building Cost 
Information Services with a base year 2000. This allowed for cost 
values to be somewhat comparable across different years.  
4.3.3.4. Data Coding 
Data coding refers to the nature of the data presented to the models. 
Each type of data requires a different representation. During the trial 
model development, categorical variables such as type of soil, type of 
project and contractor’s need for project were coded using the one-of-N 
coding, resulting in 4 sub-variables for type of soil for example (Good, 
Moderate, Poor, Not Applicable). On hindsight, this was possibly not the 
most appropriate coding to use as the one-of-N approach suggested that 
the categories could be calibrated on a nominal scale, with a sort of 
implicit degree of equal step variation between factors.  
It was thus decided to use binary coding (0, 1) for all categorical 
variables in Dataset 2. This allowed for the creation of “dummy” 
variables with the value zero, or one where the input corresponds to 
the correct category. If the variable was  Soil Type with categories Good, 
Moderate, Poor or Not Applicable for example, then the data would be 
presented to the model as shown in Table 7. This coding allowed the 
model to infer importance on its own without the modeller imposing 
weightings or subjective ratings to the variables. 
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Table 7: Example of Binary Coding of Categorical Variables 
Category Dummy Variables 
Good 1 0 0 0 
Moderate 0 1 0 0 
Poor 0 0 1 0 
Not Applicable 0 0 0 1 
 
4.3.3.5. Data Partitioning 
The actual data mining process in neural networks is usually done in 
three different steps: training, testing and validation. The performance 
of the neural net is measured by how well it generalises unseen data 
(i.e. data that was not used in training the model). To avoid model over-
fitting, it is imperative that separate data samples are used for training, 
testing and validating the neural network models. The three samples 
are used as follows: 
1. Training Set:  to train the network to identify patterns, 
correlations, etc 
2. Testing Set: to assess how well the model is learning while it is 
still under training 
3. Validation Set: to verify the performance of the model to 
determine how well it predicts unseen data which has neither 
been used for training or testing during model development. In 
this research, two validation sets were created: one to be used 
for an automated verification of model performance after 
training and the other for a manual validation of the models. 
Further details of how these two different validation sets are 
used will be provided at the actual modelling stage. 
 
Out of the 1,570 project cases, 100 were selected using stratified 
random sampling with cost as the strata variable to be used as the 
second stage manual validation set. Stratified random sampling was 
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used because this would hopefully allow for the selection of cases that 
are representative of the entire range of possible cases within the 
dataset. The remaining data was then split in a 70:15:15% ratio for 
training, testing and first stage validation respectively, using simple 
random sampling. Further details on the datasets used for the 
modelling is found in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Data Partitioning Details 
Dataset Percentage split Number of cases 
Total Size (1570) 
Training 70 1029 
Testing 15 c. 220 
Validation 1 15 c. 220 
Validation 2 - 100 
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4.4. DEVELOPING THE MODELS 
Three major modelling strategies were used to develop a series of final 
cost models in the research in an attempt to extract useful information 
embedded in construction data to support the estimation process 
within two industry collaborators. These strategies are the standard 
neural network modelling, data bootstrapping and ensemble modelling. 
4.4.1. Standard Neural Networks 
These models were developed using only artificial neural networks in 
Statistica® 10 software [See Appendix C for details on how different 
softwares were evaluated before choosing Statistica 10]. The models 
were developed in a trial and error manner to identify optimum 
network parameters and network performance. Several networks were 
trained using the input factors project scope, delivery partner, 
operating region, project duration, estimated cost at CAPEX 3 (see Table 
6). The model output was cost at final account (CAPEX 6).  
One of the challenges of using neural networks is that there are no set 
rules on the nature of the network architecture or number of neurons 
or layers to use. Each problem must thus be tackled using a trial and 
error approach until optimum network performance is reached. The 
automatic network search function of Statistica® 10 was thus used to 
optimise the search for the best network parameters, i.e. type of 
network architecture, number of hidden layers, activation functions, 
number of nodes in the hidden layer, etc. after which customized 
networks were developed using the optimal parameters identified.  
4.4.1.1. Type of Neural Network Architecture 
Initially, two different network architectures, the Multilayer Perceptron 
(MLP) and the Radial Basis Function (RBF), were experimented.  
According to Santos et al. (2013), the RBF and MLP networks are 
usually applied to the same kind of problem domains, i.e. 
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approximation and pattern recognition. They mainly differ only in their 
internal calculation structures. RBFs are linear while MLPs are non-
linear functions. Also, while RBF maps the relationship between input 
and target in a 2 phases, first performing a probability distribution of 
the inputs before the searching for relationships between the input and 
output space in the next stage, MLPs on the other hand go through just 
the second stage of the RBF (StatSoft Inc. 2011b).  
At the prototyping stage using Dataset 1, it was found that even though 
the MLP models trained a lot slower than the RBFs, the MLP models 
were always superior to the RBF networks. With preference to accuracy 
rather than speed, Dataset 2 modelling was thus carried out using only 
MLPs. 
4.4.1.2. Hidden Layers and Hidden Nodes 
One of the often asked questions about neural network modelling is, 
“how large does the network have to be to be able to adequately 
perform the task at hand?” The size of the network here refers to the 
number of hidden layers and nodes. Answers to this in the literature 
can be reduced to, “it depends”. It depends on the complexity of the 
problem being studied, the quantity and quality of data available and 
perhaps more importantly, the level of accuracy required for the 
models (Anderson 1995).  
On first principles though, the number of hidden nodes must be kept as 
low as possible to avoid model over-fitting or memorising. During 
prototyping, 2,000 networks were trained, iterating between 1-100 
hidden nodes in one hidden layer. The 5 best networks were retained 
and examined for performance improvement. Repeatedly, all the 
retained networks were found to have between 3-10 hidden nodes. This 
bound was thus used to custom build the models using Dataset 2.   
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4.4.1.3. Training Algorithm 
There are quite a number of training algorithms that can be used in 
neural networks, with the most popular being the back-propagation 
(Fausett 1994). Training algorithms are mathematical procedures used 
to automatically adjust the network's weights and biases during 
training to minimise prediction error. Without going into much details 
about all of these training algorithms, a brief summary of the ones 
deployed within Statistica® 10, the software used in this research 
(StatSoft Inc. 2011a) are presented below: 
1. Gradient descent: This is a first order optimization algorithm that 
moves incrementally to successively lower points in search 
space in order to locate a minimum. 
2. Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS): This is a more 
powerful second order training algorithm with very fast 
convergence but requires high processing requirements. It is 
also called Quasi-Newton algorithm. 
3. Conjugate descent: This is fast converging generic learning 
algorithm. The method iterates a series of line searches for 
global minimum in the error space. Succeeding search directions 
are selected to be conjugate.  
4.4.1.4. Activation Functions 
The behaviour of a neural network during training is further controlled 
by the activation function used. These are mathematical functions that 
determine the nature of the network weights transferred from one 
neuron to the other. According to Haykin (1994), activation functions 
‘squash’ or limit the output of a neuron into a permissible range, usually 
between the closed units [0,1] or [-1,1]. Five different activation 
functions are iterated in this research and are detailed in Table 9 below. 
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Table 9: Activation functions used in this research 
  Function Definition Description Range 
1 Identity - 
The activation of the neuron is 
passed on directly as the output. 
(-∞, +∞) 
2 Logistic Sigmoid 
 
     
 An S-shaped curve. Output varies 






      
      
 
A sigmoid curve similar to the 
logistic function. Often performs 
better than the logistic function 
because of its symmetry. Ideal for 
multilayer perceptrons, particularly 
the hidden layers. 
(-1, +1) 
4 Exponential (Exp)     The negative exponential function. (0,+∞) 
5 Sine      
Useful if recognizing radially 
distributed data. 
(0,1) 
Source: StatsSoft Inc., 2011 
4.4.1.5. Performance Measurement 
Model performance was measured over the training, testing and 
validation datasets using the correlation coefficient between predicted 
and output values as well as the Mean Squares Errors (MSE). MSE is 
defined here as: 
     
 
 
         
  
                                       Equation 2 
Where: Oi is the predicted final cost of the ith data case (Output) 
 Ti is the actual final cost of the ith data case (Target), and 
 n is the sample size. 
The higher the MSE value, the poorer the network at generalisation, 
whereas the higher the correlation coefficient, the better the network. 
p-values of the correlation coefficients were also computed to measure 
their statistical significance. The higher the p-value, the less reliable the 
observed correlations. 
Early stopping, the process of halting training when the model error 
stops decreasing, was used to prevent memorising or over-fitting the 
dataset in order to improve generalization. Over-fitted models perform 
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very well on training and testing data, but fail to generalise 
satisfactorily when new ‘unseen’ cases are used to validate their 
performance. Each model was repeatedly trained as long as testing 
error was on the descent. Figure 22 shows an illustration of a training 
regime with early stopping. In this case, the model training is halted 









Figure 22: Neural network training with early stopping. 
4.4.1.6. Training the standard models 
After using the automatic network search in Statistica® 10 to 
experiment with possible number of hidden layers and nodes as already 
described, 2000 different cost models were custom trained using a 
hidden node range of 3-10 and a data split of 70:15:15% for training, 
testing and first stage validation respectively. All five activation 
functions in Table 9 were used with the three training algorithms 
already described (i.e. BFGS, gradient descent and conjugate descent). 
All 6 input factors in Table 6 were used initially with Final Project Cost 
as model output.  
Early stopping was used to avoid model over-fitting and model 
performance was measured using the Mean Squared Error (MSE) over 
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the 2,000, were retained for further validation with the 100 data cases 
sampled using the stratified sampling at the data pre-processing stage.  
Figure 23 and Figure 24 show a sample of the plot of target versus 
model prediction of final cost for one of the retained models at this 
stage (MLP 16-7-1) while Figure 25 and Figure 26 plot the spread of 
residuals for the test and validation samples of the same model. These 
plots were generated for each model and inspected to give a quick 
visual indication of possible model performance.
 
Figure 23: Plot of Target vs Output of MLP 16-7-1 (Training and Test Datasets) 
  
Figure 24: Plot of Target vs Output of MLP 16-7-1 (Validation Dataset) 
  
zFC (Target) vs. zFC (Output)




















































zFC (Target) vs. zFC (Output)
 Samples: Validation
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Figure 25: Plot of Residuals for MLP 16-7-1 (Test Dataset) 
 
Figure 26: Plot of Residuals for MLP 16-7-1 (Validation Dataset) 
A better and more thorough performance comparison was carried out 
using the correlation coefficients and MSE shown in Table 10. The table 
shows details of the 10 best retained models, in no particular order of 
superiority. Of most importance is the mean squared error over the 
validation dataset of these networks, as it shows the performance of 
each model when new data is presented to it. Curiously, all the top 10 
zFC (Residuals) [1.MLP 16-7-1]
 Samples: Test























zFC (Residuals) [1.MLP 16-7-1]
 Samples: Validation
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models have virtually the same MSE of about 0.0021. This might be 
because of the rather exhaustive number of models trained (2000), 
increasing the likelihood of finding several models with similar 
predictive capabilities. These models will be further examined later. 
Before then, the sensitivity of the networks to the different input factors 
will be evaluated in the next section. 
Table 10: Summary of results for the best 10 standard models 
Model 
Architecture 




activation Train Test Validate Train Test Validate 
1 MLP 16-7-1 0.9976 0.9986 0.9963 0.0011 0.0008 0.0021 Tanh Sine 
2 MLP 16-8-1 0.9982 0.9988 0.9963 0.0008 0.0006 0.0020 Exp Sine 
3 MLP 16-4-1 0.9976 0.9989 0.9964 0.0011 0.0005 0.0021 Logistic Sine 
4 MLP 16-5-1 0.9982 0.9987 0.9964 0.0009 0.0007 0.0022 Exp Sine 
5 MLP 16-6-1 0.9977 0.9978 0.9963 0.0011 0.0016 0.0021 Tanh Identity 
6 MLP 16-3-1 0.9958 0.9957 0.9964 0.002 0.003 0.0020 Exp Logistic 
7 MLP 16-3-1 0.9976 0.9989 0.9963 0.0011 0.0006 0.0021 Logistic Sine 
8 MLP 16-4-1 0.9976 0.9985 0.9964 0.0011 0.0007 0.0024 Tanh Identity 
9 MLP 16-6-1 0.9981 0.9987 0.9963 0.0009 0.0007 0.0021 Exp Identity 
10 MLP 16-7-1 0.997 0.9982 0.9964 0.0014 0.0014 0.0019 Exp Tanh 
4.4.1.7. Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed on the input factors used in each 
of the 10 best retained models from the previous stage. This was an 
attempt to evaluate the contribution of each factor to the model’s 
performance and also help to prune the number of variables used to an 
optimum. Table 11 shows the relative influence of the various inputs on 
the predictive performance of the models. The table was generated by 
comparing the predictive error of the ‘full model’ to that of a ‘reduced 
model’ when each factor is removed from the neural network in terms. 
The variables were then arranged in order of importance according to 
the change in performance noticed when they were removed.  
The least significant input factor in this case is the Operating Region of 
the project. The in-house CAPEX 3 estimate of final cost was the most 
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important contributor to the model’s ability to predict final cost as 
expected. This probably suggests the importance that ought to be given 
to the estimates generated by the collaborating firm before it invites 
tenders. The choice of the project’s delivery partner seems to have a 
strong influence on the ultimate cost of the project as well. 
Table 11: Sensitivity analysis 















1  MLP 16-7-1 9.24 3.16 1.09 1.58 1.04 0.06 
2 MLP 16-8-1 10.25 6.89 2.98 2.97 1.13 0.05 
3 MLP 16-4-1 10.29 1.28 2.48 1.68 1.05 0.26 
4  MLP 16-5-1 7.56 2.89 5.73 5.94 2.01 0.11 
5  MLP 16-6-1 6.95 4.56 0.99 1.34 1.07 0.01 
6 MLP 16-3-1 10.65 2.34 5.91 3.2 4.9 0.15 
7 MLP 16-3-1 9.56 6.37 4.31 2.42 1.52 0.19 
8 MLP 16-4-1 11.82 4.53 5.01 3.15 2.61 0.05 
9 MLP 16-6-1 8.11 6.21 1.52 4.13 1.01 0.91 
10 MLP 16-7-1 10.04 2.01 0.95 1.69 0.96 0.03 
 
  Average 9.45 4.02 3.10 2.81 1.73 0.18 
 
As it is usually unhelpful to increase the number of modelling 
parameters beyond what is objectively necessary to explain the 
variance in a dataset as that has the likelihood of introducing potential 
redundancies, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the model. Thus, using 
the relative importance list in Table 11 from the sensitivity analysis, the 
model’s predictive performance is measured while deleting one input 
factor at a time, starting from the least important, until the model 
showed no further improvement or begun to decay.  
The model’s performance significantly improved with the exclusion of 
project operating region, but reduced significantly when Primary 
Purpose was also excluded from the input space. Table 12 shows 
improved coefficients of correlation and reduced mean square errors 
when Operating Region was removed from the input space. Unlike the 
previous stage where the activation functions were random in both the 
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hidden and output layers all the new models, without Operating Region, 
had identity functions and mostly logistic functions in their output and 
hidden layers respectively, suggesting a better model consistency when 
the operating region was excluded.  
Table 12: Summary of best models and performance (Without Operation 
Region) 
Model 




Training Test Validation Training Test Validation 
1 MLP 12-7-1 0.9951 0.9974 0.9993 0.0039 0.0052 0.0013 Logistic Identity 
2 MLP 12-3-1 0.9983 0.9984 0.9995 0.0013 0.0022 0.0012 Tanh Identity 
3 MLP 12-9-1 0.995 0.9975 0.9993 0.0039 0.0051 0.0013 Logistic Identity 
4 MLP 12-6-1 0.9985 0.998 0.9994 0.0012 0.0026 0.0018 Logistic Identity 
5 MLP 12-3-1 0.9951 0.9974 0.9993 0.0038 0.0053 0.0014 Identity Identity 
6 MLP 12-3-1 0.995 0.9976 0.9994 0.004 0.004 0.0012 Logistic Identity 
7 MLP 12-8-1 0.9985 0.9981 0.9995 0.0012 0.0025 0.0019 Logistic Identity 
8 MLP 12-3-1 0.9984 0.9982 0.9998 0.0013 0.0027 0.0005 Logistic Identity 
9 MLP 12-3-1 0.9983 0.9979 0.9996 0.0014 0.0028 0.0015 Logistic Identity 
10 MLP 12-3-1 0.9951 0.9974 0.9993 0.0038 0.0053 0.0014 Logistic Identity 
Average 0.9967 0.9978 0.9994 0.0026 0.0038 0.0013 - - 
 
Recall that 100 project cases were selected using stratified sampling 
during data partition of the pre-processing stage. The ten retained 
models in Table 10 were then further evaluated using these 100 
validation cases to manually test their performance over the 100 data 
cases. Model performance was evaluated using the equation: 
                      
                                     
                
                Equation 3 
Table 13 shows a summary of the performance of the 10 standard 
models when validated with the 100 data cases. It can be seen that the 
model performance is within a range of 9.6% average underestimation 
to 8.35% average overestimation of actual final cost. Although the 
results indicate a similar range of performance across all the 10 models, 
Model 4 shows the smallest range of error between -7.69% and 7.09%. 
The architecture of this particular model is an MLP 12-6-1 (i.e. 12 input 
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nodes from 5 inputs, 6 hidden nodes and 1 output). It was trained with 
a Quasi-Newton algorithm using a logistic function in its hidden layer 
and identity function in the output layer.  Figure 27 shows the error 
plot of Model 4, with the model achieving minimum error after 49 
cycles of training. The training was set to continue until there is no 
more improvement in test error over 20 cycles to control model over-
fitting. 
Table 13: : Summary of performance of standard models with 100 validation 
cases 
Model Standard Model Performance 
 % Average Underestimate % Average Overestimate 
Model 1 -10.84% 8.35% 
Model 2 -9.88% 7.16% 
Model 3 -10.61% 8.86% 
Model 4 -7.69% 7.09% 
Model 5 -10.77% 9.36% 
Model 6 -11.93% 10.96% 
Model 7 -8.01% 7.05% 
Model 8 -8.28% 7.78% 
Model 9 -7.13% 7.89% 
Model 10 -10.84% 8.95% 
Averages -9.60% 8.35% 
 
 
Figure 27: Training graph for Standard Model 4 
Training graph for [MLP 12-6-1] 
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4.4.2. Bootstrapping 
During the development of the standard models, the dataset was 
divided into three exclusive subsets for training, testing and validating 
as is customary for neural network modelling. On second thought, this 
might actually not be getting the best out of the data as not all the data 
gets used for training, testing or validation. It is possible that some level 
of information is lost as the entire database is not used for the actual 
learning process.  
Bootstrapping is a general technique, attributed to Efron (1992), for 
estimating sampling distributions that allow for treating the observed 
data as though it were the entire (discrete) statistical population. Hair 
et al. (1998) summarise the steps taken in bootstrapping. This involves 
designating the original dataset to act as the population, then randomly 
re-sampling it a specific number of times to generate a large number of 
new samples. A different combination of new sub-samples is then used 
each time for training, testing and validating the model before 
averaging the model performance across the samples. By this approach, 
each data case gets used for training, testing and validation at least once 
during model development. This helps to glean as much information as 
possible from the entire dataset. Bootstrapping has been successfully 
applied to sunset detection, outdoor scene classification, and automatic 
image orientation detection by Jiebo et al. (2005) and for face detection 
in 3D by Schneiderman and Kanade (2000). Bootstrapping was used in 
both of these studies to overcome the problem of the large variety of 
input combinations and the limited amount of data available.  
Furthermore, traditional approaches to statistical inference are based 
on the assumption of normality in the data distribution. This is 
reasonable and largely accepted but where this assumption is wrong, 
Efron (1992) warns that the corresponding sampling distribution of the 
statistic may be seriously questionable. In contrast, non-parametric 
bootstrapping provides a way to estimate a statistic of population 
without explicitly deriving the sample distribution.  
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Statisticians, however, disagree on the number of bootstrap samples 
(BS) necessary to produce reliable results. Most textbooks suggest 
choosing a sufficiently large enough bootstrap sample size without 
specific guidance on an optimum size. Efron and Tibshirani (1993), as 
well as Pattengale et al. (2010) however suggest that an minimum of 
100 or a maximum of 500 BS is generally sufficient in most cases.  
Bootstrapping was thus applied to the dataset in this manner - 600 
different training, validation, testing BS sample sets were generated by 
perturbing the entire dataset for each model using sampling with 
replacement over a uniform probability distribution. This should 
ensure that as many data cases as possible get used in the training, 
validation or testing sample sets. With the same inputs, neural network 
architectures, activation functions, hidden layers and nodes used in the 
case of the standard sample models developed in the previous section, 
2,000 neural network models were again then trained and tested, 
retaining the best 10 performing models just as before. The 10 retained 
models were then further validated using the 100 separate validation 
cases just as was done previously.  
The bootstrapped models showed a far more consistent performance 
and produced smaller MSEs in comparison with the standard models as 
shown in Table 14. The results from the 100 validation cases of the 
bootstrapped models were also superior to those achieved by the 
standard models. While the bootstrapped models overestimated actual 
final cost by about 4% on average, the standard models overestimated 
by 8.35% on average. Furthermore, the bootstrapped models 
underestimated actual final cost with an average error of about -6%, 
whereas the standard models averaged about -10% (see Table 15). 
Figure 28 shows a visual plot of the performance of the best 10 models 
from both the standard and bootstrapped models, validated over the 
100 validation cases. It is obvious that the bootstrapped models far 
outperform the standard models. This performance improvement can 
be attributed to the fact that by using the 600 bootstrapped sub-
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samples afforded the models a wider learning space than the standard 
models. These bootstrapped models were then carried forward for the 
final analysis in building the ensemble models. 
Table 14: Summary of best 10 bootstrapped models 
Model 
Correlation Coefficient MSE Hidden 
activation 
Output 
activation Training Test Validation Training Test Validation 
1 MLP 12-3-1 0.9984 0.9980 0.9997 0.0013 0.0026 0.0007 Tanh Identity 
2 MLP 12-4-1 0.9984 0.9981 0.9997 0.0013 0.0028 0.0008 Logistic Identity 
3 MLP 12-5-1 0.9984 0.9980 0.9997 0.0012 0.0031 0.0012 Logistic Identity 
4 MLP 12-3-1 0.9985 0.9982 0.9998 0.0012 0.0023 0.0003 Tanh Identity 
5 MLP 12-5-1 0.9985 0.9981 0.9995 0.0012 0.0025 0.0019 Tanh Identity 
6 MLP 12-3-1 0.9984 0.9982 0.9998 0.0013 0.0025 0.0005 Tanh Identity 
7 MLP 12-3-1 0.9984 0.9982 0.9997 0.0012 0.0023 0.0008 Logistic Identity 
8 MLP 12-5-1 0.9984 0.9982 0.9995 0.0012 0.0031 0.0013 Logistic Identity 
9 MLP 12-5-1 0.9984 0.9983 0.9997 0.0013 0.0026 0.0010 Logistic Identity 
10 MLP 12-7-1 0.9985 0.9980 0.9994 0.0012 0.0026 0.0011 Tanh Identity 
Average 0.9984 0.9981 0.9997 0.0012 0.0026 0.0010 - - 
 
 
Table 15: Bootstrapped Model Performance 
 Bootstrapped Model Performance 
 % Average Underestimate % Average Overestimate 
Model 1 -6.27% 3.21% 
Model 2 -6.32% 4.42% 
Model 3 -4.98% 4.31% 
Model 4 -5.68% 3.54% 
Model 5 -4.78% 2.84% 
Model 6 -7.36% 3.79% 
Model 7 -5.67% 3.15% 
Model 8 -5.80% 4.21% 
Model 9 -5.21% 4.89% 
Model 10 -6.06% 4.07% 
Average -5.81% 3.84% 
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Standard vs Bootstrapped Models 
Std. Average % Underestimation Std. Average % Overestimation 
Bootstrap Average % Underestimation Bootstrap Average % Overestimation 
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4.4.3. Ensemble Modelling  
All modelling techniques are prone to two main types of error: bias and 
variance, according to Hastie et al. (2009). This is largely due to the fact 
that models essentially try to reduce complicated problems into simple 
forms and then attempt to solve the ‘reduced’ problem using an 
imperfect finite dataset. Bias generally refers to the difference between 
the mean of the estimated values and the true value while variance 
represents the variability over all estimated values (Zhang et al. 2014). 
Skitmore et al (1990) describe a framework for reckoning the quality of 
estimates using three measures - bias, consistency and accuracy. While 
limiting their work to forecasts and contract bids, they defined bias as 
the average (mean) of the difference between actual tender price and 
the forecasted price. This bias has two main sources, according to 
Aibinu and Pasco (2008): bias associated with the estimating technique 
employed and environment as well as the bias contributed by the 
project itself. The lower the bias, the better the estimate. Consistency 
however refers to the ‘degree of variation around the average’- the 
variance. The lesser this variance, the more consistent the estimate so 
that a low consistency might be equated to efficiency of the estimation 
process. Accuracy combines both bias and consistency so that an 
estimate with both low bias and variance measures is said to be 
accurate (Skitmore et al. 1990). 
The relationship between variance and bias has been subject of studies 
by Geman et al. (1992), Zhou et al. (2002) and Hastie et al. (2009). This 
relationship can be summarised in Figure 29. Hastie et al. (2009) 
observe that as model complexity is increased, variance generally 
increases while the squared bias of the model decreases. The opposite 
also holds true. High variance models are over-fitted models that 
perform well on training sets but fail to generalise adequately when 
new data is presented to the model. High bias models, i.e. simple 
models, also under-fit the data and fail to learn effectively from the data. 
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This also unfortunately results in poor generalisation. It is important 
therefore to choose models that achieve a trade-off between variance 
and bias.  
 
Figure 29: Bias and Variance Trade-Off 
The use of ensemble modelling helps to circumvent this problem by 
combining individual models in a way that achieves some sort of 
compromise between variance and bias. Also referred to as committee 
methods by Oza (2006), ensembles attempt to leverage the power of 
multiple models to achieve better prediction accuracy than any of the 
individual models could reach on their own. It is perhaps a way of 
consulting a committee of experts before reaching a final decision 
either by averaging, bagging, voting or by a 'winner-takes-all' 
procedure, whichever is most appropriate (Jordan and Jacobs 1994). 
The result, at least in theory, is a model (the ensemble) that is more 
consistent in its predictions and on average, at least as good as the 
individual networks from which it was built.  
A weighted average algorithm in Statistica® was applied to combine 
the 10 best bootstrapped models to trade off bias and variance. This 
also proved to be effective as performance from the bootstrapped 
models were further improved. Table 16 summarises the performance 
source: Hastie el 2009 
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of the ensemble models with the bootstrapped and standard models, 
visually illustrated in Figure 30. It is obvious that significant 
improvement has been achieved by applying the ensemble technique to 
the 10 bootstrapped models. On average, the ensembles overestimate 
final cost of the project by 2.33%. When they underestimate, they do so 
by an average of 3.83%.  
Table 16: Summary of results (Standard, Bootstrap & Ensemble Models) 
Model Average percentage error 
 Overestimate Underestimate 
Standard models 8.35% -9.60% 
Bootstrapped models 3.84% -5.81% 
Ensemble model 2.33% -3.83% 
 
 
Figure 30: Bar chart showing the performance of the final models 
For a more accessible comparison of model performance, Table 17 
shows a random sample of 20 results out of the 100 validation cases 
used to test the ensemble model, further summarised in Table 17. It 
details a comparison between the ensemble’s final cost prediction and 
the actual final cost of the project, with a measure of the actual 











Average Percentage Error 
Performance Comparison of Final Models 
Overestimate Underestimate 
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predictions were within ±10% of the actual final cost of the project with 
77% within a ±5% of actual final cost. Only 8 out of the 100 validation 
had predictions beyond ±10% of the final cost of the project case. The 
absolute percentage errors of the ensemble ranged between from 
0.04% to 15.85% of final actual cost. 
Table 17: Sample results from ensemble model validation 
Case 









1             4,846  4,990 (144)             2.97  
2             1,586  1,590 (4)             0.25  
3           24,986  23,760 1,226             4.91  
4           11,143  10,934 209             1.88  
5             5,328  5,765 (437)             8.20  
6             3,787  3,723 64             1.69  
7           17,346  16,967 379             2.18  
8             4,136  4033 103             2.49  
9             3,117  2994 123             3.95  
10             1,000  939 61             6.10  
11             1,773  1674 99             5.58  
12             3,779  3600 179             4.74  
13               209  192 17             8.13  
14             3,960  3810 150             3.79  
15               294  300 (6)             2.04  
16             2,296  2220 76             3.31  
17             2,104  2038 66             3.14  
18               248  247 1             0.40  
19               208  192 16             7.69  
20               201  197 4             1.99  
 
Table 18: Summary of validation performance of ensemble model 
Percentage Error Number of cases Percentage of total validation set 
Within ±5% 77 77% 
±5% < x > ±10% 15 15% 
Beyond ± 10% 8 8% 
Total 100 100% 
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4.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
A lot of project and cost information is usually generated on any one 
particular construction project. If this is done in a meaningful and 
retrieval manner for a number of projects over time, a vast database of 
potentially valuable asset results. This can be converted into valuable 
decision-support systems using data mining strategies. The possibilities 
are that these decision-support systems could help construction 
practitioners in making better informed and reliable decisions 
especially in the early planning stages of the project.   
Hitherto, the scale and sources of cost overruns on construction 
projects have been thoroughly examined, particularly through the lens 
of the PsychoStrategists and Evolution Theorists. A distinction between 
the often conflated issues of overruns and underestimation was also 
clarified using the conceptual model in .  
As already pointed out, much of the budgetary decision making process 
in the early stages of a project is carried out in an environment of high 
uncertainty with little available information for accurate estimation. 
Cost overruns can thus be attributed to the unavailability of necessary 
information for reliable estimation. This chapter thus presents a 
practical means of transforming information embedded in existing 
construction data into decision-support systems that can complement 
traditional estimation methods for more reliable final cost forecasting. 
Using standard artificial neural networks, non-parametric 
bootstrapping and ensemble modelling, final project cost forecasting 
models were developed with 1,600 completed projects. While the 
standard neural network models achieved acceptable validation 
performance of +8.35% and -9.60% average percentage over and 
underestimation respectively, the bootstrapped models significantly 
reduced this error to +3.84% and -5.81% error. The use of committee 
modelling in the ensembles to achieve a compromise between bias and 
variance, further improved the prediction results of the bootstrapped 
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models. 77% of the validation predictions using the ensemble models 
were within ±5% of actual final cost, an indication of the model's ability 
to learn the underlying structure and correlations within the database 
to predict final cost.  
Although it is acknowledge that reliable cost planning and estimation 
form only one aspect of dealing with cost overrun in construction. A 
more holistic approach must include effective project governance, client 
leadership, accountability and measures of cost control. However, the 
results from the models show significant promise for future work on 
construction data mining to support the estimation process, thereby 
potentially producing more reliable and realistic final cost estimates.  
The models will be particularly useful at the pre-contract stage of the 
partnering construction firm in this research as it will provide a 
benchmark for evaluating submitted tenders as well as their likely total 
financial commitment on each project. The models could further allow 
quick generation of various alternative solutions for a construction 
project using what-if analysis for the purposes of comparison. The 
method and approach adopted to develop the models can be extended 
to even more detailed estimation so long as relevant data can be 
acquired.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
"The outcome of any serious research  
can only be to make two questions grow  




“UNLESS someone like you cares a whole awful lot, 
nothing is going to get better. It's not.” 
Dr Seuss, The Lorax
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5.0 INTRODUCTION 
The main concern of a construction client is to procure a facility that is 
able to meet its functional requirements, of the required quality, and 
delivered within an acceptable budget and timeframe. Cost estimates 
prepared in the early stages of a project allow the client to perform a 
cost-benefit analysis, secure funding, evaluate most economical tenders 
as well as used as a basis for cost control during project delivery. Where 
the project is a commercial asset, the initial capital investment must be 
balanced with the cost of maintenance and operations over the life-time 
of the project to ensure that the project remains profitable and planned 
returns on capital investment is achieved over an estimated period. 
Decisions made at the early stages of the project development therefore 
carry far-more reaching economic consequences and can seal the 
financial fate of a project. 
However, most construction projects routinely overrun their initial cost 
estimates leaving clients, financiers, contractors and the public 
dissatisfied. Clients may have to secure extra funding or suffer 
reputational detriments. Financiers may have to suffer the 
consequences of their investment not returning profits for a longer 
period. Contractors could face cash flow issues, liquidity and damage to 
their business image while the public, where the project is funded by 
taxpayer’s money, have to pay more for a problem that was not their 
fault. 
Hitherto, the thesis has addressed the “what?”, “why?” and “how?” 
questions of construction cost overruns. A researcher has not 
completed his or her task unless they are confidently able to respond to 
a ‘so what?’ query as well as project forward the meaning of their work, 
placing it the context of the wider field of study. This chapter would 
thus make sense of the key findings and results of the study by tying 
together and synthesising the arguments and results in the body of the 
thesis to the aims and objectives set out in the introductory chapter. 
The chapter will answer the research questions and identify the 
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theoretical and practical implications of the study. Lessons for the 
infrastructure delivery and management of construction projects will 
also be made with some suggestions for future research. 
5.1. REVIEW OF ORIGINAL AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
Following the arguments laid out in Chapter Two and the subsequent 
data analysis in Chapter Four using neural networks, bootstrapping and 
ensemble modelling, the following conclusions have been reached in 
line with the stated objectives of the research:  
Objective 1a: To ascertain through a critical review of the literature, the 
factors that contribute to the difference between the 
initially estimated cost and the resulting final costs at 
project completion 
The literature review in Chapter Two focused on contemporary 
mainstream arguments on the causes of overruns on construction 
projects. These include poorly managed risk and uncertainty, lack of 
information for reliable estimation in the early stages of the project, 
scope changes and rework. There was a strong case for the deliberate 
distortion or misstatement of the likely level of resources necessary to 
deliver a project and unjustifiable optimism bias - the tendency to 
evaluate possible negative future events in a fairer light than suggested 
by inference from the base rates. Specific evidence in support of the 
latter two sources were identified on the Scottish Parliament project 
and the Perth Arena project in Australia (Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) 
Objective 1b: Explore the different theoretical schools of thought on the 
cost overruns 
The literature is quite clear - there are essentially two prevalent schools 
of thought on cost overruns, referred to in the thesis as the 
PsychoStrategists and the Evolution Theorists (Section 2.2). The 
PsychoStrategists attribute cost overruns mainly to deception (strategic 
misrepresentation) and delusion (optimism bias). The Evolution 
Theorists however posit that projects change in scope and definition 
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between the conception stage and project construction phase. These 
changes are the drivers of cost overruns according to the 
evolutionaries.  
Objective 1c: Synthesise the different schools of thought into a holistic 
conceptual model to help properly understand overrun. 
The PsychoStrategists and the Evolution Theorists hold opposing views 
on the sources of ‘overruns’. They also measure ‘overruns’ from two 
different reference points - the former, from the cost at the time of the 
decision-to-build while the latter group measures from cost at contract 
award. This leads to large disparities in the size of cost ‘overrun’ 
reported from the two perspectives.  
However, using the conceptual model in Figure 2, the two schools can 
be usefully viewed as two complementing sides of the issue - both valid 
and crucial to thoroughly understanding or tackling ‘cost overrun’. 
Based on Figure 2, underestimates have been described in this thesis as 
the difference between the estimated cost at project inception, where 
the decision-to-build is taken and the estimated cost at the end of the 
project definition stage. The main contributors to cost underestimation 
at this stage are a lack of information, significant scope changes, 
estimation error, strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias. 
Overruns, however, are more appropriately described as the difference 
between cost at project completion and project definition stage. This is 
usually as a result of further scope changes (usually not as significant as 
those before detailed design), rework, ground conditions, technical and 
managerial difficulties, material price changes or estimation error. 
Aim 1: To provide a better conceptual understanding of “cost 
overruns” 
Aim 1 of the research can now be evaluated based on the conclusions 
reach in the objectives above. Much of the media furore and arguments 
in the literature on the so-called overruns hardly make a differentiation 
between the causes of ‘underestimation’ and ‘overruns’ as identified in 
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Figure 2. Media reportage, in particular, is usually based on a 
comparison between cost at inception of the project and resulting cost 
at completion of a project, ignoring the mediating phases of project 
gestation and definition. Very often, this comparison is between two 
projects that are significantly different in scope and design.  
Furthermore, the conflating definitions and reference points for 
assessing cost performance on projects have resulted in large disparity 
in the level of overruns reported. Should the reference point for 
measurement cost growth be recalibrated to the point of contract 
award for example, it is very likely that not “nine out ten” projects 
actually “overrun their budgets” and infrastructure projects may not 
have an 86% likelihood of outrunning their budgets, as stated in the 
opening sentence of the thesis. It would also likely mean that the size of 
overrun, as reported by Flyvbjerg for example, will become significantly 
lower. 
In addition, focussing on one side of the debate in dealing with overruns 
will do little to effectively tackle cost overruns in the management of 
construction projects. PsychoStrategic theorists neglect well 
documented issues like design problems, unforeseen ground 
conditions, scope changes and rework that drive up cost during the 
actual project construction. The unfortunate consequence of this 
perspective also brands planners, project promoters and estimators as 
unethical and suspicious without sufficient evidence to sustain the 
supposition. An evolutionary theorist perspective alone, on the other 
hand, would also rather naïvely not fully accommodate the strong 
influence and dynamics of business strategy, competition, power and 
organisation politics in setting unrealistic cost targets that will 
inevitably be unattainable.  
Finally, as a result of the discussions in Chapter Two regarding the term 
‘overruns’, it is proposed that the phrase ‘cost growth’ better describes 
the increase in estimated cost from one phase of the project to another. 
‘Overruns’ indirectly imply that there exists a single, accurate and 
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deterministic estimated figure to which all others have to be compared. 
Perhaps it is for this very reason the word ‘estimate’ is used to refer to 
the projections of likely future cost based on known and available 
information at the time of forming those estimates. Consequently, cost 
certainty in terms of an estimate, would seem a rather false notion. 
Estimates can only get more accurate as more information is available. 
The journal publications “Rethinking construction cost overruns: 
Cognition, learning and estimation” (Journal of Financial Management of 
Property and Construction) and “Dealing with construction cost 
overruns using data mining” (Construction Management and 
Economics) are based on the arguments that resulted from achieving 
Aim 1.  
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Objective 2a: Identify and collect a reliable dataset for the cost modelling 
process. 
Recognising the potential benefits of converting their existing database 
of projects into decision support tools for cost estimation, two 
collaborating industry partners got involved in this research after the 
concept and advantages of using data mining was presented to them.  
The initial data collection process involved shadowing of the tendering 
and estimation procedure in these firms as a quasi member of their 
tendering teams. This provided the opportunity to gain a first-hand 
understanding of how the data to be used for the modelling was 
generated and what different variables meant.  
One dataset of 98 project cases with a total value of about £99 million 
was collected from Morrison Construction, a UK Civil Engineering 
contractor. These projects were completed between 2007 and 2011. 
This first dataset was used for developing trial models to test different 
modelling strategies and experiment with using neural networks for 
cost modelling.  
The second dataset of approximately 1,600 projects was collected from 
a major public utility company in Scotland1. These projects were also 
completed fairly recently between 2009 and 2012. About 99% of the 
total number of project cases cost less than £25 million with only 3 
projects costing more than this figure. The total value of these projects 
was over £800 million. 80% of the projects were completed within 3 
years, with only 64 projects completed after 5 years. The average 
duration of the projects was about 24 months. See Section 4.3. 




1 Name withheld for confidentiality purposes 
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Objective 2b: Develop the cost models to estimate likely final cost of 
projects. 
The concept and approach of using artificial neural networks for 
construction cost modelling was initially piloted using the smaller 
dataset of 98 projects. Different training algorithms, transfer functions, 
neural network architectures and data transformations were 
experimented with using this dataset (See Section 4.3.1). Trial  final cost 
estimation models were also developed using this dataset. The 
significant input variables for the model in this dataset include ground 
condition, project duration, tendering strategy, estimated cost at 
contract award and contractor’s need for the project.  
The performance of the final cost model from this dataset is indicated in 
Figure 12. The error range of this model was between -2% 
(underestimation) to 7.9% (overestimation) with an average error of     
-1.8% underestimation. This compares favourably with the -10% to 
+15% estimation error commonly found and accepted in practice (Potts 
2008). The analysis and results of the trial models from this dataset 
have been published in the conference papers: “Neural networks for 
modelling the final target cost of water projects” and “A neuro-fuzzy 
hybrid model for predicting final cost of water infrastructure projects” 
(attached as Appendix A5 and A6) 
Having achieved successfull results with the smaller dataset, the 
lessons, experience and approach used were then expanded to the 
larger dataset of 1,600 project cases. Three different modelling 
strategies, namely, standard neural networks, data boostrapping and 
ensemble modelling were adopted sequentially, with each new strategy 
designed to overcome a weaknesses of the previous. The overall aim of 
the modelling is to convert information embedded in historical 
construction data into cost models that could aid the estimation process 
in early stages of the project. Details of the analysis carried out under 
the three different modelling strategies are detailed from Section 4.4 of 
Chapter Four. Two published conference papers, "My cost runneth 
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over": Data mining to reduce construction cost overruns” and “Dealing 
with construction cost overruns using data mining” are based on the 
analysis in dataset 2.  
Objective 2c: validate the models using new project cases. 
The models developed with dataset two were validated using 100 
project cases that were not used in the model training. This was a way 
to ascertain whether the models had adequately discovered the 
underlying relationships and structure within the dataset in order to 
make reliable estimations of likely final cost of new projects.  
The validation results have been presented in Figure 30 and Table 16. 
The results show that while the standard neural network models 
achieved acceptable validation performance range of -9.60%  to +8.35% 
error on average, the bootstrapped models significantly reduced this 
error range to -5.81% to +3.84% (+ for over estimation, - for under 
estimation). The use of ensemble modelling to achieve a compromise 
between bias and variance, further improved the prediction results of 
the bootstrapped models to a range between -3.83% and +2.33%. 77% 
of the validation predictions using the ensemble models were within 
±5% of actual final cost.  
Aim 2: To develop cost models for estimating final cost of projects 
based on historical cost and project details of completed 
project.  
The business landscape is continually experiencing a growing 
recognition of information as a key competitive tool. Companies that 
are able to successfully collect, analyze and understand the information 
available to them are among the winners in this information era. Most 
construction firms maintain copious information on each project 
undertaken. This data can usefully be transformed into decision 
support tools for the improvement in the reliability of cost. 
Data mining, an analytic process for exploring large amounts of data in 
search of consistent patterns and systematic relationships between 
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variables, has been used in this research to develop final cost 
estimation models based on data collected from two industry partners. 
Neural networks, the chosen data mining technique for this research, 
was then used to scour these datasets to in order to find predictive 
knowledge for final cost estimation in the early stages of a project 
where the information required for a thorough estimation is largely 
unavailable. 
The highly satisfactory level of performance of the models (as shown in 
Figure 30 and Table 18: Summary of validation performance of 
ensemble model) demonstrate the significant promise of effectively 
using neural networks and cost modelling techniques to increase the 
reliability of early stage cost estimates based on historical cost and 
project data. The journal paper “Dealing with construction cost overruns 
using data mining” (Construction Management and Economics) 
[Appendix A2] and the conference paper "My cost runneth over": Data 
mining to reduce construction cost overruns” [Appendix A3] were 
published to demonstrate the potential benefits of using data mining for 
early cost estimation in an attempt to reduce cost overruns. 
5.2. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Having achieved the aims and objectives of the research, a response is 
now provided for the research questions as below: 
1. Is the current understanding of construction cost overruns 
adequate? 
The study suggests that the current understanding of ‘cost overruns’ is 
inadequate and at best fragmented. There is no unanimity on the 
appropriate reference point from which cost performance on projects 
could be assessed leading to a large disparity in the scale of overruns 
reported in the literature. Some measure overruns as the difference 
between estimate at the time of decision to build and final completion 
cost, while others measure from the estimate at contract. As was 
evident in the arguments clearly laid out in Section 2.3, and supported 
by examples from real projects, the scope and design of some projects 
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tend to change significantly along the different phases of the project life 
cycle. This confusion sometimes leads to erroneous and misleading 
comparison of what has been termed ‘apples and oranges’ in some 
cases.  
2. What are the predominant schools of thought on the sources of 
construction cost overruns? 
Two predominant schools of thought have been identified in the study -  
The PsychoStrategists attribute cost overruns mainly to deception 
(strategic misrepresentation) and delusion (optimism bias). The 
Evolution Theorists, on the other hand, attribute overruns to change. 
They posit that projects essentially evolve in scope and definition 
between the conception stage and project construction phase, with 
attendant growing cost. 
3. Is there a conceptual difference between cost underestimation and 
cost overruns? 
Table 2 has been used to make a distinction between the two terms. 
Underestimates are appropriately measured as the difference between 
the estimated cost at project inception, where the decision-to-build is 
taken and the estimated cost at the end of the project definition stage. 
The main contributors to cost underestimation are a lack of reliable 
information to base the estimates on, significant scope changes as a 
result of project definition, estimation error, strategic 
misrepresentation and optimism bias. 
Overruns, however, are more appropriately described as the difference 
between cost at project completion and project definition stage. This is 
usually as a result of further scope changes (usually not as significant as 
those before detailed design), rework, ground conditions, technical and 
managerial difficulties, material price changes or estimation error. 
4. Is neural networks an appropriate method of estimating the cost 
of construction projects? 
The satisfactory results achieved at the development stage of the 
research demonstrate the appropriateness and potential for using 
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neural networks for cost estimation in construction. Some of the 
advantages of using neural networks include its ease of use, power and 
ability to model complex non-linear relationships between a large 
number of variables without having to first establish any a priori 
conditions. They are particularly recommended where the relationships 
between variables are vaguely understood or difficult to describe by 
conventional approaches. 
The most important point of caution might be that neural networks 
should be used when the goal of the modelling exercise is to measure 
how well, rather than thoroughly understand the why of a phenomenon. 
The why of the problem must be established in other ways as it is 
difficult to elucidate cause and effect relationships using neural 
networks. 
5.3. SO WHAT? MAKING SENSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 CONTRIBUTION  
The aims and objectives have been achieved and research questions 
answered. But, it is imperative that sense is made of these outcomes in 
order to place the research within the wider context of construction 
management research and practice. As previously intimated, it is 
insufficient to simply address the “what?”, “why?” and “how?” questions 
of construction cost overruns: we also need to know what difference 
the research makes. 
5.3.1. Theoretical Contribution 
Existing theories on the causes of overruns can be separated into two: 
one from an engineering and technical perspective, described as the 
Evolution Theorists, and the other emerges from an economic, 
psychological and strategic point of view, termed the PsychoStrategic 
Theory.  These two views are both critical to holistically understanding 
and dealing with the problem of cost growth and therefore should be 
viewed as two complementing, rather than opposing, sides of the same 
issue.  
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The second theoretical contribution is summarised in the conceptual 
model shown in Figure 2 that helps to distinguish ‘overruns’ from 
underestimates, along with their causes. The two terms can be directly 
linked to the schools of thought above. PsychoStrategists such as 
Flyvbjerg et al (2002, 2008) and Wach (Wachs 1989, 1990) focus on 
underestimation while Evolution Theorist, such as Love et al (2012, 
2014) and Odeck (Odeck 2004) focus their analysis on ‘cost overruns’. 
The third  theoretical contribution is the introduction of the term ‘cost 
growth’ to describe the increase in estimated cost from one phase of the 
project to another, instead of the loosely used term ‘cost overruns’. 
Overruns indirectly imply, and perhaps misleadingly so, that there 
exists a single, accurate and deterministic estimated figure to which all 
others have to be compared. This is practically unrealistic. 
Consequently, it is unreasonable to think of cost estimates on a 
construction project as 100% accurate. Their degree of realism and 
reliability would only be increased as more information becomes 
available for the estimation process. 
Finally, the research contributes to existing knowledge on cost 
modelling approaches. It demonstrates the use of neural networks with 
data bootstrapping and ensemble modelling for developing final cost 
models based on historical data. As far as can be ascertained, this 
combination of modelling approaches has not been used in any 
construction cost estimation related research. 
5.3.2. Contributions to Practice 
The contribution of the study to practice can be viewed in two ways - a 
more holistic understanding of the sources of cost growth and the 
presentation of a neural network method for developing cost models 
from existing project information.  
The industry is usually focussed on either one or the other schools of 
thought regarding cost growth. Focussing only on one side of the debate 
will probably not help much to effectively tackle the problem in the 
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procurement, governance and delivery of projects as PsychoStrategic 
view neglects prominent issues like design problems, unforeseen 
ground conditions, scope changes and rework that drive up cost during 
the actual project delivery. An evolutionary perspective alone, on the 
other hand, would also rather naïvely not fully accommodate the strong 
influence and dynamics of business strategy, competition, organisation 
politics in setting unrealistically low cost targets that will inevitably be 
unattainable. The industry may therefore need to start recognising and 
dealing with the sources of cost growth from both perspectives to deal 
effective with the problem.  
Secondly, the use of artificial neural networks for cost modelling has 
been demonstrated as a possible avenue for converting existing data 
within construction organisations into decision support tools, especially 
where information is lacking or inadequate. The use of  cost models can 
help clients, project managers, financiers or contractors to: 
 pro-actively predict deviations in cost estimates; 
 improve the reliability of their initial cost plans;  
 enhance early identification of potential problems on a project; 
 minimise late changes and their associated costs; and 
 ultimately increase customer satisfaction. 
The particular models developed in this research will be directly 
beneficial to the partnering firms in the research as the data used is 
company specific.   When extending and translating the models to other 
environs and project types further specific data is clearly needed – it is 
not safe to assume the nature of the work considered here can be 
extrapolated without question – but the approach to data collection, 
data pre-processing and eventual model development using neural 
networks, bootstrapping and ensemble modelling can allow the 
extension to any relevant dataset or type of project very feasible. 
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5.4.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations have been made based on the key 
findings of the study:  
1. Understanding is crucial 
A thorough understanding of the sources of overruns on projects is an 
important precursor to effectively deal with the problem. Clients and 
industry need to revisit their thinking on overruns if any improvement 
in cost reliability is desired. 
2. Data is an asset  
The real value of data lies in using it to the advantage of any 
organisation. The construction  industry  thus needs to recognise and 
use the vast data available to them from past projects to support their 
cost estimation process.   
3. Client is key 
It is imperative to clarify questions about project scope and who has 
ultimate responsibility, on behalf of the client, to govern the project. 
This could have profound implications on cost growth from inception to 
completion of the project.  
4. Be realistic 
As was suggested by a Commercial Manager of a large construction 
company in the UK during the study, “winning a bid is easy. But winning 
at the right price is difficult”. Clients should award contracts based on 
the realistic tenders submitted, rather than the lowest evaluated tender. 
Cultural changes within the industry towards the search for realistic 
targets might incentivise contractors to flag-up potential pitfalls early-
on. 
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5.5. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
1. Validation in practice 
The models produced in this research have gone through a validation 
process using a sample data kept aside for that purpose. A further stage 
of validating the models would be to test them against a project yet to 
be undertaken. The scope and timeframe of the present research did 
not allow for such level of testing. 
2. More detailed project attributes  
The final models used high level project attributes like delivery partner, 
duration, scope of project, purpose of project and location. It is possible 
that the predictive performance of the models could further be 
improved should more detailed project level information on 
earthworks, concreting, plants, schedule of dayworks be used.  
3. Data warehousing 
The success of a data mining exercise depends heavily on the 
availability of business, operational and project data, stored in a 
meaningful and retrieval manner. For most construction companies, 
relevant data for modelling construction processes is sparse, 
fragmented or stored in ways that will make the use of data mining 
practically difficult, or even impossible. The poor culture of data 
collection and warehousing in the construction industry is expected to 
be perhaps one of the major limitations of using data mining in practice.  
5.6. FURTHER RESEARCH 
While tangible and worthwhile outcomes have been achieved from this 
research, there is still scope and room for further work and 
improvement. Long term progress and development in this field is not 
under consideration here. Instead, below are two research strategies 
that should be undertaken in the near future. 
1. Neuro-Fuzzy Modelling 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the modelling philosophy adopted is one 
of continuous and incremental improvements. In other words, only the 
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arrogant modeller assumes his or her work is complete in itself. For 
possible further improvement in the results already achieved, neuro-
fuzzy modelling could be used. This approach allows the learning and 
generalisation capabilities of neural networks to be combined with the 
capacity for tolerance and imprecise knowledge representation of fuzzy 
set theory. It has the possibility of increasing the reliability and 
flexibility of the models. As indicated in Section 4.3.1, this approach was 
piloted using dataset 1 with initial results published in the conference 
paper “A neuro-fuzzy hybrid model for predicting final cost of water 
infrastructure projects” [Appendix A6]. 
A three-point fuzzy lower, upper and mean estimate of likely final cost 
was generated to provide a tolerance range for final cost rather than the 
traditional single point estimate. The performance of the final models 
using dataset 1 ranged from 3.3% underestimation to 1.6 % 
overestimation. Time constraints did not allow for the approach to be 
extended to dataset 2. 
2. Validation In Practice 
As discussed in the research limitations above, the work is currently 
only validated based on historical data. Validation in practice is a 
process which needs consideration to provide greater usefulness and 
acceptance of the models produced. 
5.7. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The scale of the problem of cost overruns in the global construction 
industry has been presented. Overruns occur irrespective of the size or 
type of project, its geographical location, procurement method or 
duration. There are essentially two schools of thought on the causes of 
overruns, referred to in the thesis as the PhychoStrategic and Evolution 
Theorists. These two perspectives have existed for many decades and it 
is inevitable that they will continue to dominate, causing the type of 
confusion and misunderstanding of construction of outcomes that have 
plagued the industry and have been outlined in detail in earlier 
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chapters of this thesis. A conceptual model that holds the two views as 
complementary, rather than opposing perspectives has been presented.  
It is unlikely that the construction industry will be able to adequately 
deal with the problem of cost overruns if only one of these perspectives 
is focussed upon. Unless there is fresh thinking and a realisation in both 
academia and industry that previous thinking is over-simplistic, and 
conflated views of cost overrun are abandoned, there will be no 
progress to achieving better value and satisfaction for all construction 
stakeholders. The theoretical contribution of this thesis makes clear the 
detriments of continuing to separate the existing schools of thought and 
the benefits of rethinking cost overruns. 
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Abstract
Purpose – Drawing on mainstream arguments in the literature, the paper presents a coherent and
holistic view on the causes of cost overruns, and the dynamics between cognitive dispositions, learning
and estimation. A cost prediction model has also been developed using data mining for estimating
final cost of projects. The paper aims to discuss these issues.
Design/methodology/approach – A mixed-method approach was adopted: a qualitative
exploration of the causes of cost overrun followed by an empirical development of a final cost
model using artificial neural networks.
Findings – A conceptual model to distinguish between the often conflated causes of underestimation
and cost overruns on large publicly funded projects. The empirical model developed in this paper
achieved an average absolute percentage error of 3.67 percent with 87 percent of the model predictions
within a range of ^5 percent of the actual final cost.
Practical implications – The model developed can be converted to a desktop package for quick
cost predictions and the generation of various alternative solutions for a construction project in a sort
of what-if analysis for the purposes of comparison. The use of the model could also greatly reduce the
time and resources spent on estimation.
Originality/value – A thorough discussion on the dynamics between cognitive dispositions,
learning and cost estimation has been presented. It also presents a conceptual model for understanding
two often conflated issues of cost overrun and under-estimation.
Keywords Data mining, Prospect theory, Cost overruns, Dunning-Kruger effects, Optimism bias,
Referenced class forecasting
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Cost performance on a construction project remains one of the main measures of the
success of a construction project (Atkinson, 1999; Chan and Chan, 2004). Reliable cost
estimates are important for several reasons – for organisational budgeting purposes, for
loan application if a project has to be funded through credit facilities, to estimate likely
cost of financing loans (interest payments), for estimating commercial feasibility or
viability of the project. The present economic conditions also impose a parsimonious
approach to spending on most organisations and governments. However, estimating the
final cost of construction projects can be extremely difficult due to the complex web of
cost influencing factors that need to be considered. These include type of project,
material costs, likely design and scope changes, ground conditions, duration, size of
project, type of client, tendering method and so on (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2012).
Trying to work out the influence of most of these variables at the inception stage of a
project when cost targets are set, can be an exhaustive task, if not futile; while ignoring
them altogether creates a recipe for cost overruns, disputes, law suits and even project
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termination in some cases. There is also a high level of uncertainty around most of these
factors at the initial stages of the project as noted by Jennings (2012).
Table I shows major public projects that have experienced significant cost growth.
Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) report that nine out ten infrastructure projects overrun their
budgets and that infrastructure projects have an 86 percent likelihood of exceeding
their budgets. The on-going Edinburgh Trams project, has already far exceeded its
initial budget leading to significant scope reduction to curtail the ever-growing cost
(Miller, 2011; Railnews, 2012). The recent 2012 London Olympics bid was awarded at
circa £2.4 billion in 2005; was adjusted to about £9.3 billion in 2007 after significant
scope changes; and was completed at £8.9 billion in 2010 (Gidson, 2012; NAO, 2012).
These statistics have often led to extensive claims, disputes and lawsuits in some cases
within the industry (Love et al., 2010).
Cost overrun in the construction industry has been attributed to a number of
sources including technical error in design or estimation, managerial incompetency,
risk and uncertainty, suspicions of foul-play, deception and delusion, and even
corruption. A recent debate on the Construction Network of Building Researchers
(CNBR) on whether or not construction cost overruns could be attributed to error in
estimation, or lies by project sponsors and estimators, raised more questions than
answers (See the November 2012 CNBR archive online). For instance: how accurate or
reliable can cost estimates be? What is the best measure of cost overrun? Might there
be need to change how cost performance is presently measured? Should the estimator
be absolved of the responsibility of producing reasonably accurate estimates? Should
the industry even bother about cost overruns at all, if project goals are met in the long
run?
While drawing on the works of some contemporary authorities on the subject,
different schools of thought on causes of construction cost overruns have been
synthesized in this study, to provide a coherent and holistic view of the problem.
Recurring themes have been expanded upon, challenging traditional paradigms of
assessing cost performance on construction projects while offering emerging
frameworks of reckoning cost growth. It is proposed that there is a conflation of
two quite different issues in the understanding of cost growth: cost underestimation
and cost overrun. The paper presents a conceptual model for understanding these
issues and then presents the development of a validated cost model using data mining
and artificial neural networks (ANN). It is hoped that the continuous and effective
application of data mining techniques might be one of the possible avenues for
alleviating the problem of project cost overruns within the construction.
Project Estimated cost (in millions) Final cost (in millions) % overrun
Sydney Opera House AUD 7 AUD 102 1,357
Nat West Tower £15 £115 667
Thames Barrier Project £23 £461 1,904
Scottish Parliament £195a £414 112
British Library £142 £511 260
Notes: aSeptember 2000 estimate; initially stated cost was about £40 million
Source: Audit Scotland (2004)
Table I.







Sources of cost growth
Causes of cost growth have been attributed to several sources including improperly
managed risk and uncertainty (Okmen and Öztas, 2010), scope creep (Love et al., 2011;
Gil and Lundrigan, 2012), optimism bias (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003; Jennings, 2012)
and suspicions of foul-play and corruption (Wachs, 1990; Flyvbjerg, 2009). While not
attempting to provide a definitive list of all possible sources, the following section of
the paper provides a synthesis of mainstream arguments on the causes of cost growth
to provide a holistic view of the subject.
Risk and uncertainty
The nature of a construction project makes it particularly prone to the effects of risk and
uncertainty – it is complex and dynamic; each project has many parties with differing
business and project objectives; projects are exposed to the weather (not in a controlled
environment); and total project duration can spread over several years. It is no surprise
then that risk, simply defined here as the measure of exposure to financial loss, or gain
(Akintoye, 2000), has been heavily cited as one of the main causes of failure to meet cost
targets on construction projects (Skitmore and Ng, 2003; Öztas, 2004; Okmen and Öztas,
2010). Arguably, the construction industry is perhaps one of the most risk prone
industries, with project cost being one of main areas susceptible to its effects. Almost all
types of risk (including scope changes, inclement weather, unsuitable ground
conditions, disputes, client’s cash flow problems, etc.) present financial ramifications.
Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2012) noted that effective cost planning relates the design
of facilities to their cost, so that while taking full account of quality, risks, likely scope
changes, utility and appearance, the cost of a project is planned to be within the economic
limit of expenditure. This stage in a project life-cycle is particularly crucial as decisions
made during the early stages of the development process carry more far-reaching
economic consequences than the relatively limited decisions which can be made later in
the process. Despite the importance of cost estimation, it is undeniably not simple, nor
straightforward, because of the lack of information in the early stages of the project
(Hegazy, 2002). To achieve accuracy, the estimator has to be able to predict the future –
something even the best technologies cannot achieve with certainty. This is because
accurate reasoning is only possible in a world where information is complete and certain,
and where cause and effect links are accurately known. Risk and uncertainty thus deeply
pervade the construction industry and continue to cause unending controversy and
debate. As Baccarini (2005) suggests, all too often risks are either ignored or dealt with in
a completely arbitrary manner using rules-of-thumb or percentages. Flanagan and
Norman (1993) also point out that the task of risk management or response in most cases
is thus so poorly performed, that far too much risk is passively retained, ultimately
resulting in cost escalation during project delivery.
Strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias
Some authorities on the subject of cost overrun have proposed more depressing
explanations to the phenomenon. Flyvbjerg et al., suggest that overruns are chiefly due
to “strategic misrepresentations”, i.e. outright lying (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002) and
“optimism bias” (Flyvbjerg, 2007). Flyvbjerg et al. compared the cost of projects at the
time of the decision to build to the cost at completion and found inaccuracies in cost




rail, 33.8 percent for bridges and tunnels, 20.4 percent for roads – concluding that nine
out of ten projects outrun their cost targets. Overruns beyond 100 percent of original cost
are also not uncommon (Trost and Oberlander, 2003; Odeck, 2004).
In order to get a project approved, sponsors and estimators, especially on public
works, tend to intentionally underestimate the true cost of the project in what has been
described as the “Machiavelli factor” (Flyvberg, 2003). “By routinely overestimating
benefits and underestimating costs, promoters make their projects look good on paper,
which helps get them approved and built” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). It makes little
reasoning to stop the project once a considerable amount of money has already been
spent to get it started, Flyvberg (2004) claims. Wachs (1989) was even more forthright
in his paper “When planners lie with numbers” and later advocated for better ethics
in forecasting for public works (Wachs, 1990).
If cost overruns cannot be explained by intentional underestimation, optimism bias
might be a likely culprit (Flyvbjerg, 2007). Optimism bias can be explained as the cognitive
disposition to evaluate future events in a fairer light than they might actually be in reality
(Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). Unlike strategic misrepresentation, this might not be born
out of deceptive intent, but also often leads to underestimating true cost, overestimation of
benefits, and overlooking the potential of error and uncertainty. The potential gains of the
project thus become overwhelmingly enticing, and almost blinding to likely pitfalls. It also
leads to underestimating the full extent of certain risk events, should they occur.
In effect, delusion and deception are complementary explanations of the failure
of large infrastructure projects, causing works such as diverting existing utilities,
environmental impacts and foreseeable risks to be continually underestimated in
construction (Flyvbjerg, 2009). This line of diagnosis of the problem of cost overrun
might seem appealing, at least on first thought, especially in terms of large capital
intensive public projects or those that are likely to make to make high political
statements. Flyvbjerg’s far-reaching work on cost overruns led to the endorsement of his
“reference class forecasting (RCF)” by the American Planning Association in 2005
(APA, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2007). This will be discussed in more detail in this paper.
Going beyond strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias
Even though deception and delusion might be plausible explanations for cost overruns,
particularly in large publicly funded or politically motivated projects, they are not easily
generalisable to all types of projects undertaken within the construction industry.
Researchers, including Love et al. (2012), rebut Flyvbjerg’s conclusions as simplistic,
largely misleading and not an accurate reflection of reality. Love et al.’s rejoinder suggests
a move beyond optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation to focus on intermediary
events, actions, the so-called “pathogens” that occur between project inception and
completion. At the core of Love’s argument is that many events and actions that are not
accounted for in initial estimates, tend to drive up cost. This school of thought is largely
supported by Aibinu and Pasco (2008), Odeck (2004) and Odeyinka et al (2012). Love’s case
study of social infrastructure projects suggest that foul-play, as suggested by Flyvbjerg
and Wach, might not be best explanations of cost overruns; and that the fingers point at
events that occur before and during the project delivery stage (Love et al., 2011). Besides,
it is almost impossible to draw valid distinctions along a continuum of motivation when
promoting a project from reasonable optimism, through over-enthusiasm, culpable error,





Research on leadership and governance of construction projects by Gil and Lundrigan
(2012), perhaps offers a more holistic assessment of cost growth that aligns closely with
the views of Love et al. above. That projects evolve, is essentially, the core of their defence.
Very often, construction projects change considerably in scope and design between
conception, to inception and completion, often due to a client’s proposed changes or
technically imposed changes. This suggests that it might be erroneous to simply compare
the cost of a project at inception, A, with the cost at completion, B, and wherever B . A,
then overruns have occurred and estimators of A either lied or were incompetent. A and B
are essentially very different. More robust explanations of overruns need to factor-in
process and product, as well as sources of changes to scope. For Love et al (2011) and Gil
and Lundrigan (2012) (op. cit.), project overruns are not really a case of projects not going
according to plan (budget), but the other way round – plans not going according to project.
Gil and Lundrigan (2012) propose a “relay race” framework for understanding cost
growth, particularly on mega projects such as the London Olympics project, Scottish
Parliament or Terminal 2 project at Heathrow Airport, all of which seemed to have
suffered the curse of cost growth, at least on a perfunctory examination. In the relay race
of construction delivery, the baton of project leadership is passed on from one person(s)
or organisation at the different stages of the project delivery. The aims and scope of the
project, as well as skills and competencies of the project sponsors and promoters (project
governors) at the conceptual stage, are often very different from their counterparts at the
project design or delivery stage. Also, it is not unusual for most public projects to have
long gestation periods, stretching over several years before final approval is reached, by
which time project budget would also have changed a number of times. The Scottish
Parliament Building is a paragon in this respect – the circa£40 million submitted by the
Scottish Office as likely final cost did not take into consideration project location,
or the building of a completely new parliament building. It is no wonder the final cost of
the project was ten times this initial proposed cost (Fraser, 2004).
Perception and measuring overruns
Perhaps our perception of cost overruns needs to change altogether. What is described as
cost overruns at the moment might not be overruns after all if reckoned through the eyes
of different procurement routes, for example. It is possibly one of the reasons why cost
overrun is not often reported in projects procured through joint ventures or alliancing.
Typically, in traditional contracting, design and estimates are first prepared by the
client’s estimator (CE) and then bids are invited from contractors. The lowest bidder often
wins the job with the lowest tender value becoming the cost estimate at the beginning of
the project (A). The contractor undertakes then to deliver the project at cost, A, and all
add-ons are dealt with through change orders or claims until project completion at cost, B.
Whenever B . A, overruns are reported. It is easy to identify how competition, market
conditions, optimism bias and the selection by lowest bidder combine to drive down
the initial estimate, A, creating a somewhat unrealistic target as likely final cost. For the
contractor therefore, winning work at the right price (realistic cost) becomes a very
difficult task. To be thorough in estimation would mean including likely cost of most/all
risk events in the tender, consequently pricing the contractor out of competition. Most
contractors may therefore not include potential risk events in their tenders, so as to
increase their likelihood of winning the contract. This was evident in related studies in




Some have suggested that the industry move beyond its fixation on measuring
project success largely in terms of cost (Bassioni et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2008).
The CNBR debate was frequently punctuated by the question, “why care about cost
overruns anyway? If projects run over budget but deliver what the client wants, should
not everyone be happy?” After all, cost overruns only represent our human inability to
predict future events accurately, or identify risks and quantify their likely impact and
cost. Others think perhaps there is a need for a paradigm shift in how projects are
evaluated to cover a combination of social, economic, social, usability or value for money
(Toor and Ogunlana, 2010). The Sydney Opera House experienced large overruns at the
time of construction but it is now generally considered a twenty-first century icon of
buildings and a popular destination for tourists and opera concerts. Similarly, in spite of
the controversies about cost overruns, the Scottish Parliament Building has won several
awards, including the coveted Stirling Award in 2005 by the Royal Institute of British
Architects for its audacious, highly conceptual and iconic design. Even if cost should be
a major factor for assessment, it certainly should not be a simplistic or statistical
comparison between awarded contract sum and cost at final accounts.
Cognition, bias and learning
Can a science that combines intuition and analysis ever be precise or unbiased? A qualified
“no” is probably the answer to that question, according to Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
formulators of Prospect Theory – decision making under risk and uncertainty. The theory
suggests people make decisions based on the likely gains, or loss, of a venture, and not
necessarily based on the real outcome of the decision. It further proposes that decision
making is often flawed by systematic biases and that error in judgement is often
systematic and predictable, rather than random. Kahneman, a Noble Prize winner for his
works on decision making and behavioural economics, delineates decision making and the
illusion of understanding, stating that we often exhibit an excessive confidence in what we
believe we know about any situation, and that our inability to acknowledge the full extent
of our ignorance and the uncertainty of the world we live in makes us prone to overestimate
how much we really understand (Kahneman, 2011). Kahneman’s work with Lovallo and
Kahneman (2003) provides further defence of the Prospect Theory from different business
areas. Kahneman’s theory holds profound extensions for decision making in the
construction industry, especially for large public projects where the effects and cost of risk
and uncertainty are particular heightened. It would also provide large support of
Flyvbjerg’s arguments on strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias already
discussed in this paper. Conceivably, this is one reason why it is easy to err on the side of
optimism when promoting a project, or when estimating the outcome of a risk event.
Perhaps even more controversial are the conclusions reached by Kruger and Dunning
(2009), that incompetence does not only cause poor performance but also has the dual
effect of robbing people of the ability to recognise poor performance. They posit that the
metacognitive skills required to judge the accuracy of a decision is the same required to
evaluate the error in the same decision – to lack the former, is to fall short in the latter as
well (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). The result thereof is that the “incompetent will tend to
grossly overestimate their skills and abilities” (Kruger and Dunning, 2009). They tied
their conclusion to Darwin’s (1871) pronouncement: “ignorance more frequently begets
confidence than does knowledge”, a theory largely supported by Ehrlinger et al. (2008)





Herein lies the estimation complex – a combination of optimism bias and Prospect
Theory predisposes us to underestimate true cost, discounting the real effect of
uncertainty and error while doing so. At the same time, Dunning-Kruger tendencies
blind forecasters to the error in reaching unrealistic estimates for project cost. Juxtapose
these with the effect of risk and uncertainty, competition embedded within the culture of
lowest-bidder tendering, as well as strategic misrepresentation, and the overruns
reported in Table I become less surprising. It is easier to understand how most cost
estimates can be prepared, or at least reported, with an unjustifiable confidence in their
accuracy. If this is the case, then perhaps we might not have to move beyond optimism
bias just yet, as suggested by Love et al. (2011). If we are indeed systematically prone to
err towards optimism bias in our reasoning, then it might be wise to rethink how that
affects our estimates and what needs to be done about it.
Flyvbjerg (2005) also noted that “no learning” seemed to be taking place in the
construction industry over the 70 years prior to his study, and that estimation accuracy
has not seen much improvement even with the advancements in technology and the
proliferation of cost models and project management approaches. Kruger and Dunning
(2009), as well as Ehrlinger et al. (2008) attribute lack of performance improvement to the
lack of accurate and constructive feedback. They however observed, that an awareness
of limitations of skills and decision making within an environment of uncertainty, helped
to improve performance and self-calibration. A lack of learning in the construction
industry could be explained in a number of ways: that the mitigating factors causing
overruns are ones that the industry absolutely cannot overcome and therefore, has to
accept cost overruns as normal part of practice; or, that there is simply very little
incentive to reach realistic target inception; or further still that the industry seems largely
to miss the opportunities offered by effective knowledge transfer and feedback from
previously completed projects (Hartmann and Dorée, 2013). How is explicit and tacit
knowledge captured and utilised within the industry presently? How do project closure
reports feed back into the development of new projects for continuous improvement?
Rethinking overruns
For the purposes of cost modelling or estimation, it is important to clarify an important
point. Existing literature, and recent CNBR debate, on “cost overruns” seems to conflate
two related, but different issues – overruns and underestimation. Unfortunately, a lot of
cost models do not make this distinction either and thus become limited in their
application in practice. As already pointed out, most large publicly funded projects tend
to go through a long gestation period after project conception during which many
changes to scope and accompanying costs occur – sometimes the initial scheme bears
little likeness to the defined project. The estimated cost at project inception often fails to
take into consideration a lot of details and information, largely because much of these are
not yet available or uncertain; the case of the initial circa £40 million estimate for the
Scottish Parliament. For many large publicly funded projects, this is normally when
project sponsors garner for project approval and funding. It is perhaps at this stage the
effects of Prospect Theory, Dunning-Kruger effect, optimism bias and strategic
misrepresentation are particularly heightened, to keep cost at an attractive low and
benefits of undertaking the project high. This might be what accounts for what the
authors refer to as underestimation of likely cost – the difference between estimated cost




Overruns however, are aptly described as the difference in cost at project completion
and project definition stage (Figure 1). This is usually as a result of further scope
changes, normally not as significant as those at project definition stage, ground
conditions, technical and managerial difficulties, material or labour price changes or
estimation error. These are the factors that Love et al. (2011) describe as “pathogens”.
So, whereas, Flyvberg’s work mainly deals with underestimation, Love’s explanations
for cost growth largely covers the latter phases of the construction project. It is
important to note however that Figure 1 is not necessarily wholly applicable for small,
non-political and routine projects where the effects of the political and cognitive causes
of cost growth are less heightened. Much of the media hype on cost overruns however
is often based on a comparison between cost at inception and cost at completion,
almost ignoring the mediating phases of project gestation and definition.
Reference class forecasting
Flyvbjerg developed a practical method for forecasting cost of large projects based on
RCF formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Kahneman (1994). RCF
attempts to use “distributional information” (knowledge) from previous projects
similar to the new project being undertaken, the so-called taking of an “outside view” of
planned actions, based on actual past performance. Kahneman and Flyvbjerg reckon
this approach might somehow help to bypass optimism bias and strategic
misrepresentation in decision making (Flyvbjerg, 2007). The methodology involves
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(1) identify a reference class of past, similar projects;
(2) estimate a probability distribution for the selected reference class; and
(3) establish likely cost of the new project using the reference class distribution.
The first instance of its application was on Edinburgh Tram project by the UK
Government – the original forecast by the Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (tie), the
project promoter was about £255 million but the RCF indicated this could rise up to
£400 million and warned that the final cost could even be exceedingly higher
(Flyvbjerg, 2007). Recent estimates now indicate that the final construction cost of
the Trams could be around £776 million (Miller, 2011; Railnews, 2012). The RCF has
reportedly been applied to the £15 billion London Crossrail and £7.5 million Taunton
Third Way projects in the UK (Flyvbjerg, 2007).
Even though RCF remains to be widely tested or adopted, it might be a step in the
right direction especially in dealing with the root causes of underestimation, (as opposed
to cost overrun) as shown in Figure 1, i.e. optimism bias, Prospect Theory,
Dunning-Kruger effect and strategic misrepresentation. However, as pointed out by
Flyvbjerg, RCF is largely applicable to large, non-routine or one-off projects such as
stadiums, museums, dams, etc. On smaller, less political, or frequent projects however,
a fairly similar but more established method of forecasting that employs previous
experience and incremental learning is data mining. This has been extensively used
in other industries including finance (Kovalerchuk and Vityaev, 2000), medicine
(Bellazzi and Zupan, 2008; Koh and Tan, 2011) and business (Apte et al., 2002), but is yet
to see widespread adoption in the construction industry. Notwithstanding, it has been
applied to construction knowledge management (Yu and Lin, 2006), for estimating the
productivity of construction equipment (Yang et al., 2003), study of occupational injuries
(Cheng et al., 2012a), alternative dispute resolution (Fan and Li, 2013) and prediction of
the compressive strength high performance concrete (Cheng et al., 2012b). Data mining
is used to develop final cost models in the next section of this paper, in a manner that
addresses the overruns part of Figure 1.
Final cost model development using data mining
Data mining is the analytic process for exploring large amounts of data in search of
consistent patterns, correlations and/or systematic relationships between variables;
and to then validate the findings by applying the detected patterns to new subsets of
data (StatSoft Inc., 2008). Data mining attempts to scour databases to discover hidden
patterns and relationships in order to find predictive information for business
improvement. Similar to RCF, data mining starts with the selection of relevant data
from a data warehouse that contains information on organisation and business
transactions of the firm (Ngai et al., 2009). The selected data set is then pre-processed
before actual data mining commences. Data pre-processing typically involves steps
such as sub-sampling, clustering, transformation, de-noising, normalisation or feature
extraction (StatSoft Inc., 2011), to ensure that the data are structured and presented to
the model in the most suitable way for effective modelling.
The next stage, as shown in Figure 2, involves the actual modelling, where one or a
combination of data mining techniques is applied to scour down the dataset to extract
useful knowledge. The results obtained are then evaluated and presented into some




graphical representation or visualisation of the model for easy communication. ANN is
used for the modelling aspect of this study mainly because of its learning and
generalisation capabilities (Anderson, 1995).
Data
The data used for the models in this paper were supplied by an industry partner with its
primary operation in the delivery of water infrastructure and utility in the UK.
Approximately 1,600 projects completed between 2004 and 2012, with cost range of
between £4,000 and £15 million, comprising newly built, upgrade, repair or
refurbishment projects. Fifteen project cases were selected using stratified random
sampling to be used for independent testing of the final models. The remaining data
were then split in an 80:20 percent ratio for training and testing of the models,
respectively.
Cost values were normalised to a 2012 baseline with base year 2000 using the
infrastructure resources cost indices by the Building Cost Information Services








































where: zScore is the standardized value of a numerical input, xi; m is the mean of the
numerical predictor; and s is the standard deviation of the numerical predictor.
This allowed numerical inputs to be squashed into a smaller range of variability,
potentially improving the numerical condition of the optimization process of the model
(StatSoft Inc., 2008). If one input has a range of 0-1, while another has a range of
0-30 million, as was the case in the data that were used in this analysis, the neural net will
expend most of its effort learning the second input to the possible exclusion of the first.
All categorical variables were coded using a binary (0,1) coding system. Data screening
using scree test, factor analysis and optimal binning allowed for the selection of six initial
predictors (primary purpose of project, project scope, project delivery partners, operating
region, project duration, and initial estimated cost) to be used for the actual modelling
using ANN. Invariant variables, such as payment method, fluctuation measure and type
of client, were removed from the variable set as they would only increase the model
complexity and yet offer no useful information for model performance.
Model development
The final model was developed after an iterative process of fine-tuning the network
parameters and/or inputs until acceptable error levels were achieved or when the model
showed no further improvement. First, the automatic network search function of
Statistica 10w software was used to optimise the search for the best network parameters,
after which customized networks were developed using the optimal parameters
identified. Five activation functions[1] were iterated in both hidden and output layers,
using gradient descent, conjugate descent and Quasi-Newton (BFGS) training
algorithms. About 2,000 multilayer perceptron networks were trained at each
iteration stage, retaining the five best before further tweaking to investigate possible
model improvement.
Early stopping, the process of halting training when the test error stops decreasing,
was used to prevent memorising or over-fitting the dataset in order to improve
generalization. Over-fitted models perform very well on training and testing data, but
fail to generalise satisfactorily when new “unseen” cases are used to validate their
performance. The best networks at each stage were selected based on their overall
performance, measured using the correlation coefficient between predicted and output





where: Oi is the predicted final cost of the ith data case (output); and Ti is the actual
final cost of the ith data case (target).
The higher the SOS value, the poorer the network at generalisation, whereas the
higher the correlation coefficient, the better the network. The p-values of the correlation
coefficients were also computed to measure their statistical significance. The higher the
p-value, the less reliable the observed correlations. Overall, about 30 networks were
retained, which were then validated using the 15 separate projects that were selected
using stratified sampling at the beginning of the modelling exercise. Figure 3 shows




Table II shows the performance of overall best model (model 33). It compares the final
cost forecasts reached by the model with the actual final cost recorded at the end of the
project. This model was an MLP 8-11-1, i.e. a multilayer perceptron with eight nodes in
the input layer, 11 hidden units and one output (final cost). It was trained with a
Quasi-Newton (BFGS) training algorithms and had a hyperbolic tangent (tanH)
activation function in both hidden and output layers. The tanh activation function,
defined in equation (3), squashes continuous variables into a range of (21, þ 1) for
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(£) Model absolute % error
1 4,912,649 5,120,943 2208,294 4.24
2 1,617,225 1,617,805 2580 0.04
3 11,277,470 10,743,624 533,846 4.73
4 2,110,260 2,136,125 225,865 1.23
5 5,398,965 5,425,142 226,177 0.48
6 180,532 181,214 2681 0.38
7 2,572,564 2,530,178 42,386 1.65
8 1,440,593 1,372,864 67,729 4.70
9 3,842,258 3,793,851 48,407 1.26
10 4,194,219 4,131,285 62,934 1.50
11 375,170 387,731 212,561 3.35
12 50,637 51,502 2865 1.71
13 24,479 22,017 2,462 10.06
14 858,112 824,334 33,779 3.94
15 21,798 18,344 3,454 15.85
Average absolute % error 3.67
Table II.
Validation results of the
































































The final predictors in this model were the purpose of the project, the construction
delivery partner used by the client, the estimated duration, an early scheme estimate of
final cost and scope of the project. The average APE achieved by this model was
3.67 percent across the 15 validation cases. Its APEs ranged between 0.04 percent and
15.85 percent. It was observed that the worst performances of the model were achieved
on projects with the smallest values in the validation set (cases 13 and 15). This might be
because a majority of the projects used for the model training had values in excess of
£5 million. However, the actual monetary errors on these predictions were deemed
satisfactory as they were relatively small (about £3,500 and £2,500 for models 13 and 15,
respectively). 87 percent of the validation predictions of the best model were within
^5 percent of the actual cost of the project. The authors are now exploring avenues of
transforming the models into standalone desktop applications for deployment within
the operations of the industry partner that collaborated in this research.
Conclusion
Cost estimate reliability and accuracy on construction projects continues to receive a
lot of attention from both industry and academia. The industry is faced with a complex
web of causes, which we propose fall into two distinct yet often conflated categories –
cost underestimation and cost overrun summarised as follows.
Underestimation
. optimism bias – a propensity to believe and act on a notion that all will go well
leading to the underestimation the role of uncertainty in outcomes;
. prospect theory – making decisions based on likely gains and loss rather than
the actual outcome of the decision;
. strategic misrepresentation – outright lying and corruption; and
. Dunning-Kruger effect – the bend to overestimate competency or accuracy in
judgement and the inability to see past our own errors; competition to win
projects.
Overrun
. scope changes, whether mandated by circumstances or requested by client;
. managerial and technical difficulties;
. risk and uncertainty; and
. ground conditions, price changes (etc.).
Most of these, especially the cognitive and psychological factors, tend to work together
to drive down the true cost of the project during the initial stages, creating a false and
unreliable estimate as target to reach. We have attempted to provide a holistic view of
the problem of cost growth, while presenting a conceptual model to distinguish
between these often conflated ideas of underestimation and overruns on construction
projects. RCF was discussed as a possible means of addressing underestimation,
particularly on large publicly funded projects. The development of a final cost
prediction model using data mining and ANN was then presented as a possible avenue




average absolute percentage error of 3.67 percent with 87 percent of the validation
predictions falling within an error range of ^5 percent. These methods can be used to
develop decision support systems especially at early stages of the construction project
as well as complement traditional methods of estimation in order to reach more
accurate and reliable cost estimates.
Clients can play a crucial role in ensuring the quality and reliability of cost estimates
in the construction industry. As indicated by the commercial manager of one the biggest
construction companies in the UK, “winning a tender is easy. But winning at the right
price is difficult”. Unless clients start demanding realistic estimates, rather than the
lowest estimates at the early stages of a project, the problem of cost overrun might
remain with the industry for a long time to come. Cultural changes within the industry
towards the search for realistic targets might incentivise contractors to flag up potential
estimating pitfalls early-on. Questions about who has the responsibility on behalf of the
client to govern the project always has profound implications on cost growth from
inception to completion and needs to be addressed very early on a project. This is
particularly important on mega projects.
Project knowledge capture and its utilisation would also be crucial in tackling cost
overruns. Some data mining techniques like neural networks are particularly useful in
modelling both explicit and tacit knowledge within extensive databases. This can be
used to complement traditional cost estimation methods or RFC to reach more realistic
and reliable estimates. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, is the creation of a
culture of critical questioning, measures of accountability, with checks and balances to
make sure that cost is managed to be within reasonable budget limits.
Note
1. Identity, logistic, tanh, exponential and sine activation functions.
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One of the main aims of any construction client is to procure a project within the limits of a predefined budget.
However, most construction projects routinely overrun their cost estimates. Existing theories on construction
cost overrun suggest a number of causes ranging from technical difficulties, optimism bias, managerial incompe-
tence and strategic misrepresentation. However, much of the budgetary decision-making process in the early
stages of a project is carried out in an environment of high uncertainty with little available information for accu-
rate estimation. Using non-parametric bootstrapping and ensemble modelling in artificial neural networks, final
project cost-forecasting models were developed with 1600 completed projects. This helped to extract information
embedded in data on completed construction projects, in an attempt to address the problem of the dearth of
information in the early stages of a project. It was found that 92% of the 100 validation predictions were within
±10% of the actual final cost of the project while 77% were within ±5% of actual final cost. This indicates the
model’s ability to generalize satisfactorily when validated with new data. The models are being deployed within
the operations of the industry partner involved in this research to help increase the reliability and accuracy of
initial cost estimates.
Keywords: Artificial neural networks, bootstrapping, cost overrun, data mining, ensemble modelling.
Introduction
In a construction project, the main obligations of a pro-
ject team towards their client are usually reduced to
concerns around functional requirements, specific
quality, and delivery within an acceptable budget and
time frame. Usually for most clients, the cost aspect
of these requirements seems to rank highest. Thus,
the estimates prepared at the initial stages of a project
can play several important roles: they can form the basis
of cost-benefit analysis, for selection of potential deliv-
ery partners, to support a to-build-or-not-to-build deci-
sion, and very often as a benchmark for future
performance measure. As suggested by Kirkham and
Brandon (2007), therefore, effective cost estimation
must relate the design of the constructed facilities to
their cost, so that while taking full account of quality,
risks, likely scope changes, utility and appearance, the
cost of a project is planned to be within the economic
limits of expenditure. This stage in a project life cycle
is particularly crucial as decisions made during the early
stages of the development process carry more far-reach-
ing economic consequences than the relatively limited
decisions which can be made later in the process. Effec-
tive cost estimation is, therefore, so vital, it can seal a
project’s financial fate, Nicholas (2004) notes.
However, in spite of the importance of cost estima-
tion, it is undeniably neither simple nor straightforward
because of the lack of information in the early stages of
the project, Hegazy (2002) observes. Many projects
consistently fail to meet initially set cost limits due to
a number of causes ranging from the inability to accu-
rately identify and quantify risk (Akintoye, 2000), error
in estimation (Jennings, 2012), design changes and
scope creep (Odeck, 2004; Love et al., 2012) and even
suspicions of foul play and corruption (Wachs, 1990;
Flyvbjerg et al., 2002).
Developments in the business landscape, however,
suggest a growing recognition of information as a key
competitive tool. A vast amount of data is continuously
generated by construction business transactions. As per
due diligence or contractual requirements, most con-
struction firms maintain copious information on each
project undertaken. The amount of data generated by
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these firms presents both a challenge and an opportu-
nity: a challenge to traditional methods of data analysis
since the data are often complex, and usually, volumi-
nous. On the other hand, construction firms stand a
chance of gaining competitive edge and performance
improvement by making their data work for them using
detailed data mining. Fayyad et al. (1996) noted that
the real value of storing data lies in the ability to exploit
useful trends and patterns in the data to meet business
or operational goals as well as for decision support and
policymaking. Advances in the fields of data warehous-
ing, artificial intelligence, statistics, visualization tech-
niques and machine learning now make it possible for
data to be transformed into a valuable asset by auto-
mating laborious but rewarding knowledge discovery
in databases.
Data mining, simply described here as the analytical
process of knowledge discovery in large databases, has
found extensive application in industries such as busi-
ness (cf. Apte et al., 2002) and medicine (cf. Koh and
Tan, 2005). However, discussions with a number of
construction companies during this research suggest
that very few take advantage of the data available to
them to develop business decision support tools. At
best, their analysis is usually limited to basic sample sta-
tistics of averages or standard deviations. Against this
backdrop, we collaborated with a major UK water
infrastructure provider to investigate the use of data
mining techniques to develop cost models that can be
applied during the early estimation stages for more reli-
able cost forecasting. As already pointed out, a lack of
information for reliable estimation has been identified
as one of the main causes of cost growth in construc-
tion. It is hoped that data mining might help to convert
historical data on projects into decision support sys-
tems, to partly address the problem of insufficient
information for reliable estimation at the early stages
of a project. The problem of cost growth and its causes
are examined in the next section of the paper, followed
by an overview of data mining and its applications. The
data mining methodology was then applied to the prob-
lem of cost estimation in the construction industry
using artificial neural networks (ANNs). Some practical
implications of the research have been identified in the
conclusions along with some possible barriers to effec-
tive data mining within the construction industry.
Cost overruns
Chan and Chan (2004) conducted a critical analysis of
existing literature on construction benchmarking and
proposed a framework of both qualitative and quantita-
tive descriptors to evaluate the success of a construction
project. They validated their framework using three
hospital projects and noted that cost performance on
a construction project remains one of the main mea-
sures of success even though there were other emerging
qualitative measures like health and safety and environ-
mental performance. We have previously investigated
cost overruns on construction projects as part of a
wider research into the potential use of artificial neural
networks for construction cost estimation (Ahiaga-
Dagbui and Smith, 2012). We attempted to model final
cost using non-traditional cost factors such as project
location, access to site and procurement method. It
became obvious that estimating the final cost of pro-
jects can be extremely difficult due to the complex
web of cost-influencing factors that need to be consid-
ered. For a thorough and reliable estimate of final cost,
the estimator has to be able to take into consideration
factors such as the type of project, likely design and
scope changes, risk and uncertainty, effect of policy
and regulatory conditions, duration of project, type of
client, ground conditions or tendering method. Trying
to work out the influence of most of these variables at
the inception stage of a project can be an exhausting
task, if not altogether futile. Ignoring most of these fac-
tors also creates a recipe for possible cost growth, dis-
putes, lawsuits and even project termination in some
cases. Jennings (2012) employed a longitudinal ‘pro-
cess-tracking’ approach to examine the dynamics
between risk, optimism and uncertainty in construction
and how these interact with the phenomenon of cost
overruns using a case study of the 2012 London
Olympic Games. Jennings found that a high level of
uncertainty surrounds the cost estimation exercise
especially in the initial stages of the project, thus mak-
ing it difficult to produce reliable cost estimates. What
is then resorted to, in most cases, is the use of some
arbitrary percentages, the so-called contingency funds,
which unfortunately has mostly failed to keep construc-
tion projects within budget.
The Auditor General of Western Australia assessed
the management and performance of 20 capital-inten-
sive non-residential projects including sports venues,
schools and hospitals, undertaken within the state.
The expected cost of all the projects at the time was
A$6.157 billion, a staggering $3.275 billion (114%)
more than the total original approved budget estimates.
Fifteen of the 20 projects were expected to exceed their
original approved budgets, of which four were expected
to exceed their budgets by more than 200% (Auditor
General of Western Australia, 2012).
The 2012 London Olympics bid was awarded at
circa £2.4 billion in 2005. This was adjusted to about
£9.3 billion in 2007 after significant scope changes.
The project was eventually completed at £8.9 billion
in 2010 (cf. National Audit Office, 2012). The City





































to as the Big Dig) was to cost US$2.6 billion but was
completed at US$14.8 billion and seven years late in
2006 (Gelinas, 2007). The UK government-commis-
sioned report in 1998 on construction industry perfor-
mance indicated that over 50% of projects overspent
their budget (Egan, 1998). A similar report around
the same time in the US suggested that about 77% of
projects exceed their budget, sometimes to the tune
of over 200% (General Accounting Office, 1997). In
more recent years, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) sampled
258 infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion from
20 different countries and found that 90% of the
projects experienced budget escalation and that infra-
structure projects in particular have an 86% likelihood
of exceeding their initial estimates. Alex et al. (2010)
report up to 60% discrepancy between actual and
estimated costs of over 800 water and sewer projects
examined in their research. Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) thus
concluded that little learning seemed to be taking place
within the industry over time.
Sources of overrun
Cost overrun in the construction industry has been
attributed to a number of sources including technical
error in design or estimation, managerial incompetence,
risk and uncertainty, suspicions of foul play, deception
and delusion, and even corruption. Akintoye and
MacLeod (1997) conducted a questionnaire survey of
general contractors and projectmanagers in theUKcon-
struction industry to ascertain their perception of risk
and uncertainty as well as their use of various risk man-
agement techniques. They concluded that risk manage-
ment practice was largely experience and judgement
based and that formal risk management techniques such
as Monte Carlo simulation or stochastic dominance
were seldomused because of doubts as to their suitability
and lack of knowledge and understanding of these meth-
ods. The industry still seems to struggle to deal with
identifying and quantifying the impact of risk events.
This may probably be due to the nature of the industry:
it is fragmented, complex, each project spans several
years, is constructed in an environment open to inclem-
ent weather and has many different parties with varying
business interests. Flanagan and Norman (1993) sug-
gest that the task of risk management in most cases is
so poorly performed that far too much risk is passively
retained, an assertion supported by Jennings’ (2012)
recent case study of the possible sources of cost growth
on the 2012 London Olympic project.
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), as well as Wachs (1989,
1990) point to optimism bias and strategic misrepre-
sentation, or delusion and deception in other words,
as possible causes of cost growth particularly on large
publicly funded projects. Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) con-
ducted a desk study analysis of the cost performance
of 258 transportation projects worth US$90 billion
and categorized the sources of cost overruns on con-
struction projects into four groups: technical (error),
psychological, economic and political. They concluded
that cost escalation could not be adequately explained
by estimation error, but was more likely caused by
strategic misrepresentation: an intentional attempt to
mislead. They observed that nine out of 10 of the pro-
jects experienced significant cost escalation over their
construction period and that there was evidence of a
systematic bias in the cost estimates as the overruns
experienced did not appear to be randomly distributed.
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, p. 279) controversially con-
cluded that the cost estimates used to decide whether
projects should be given the go-ahead were ‘highly
and systematically misleading’, strongly suggesting foul
play by project promoters.
Further developments of the strategic misrepresen-
tation perspective by Flyvbjerg led to theories based
on optimism bias, after Weinstein (1980). Optimism
bias can be explained as the cognitive disposition to
evaluate possible negative future events in a fairer light
than suggested by inference from the base rates.
Flyvbjerg (2007) draws on this concept and suggested
that decision-making in policy and infrastructure plan-
ning is flawed by the planning fallacy that we know, or
at least are in control of all possible chains of events
from project inception to completion, thereby leading
to unjustifiable confidence in the prospects of the pro-
ject and unrealistic estimates. While strategic misrepre-
sentation is often intentional, according to Flyvbjerg
et al., optimism bias is not. Flyvberg makes this distinc-
tion between the two concepts with the terms ‘decep-
tion’ and ‘delusion’ respectively (Flyvbjerg, 2008). It
is plausible to reckon how strategic misrepresentation
and optimism bias might work in tandem with business
competition embedded in the lowest-bidder culture to
often create an unrealistic low cost target of projects
at the pre-construction phase of projects.
The proponents of another school of thought on
cost overruns, referred to as the ‘evolution theorists’,
include Love et al. (2012) as well as Gil and Lundrigan
(2012). They argue that projects essentially evolve sig-
nificantly between conception and completion so that it
might be misleading in most cases to make a direct
comparison between the costs at start and end of the
project. Their thesis statement is straightforward:
projects change, and when they do, they often come
with increasing costs. Love et al. (2012, p. 560) provide
a counter-perspective to the delusion and deception
perspective on cost overruns, instead suggesting that
the industry ‘move beyond strategic misrepresentation
and optimism bias’ to embrace a more holistic




































understanding of the phenomenon that includes some
level of the process and the social construct. They
introduce the concept of ‘pathogens’ for example, the
many events and actions that could not be accounted
for at the initial stages of the project that eventually
add on to expected cost as the main drivers of cost
growth. They further argue that Flyvbjerg’s analyses
are maybe too simplistic and not generalizable to all
projects undertaken within the industry. Their argu-
ment would seem sustainable, especially in respect of
small, privately funded projects that do not have strong
political or public interest. Besides, it is difficult to draw
valid distinctions, along a continuum of motivation,
from reasonable and justifiable optimism, through
overconfidence and delusion, culpable error, to deliber-
ate deceit using just statistical analysis, the method
adopted in Flyvbjerg’s works.
Love et al. (2005) also conducted a questionnaire
survey of 161 construction professionals in the Austra-
lian construction industry and found that rework was
one of the main contributors to escalation of cost.
The main sources of rework as found in their work
are ineffective use of information technology, staff turn-
over/allocation to other projects, incomplete design at
the time of tender, insufficient time to prepare contract
documentation and poor coordination between design
team members. This conclusion is similar to that
reached by Bordat et al. (2004) who found that the
‘dominant’ source of cost overrun was change orders
due mainly to ‘errors and omissions’ in design. In a
more recent research, Love et al. (2014) challenged
the strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias per-
spective by Flyvbjerg (2008) as lacking in verifiable
causality, and therefore limited in their application.
Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014) provide a more
detailed discussion on other possible causes of overruns
including technical and managerial difficulties and poor
estimation, as well as the dynamics between cost
growth and cognitive dispositions such as prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and Kruger-
Dunning effects (Kruger and Dunning, 1999).
Measuring overruns
It may be important to note here that much of the cur-
rent literature and media furore on cost overrun seems
to oversimplify its rather complex causes. As already
noted, most construction projects, especially publicly
funded capital-intensive projects tend to go through a
long gestation period after project conception during
which many changes to scope and accompanying costs
occur. Sometimes the initial scheme bears little resem-
blance to the defined project, as was the case of the
New Children Hospital in Western Australia (Auditor
General of Western Australia, 2012). The initially
approved budget for the hospital was A$207 million.
The scope at this stage was to relocate the Princess
Margaret Hospital to the Royal Perth Hospital. How-
ever, this scope completely changed during project def-
inition to the construction of a totally new Medical
Center at A$962 million, a cost increase of A$755 if
taken on cursory examination. The Holyrood Project
in Edinburgh also experienced a similar significant
scope change, and thereby the astonishing cost growth
recorded (see Audit Scotland, 2000, 2004). It seems
erroneous, therefore, to make a direct comparison
between the initial ‘estimate’ A and its final completion
cost B: the two schemes are usually very different. More
robust explanations of growth perhaps need to factor in
process and product, as well as sources of changes to
scope. Flyvbjerg’s works make a direct comparison
between costs A and B, and wherever B > A, overruns
are reported. It might be simplistic though, as pointed
out by Love et al. (2012, 2014), but probably justifiable
as estimate A is usually the estimate used to get project
approval when publicly funded projects are being
appraised. As it is often practically difficult to discon-
tinue a project once a considerable amount of money
has already been spent to get it started, it may thus be
crucial for the industry to find more effective ways of
project approval that deal better with underestimation
of true costs and the setting of unrealistic cost targets.
Going forward: estimating final cost
Alex et al. (2010) reviewed the cost performance on
more than 800 construction projects of Canada’s
Drainage and Maintenance Department and observed
a discrepancy of up to 60% between estimated and
actual final cost of projects completed between 1999
and 2004. They partly attributed this problem to the
fact that the Department’s estimation process was
heavily experienced based, relying largely on profes-
sional judgement, just as observed by Akintoye and
MacLeod (1997). A potential downside of experi-
enced-based estimation is the difficulty in thoroughly
evaluating the complex relationships between the many
cost-influencing variables already identified in this
paper, or its inability to quickly generate different cost
alternatives in a sort of what-if analysis. Furthermore,
as noted by Okmen and Öztas (2010) in their research
on cost analysis within an environment of uncertainty,
traditional cost estimation, i.e. the estimation of the
cost of labour, equipment and materials, and making
allowance for profits and overheads for individual con-
struction items, is deterministic by nature. It therefore
largely neglects and deals poorly with uncertainties





































deemed inadequate in reaching a reliable and realistic
final cost. As an alternative to traditional estimation
approaches, data mining, using the learning and gener-
alization algorithms within artificial neural networks in
combination with statistical bootstrapping and ensem-
ble modelling is used to develop final cost models in
this paper. The aim here is an attempt at circumventing
the problems posed by uncertainty and lack of informa-
tion for estimation in the early stages of a project.
Data mining
Data mining, otherwise referred to as knowledge discov-
ery in databases (KDD), is an analytic process for explor-
ing large amounts of data in search of consistent patterns,
correlations and/or systematic relationships between
variables, and then validating the findings by applying
the detected patterns to new subsets of data (StatSoft
Inc., 2008). Data mining attempts to scour databases
to discover hidden patterns and relationships in order
to findpredictive information for business improvement.
Questions that traditionally required extensive hands-on
analysis, experts and time, can potentially be quickly
answered from a firm’s existing data.
Goldberg and Senator (1998) report the use of pat-
tern discovery techniques by the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the United States
Department of Treasury since 1993 to detect potential
money laundering and fraudulent transactions from the
analysis of about 200 000 large cash transactions per
week. Using input factors such as age, housing, job title
and account balance, Huang et al. (2007) developed a
support vector machine credit scoring model to assess
loan applicants’ creditworthiness in an attempt to limit
a financing firm’s exposure to default. Hoffman et al.
(1997) have also explored the use of data visualization
and mining techniques for DNA sequencing in the area
of cell biology. Ngai et al. (2009) provide a comprehen-
sive review of data mining applications in customer
relationship management, classifying these applications
into four groups of customer identification, attraction,
retention and development. One-to-one marketing
and loyalty programmes targeted towards customer
retention seem to receive the most attention from
researchers.
Although data mining is yet to find extensive appli-
cation in practice within the construction industry, con-
struction management researchers have been
investigating its applicability to different problem areas.
Using some of the concepts of data mining and the the-
ory of inventive problem-solving, Zhang et al. (2009)
developed a value engineering knowledge management
system (VE-KMS) that collects, retains and reuses
knowledge from previous value engineering exercises
in an attempt to streamline future exercises, making
them more systematic, organized and problem-focused.
Cheng et al. (2012) also developed EFSIMT, a hybrid
fuzzy logic, support vector machines and genetic algo-
rithm inference model to predict the compressive
strength of high performance concrete using input fac-
tors such as the aggregate ratio, additives and working
conditions. This kind of model allows for a more reli-
able prediction of the strength of a particular mix for
design and quality control purposes as concrete
strength is generally affected by a lot of factors. There
is generally a higher rate of occupational injuries in
the construction industry than in industries like manu-
facturing for example (cf. Larsson and Field, 2002).
This might possibly be because of the dynamic and haz-
ardous environment of a typical construction site. Liao
and Perng (2008) thus employ association rule-based
data mining to identify the characteristics of occupa-
tional injuries reported between 1999 and 2004 in the
construction industry of Taiwan. Wet-weather related
injuries and fatalities were particularly significant in
their study.
Data mining process
Data mining normally follows a generic process of busi-
ness and data understanding, data preparation, model-
ling proper, evaluation of models, and deployment. It
starts with the selection of relevant data from a data
warehouse that contains information on organization
and business transactions of the firm. The selected
dataset is then pre-processed before actual data mining
commences. The pre-processing stage ensures that the
data are structured and presented to the model in the
most suitable way as well as offering the modeller the
chance to get to know the data thoroughly. Pre-pro-
cessing typically involves steps such as removing of
duplicate entries, sub-sampling, clustering, transforma-
tion, de-noising, normalization or feature extraction.
The next stage involves the actual modelling, where
one or a combination of data mining techniques is
applied to scour down the dataset to extract useful
knowledge. This process can sometimes be an elaborate
process involving the use of competitive evaluation of
different models and approaches and deciding on the
best model by some sort of bagging system (StatSoft
Inc., 2011). Table 1 provides a framework for selecting
a particular data mining technique. The type of model-
ling technique adopted depends on a number of fac-
tors, including the aim of the modelling exercise, the
predictive performance required and the type of data
available. Each modelling technique can also be evalu-
ated in terms of its characteristics. For example, regard-
ing ‘interpretability’, regression models generate an




































equation whose physical properties can be easily inter-
preted in terms of the variables used in explaining the
phenomenon under study (Hair et al., 1998). Neural
networks, on the other hand, do not produce any equa-
tion and have thus been derided as ‘black boxes’ by
some researchers including Sarle (1994). However,
their power and ability to model complex non-linear
relationships between predictors make them particu-
larly desirable for hard-to-learn problems and where a
priori judgements about variable relationships cannot
be justified (Adeli, 2001).
The results from the data mining stage are then
evaluated and presented into some meaningful form
to aid business decision-making. The knowledge gener-
ated is then validated by deploying the model in a
real-life situation to test the model’s efficacy.
Data
The data mining process described in the previous sec-
tion of this paper is now applied to cost estimation
within a partnering major water infrastructure client in
the UK. The aim here is twofold: to develop decision
support systems from existing data to complement the
existing estimation process within our collaborating
organization and also to investigate ways of circumvent-
ing the problem of lack of information for reliable esti-
mation at the early stages of a project. Many crucial
business decisions have to be made at this stage includ-
ing tender evaluations, contract award, project feasibil-
ity or securing loans to finance the project. Our
collaborating organization typically has three stage of
estimation before inviting bids from contractors. The
third stage estimate, Gate Three, is usually based on
about 50–60% completed scope design and is used for
evaluation of tenders after which detailed design is car-
ried out by the selected contractor in a sort of design and
build contract framework. The estimates produced by
the models developed in this paper thus allow the orga-
nization to forecast its total likely commitment before
tendering and before definitive estimates are available.
The data collection process involved an initial shad-
owing of the tendering and estimation procedure within
the organization. We were thus allowed to be quasi
members of the tendering team of the company on
some of its projects to observe how the estimates were
produced. It was also an opportunity to gain a first-
hand understanding of how the data to be used for
the modelling were generated and what different vari-
ables meant. The initial dataset contained over 5000
projects completed between 2000 and 2012. The scope
of these projects varied from construction of major
water treatment plants to minor repairs and upgrades.
Project values ranged from a mere £1000 to £30 mil-
lion and durations from three months to five years.
The initial analysis involved drilling down into the
database to find what might be useful in modelling final
cost. To ensure some level of homogeneity in the data,
K-means cluster analysis was used to create clusters of
project cases based on duration and cost. V-fold cross-
validation with Mahalanobis distance was used to
search for optimum number of clusters between two
and 10 clusters. This distance measure was preferred
to the popular square Euclidean distance because it
helps account for the variance of each variable as well
as the covariance between cost and duration of the pro-
ject cases. The cases to be used in the modelling also
had to be without significant missing data and fairly
representative of the entire dataset. One of the clusters
containing about 1600 projects completed between
2004 and 2012 was used for the models reported in this
paper. One hundred of these project cases were selected
using stratified random sampling with cost as the strata
variable to be used for independent second stage valida-
tion of the final models. Stratified random sampling
was used because this would hopefully allow for the
selection of cases that are representative of the entire
range of possible cases within the dataset. The remain-
ing data were then split in a 70:15:15% ratio for train-
ing, testing and first stage validation respectively.
Further details on the dataset used for the modelling
are found in Table 2.
Table 1 Framework for selecting a data mining technique



























































The pre-processing stage ensures that the data are
structured and presented to the model in the most suit-
able way as well as offering the modeller the chance to
get to understand the data thoroughly. Cost values
were normalized to a 2012 baseline using the infra-
structure resources cost indices by the Building Cost
Information Services (2012) with a base year 2000.
This allowed for cost values to be quite comparable
across different years. Numerical predictors were
further standardized to zScores using
zscore ¼ xi  l
r
(1)
where: zScore is the standardized value of a numerical
input, xi
μ is the mean of the numerical predictor
σ is the standard deviation of the numerical predic-
tor
Since neural networks were to be used for the actual
modelling exercise, standardizing either input or target
variable into a smaller range of variability would poten-
tially aid the effective learning of the neural net while
improving the numerical condition of the optimization
problem (StatSoft Inc., 2008). If one input has a range
of 0 to 1, while another has a range of 0 to 30 million, as
was the case in the data that were used in this analysis,
the net will expend most of its effort learning the sec-
ond input to the possible exclusion of the first. All cat-
egorical variables were coded using a binary coding
system.
The next stage involved deciding which predictors
to use in the modelling exercise. It was easy to remove
predictors such as project manager, project ID or year
of completion from the set of predictors on precursory
examination as they were likely not to be good predic-
tors when the model is used in practice. Table 3 con-
tains details on the set of initial predictors used at the
beginning of the modelling.
Cost model development
Data visualization using scatter and mean plots in the
earlier stages of the modelling suggested non-linear rela-
tionships between most of the variables and final cost.
Also, most of the predictors were categorical, rather than
the usual numeric type. It was thus decided to use artifi-
cial neural networks (ANNs) for the actual modelling
because of their ability to cope with non-linear relation-
ships and categorical variables (cf. Anderson, 1995). An
artificial neural network is an abstraction of the human
brain with abilities to learn from experience and general-
ize based on acquired knowledge (Moselhi et al., 1991).
It is also able to cope with multicollinearity, a statistical
condition where two or more variables are highly corre-
lated or dependent on each other thereby resulting in
spurious predictions when both of those variables are
included in the model (Marsh et al., 2004). Neural
networks have previously been applied to forecasting
tender price (Elhag and Boussabaine, 1998; Emsley
et al., 2002) and for quantification of risk in construction
byMcKim (1993). SeeMoselhi et al. (1991) for a review
of neural network application in construction manage-
ment research.
Standard models
The cost models were developed using an iterative pro-
cess of fine-tuning the network parameters and inputs
until acceptable error levels were achieved or when
the model showed no further improvement. The model
training began with a search for optimal model param-
eters. This was done in a trial and error manner to
begin with, training several networks and examining
them for possible performance improvement using the
input factors in Table 3 and cost at completion as
model output. Two different network architectures,
the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) and the Radial Basis
Function (RBF), were tried at this stage. RBF models
the relationship between inputs and targets in two
phases: it first performs a probability distribution of
the inputs before searching for relationships between
the input and output space in the next stage (StatSoft
Inc., 2008). MLPs on the other hand model using just
the second stage of the RBF. The MLP models were
superior to the RBF networks and so the rest of the
modelling was carried out using just MLPs. It was
found that the best trial results were achieved with
MLPs with a single hidden layer having 3–10 nodes.
Consequently, using a custom range of 3–10 hidden
nodes in one hidden layer, a dataset size split of 70%
for training, 15% for testing and another 15% for first
Table 2 Overview of data used for model development







c.1600 Water mains, manholes, combined sewer overflows,
repairs, upgrades
Client £4000 to £15
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1 month to 5
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stage validation, 1000 networks were trained, retaining
the best 10 performing networks for further examina-
tion. These 10 networks were selected based on their
overall performance, measured using the correlation
coefficient between predicted and output values as well
as the mean sum of mean squared errors (MSE). MSE






where Oi is the predicted final cost of the ith data case
(output); Ti is the actual final cost of the ith data case
(target) and n is the sample size.
The higher the MSE value, the poorer the network
at generalization, whereas the higher the correlation
coefficient, the better the network. The p-values of
the correlation coefficients were also computed to
measure their statistical significance. The higher the
p-value, the less reliable the observed correlations.
The best 10 retained networks were then further
validated using the 100 independent validation cases
that were selected using the stratified sampling at the
beginning of the modelling exercise.
Five different activation functions, i.e. identity,
logistic, tanh, exponential and the sine functions were
iterated in both hidden and output layers, using gradient
descent, conjugate descent and the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) training algorithms. See
Fausett (1994) and Gurney (1997) for the fundamen-
tals for neural network architectures, algorithms, or
Skapura (1996) for a practical guide to developing neu-
ral network models. Early stopping, the process of halt-
ing training when the model error stops decreasing, was
used to prevent memorizing or over-fitting the dataset in
order to improve generalization. Over-fitted models
perform very well on training and testing data, but fail
to generalize satisfactorily when new ‘unseen’ cases
are used to validate their performance.
Redundant predictors, those that do not add new
information to the model because they basically contain
the same information at another level with other vari-
ables, were detected using Spearman correlations, bi-
variate histograms or cross-tabulation. These were ten-
dering strategy, procurement option and type of soil.
This is likely due to the invariant nature of these predic-
tors as most of the projects were procured through
design and build contracts with a mix of open-compet-
itive and negotiated tendering strategies. Type of soil
was found to be linearly dependent on ground condi-
tion, thereby not making any additional contribution
to the model’s output.
All the best 10 models identified at this stage had 12
input nodes from five input factors. These five signifi-
cant input factors are purpose of project (wastewater,
water or general), scope of project (new-build, upgrade
or replacement), ground condition (contaminated or
non-contaminated ground), delivery partner (anony-
mized as X, Y, Z) and estimated project duration.
The models also had between three and seven nodes
in a single hidden layer with one output, i.e. final cost.
They were trained with a tanh or logistic activation
function between their input and hidden layers, and
an identity transfer function in the output layer.
Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is a general technique, attributed to
Efron (1992), for estimating sampling distributions that
allow for treating the observed data as though it were the
entire (discrete) statistical population (StatSoft Inc.,
Table 3 Initial list of variables for model development
Type of data
Category
1 2 3 4
Project information
1 Tendering strategy Open competitive Selective competitive Negotiated Serial
2 Procurement option Design-bid-build Design and build Management types Partnering
Site information
3 Ground condition Contaminated Non-contaminated Made-up –
4 Type of soil Good Moderate Poor –
Other information
5 Delivery partner* X Y Z –
6 Scope of project New-build Upgrade Refurbishment Replacement
7 Purpose of project Wastewater Water General –
8 Operating region North South East West
Notes: Other factors include project duration (months) and awarded target cost (£). Model output was final cost at completion (£).





































2011). It provides an avenue for using subsamples from
a sample in a manner that addresses the variability and
uncertainty in statistical inferences. Traditional
approaches to statistical inference are based on the
assumption of normality in the data distribution. This
is reasonable and largely accepted but where this
assumption is wrong, Efron (1992) warns that the cor-
responding sampling distribution of the statistic may
be seriously questionable. In contrast, non-parametric
bootstrapping provides a way to estimate a statistic of
population without explicitly deriving the sample distri-
bution. During the development of the models pre-
sented so far, the dataset was divided into three
subsets for training, testing and validation. On a closer
examination, this might be regrettable, as not all the
data get used for training, testing or validation, and thus
some level of information within the entire dataset is lost
in the learning process. If bootstrapping is employed, a
different split of data is used each time for training or
testing so as to glean as much information as possible
from the entire dataset.
Statisticians disagree though on the number of
bootstrap samples (BS) necessary to produce reliable
results. Most textbooks suggest choosing a sufficiently
large bootstrap sample size without specific guidance
on an optimum size. Efron and Tibshirani (1993), as
well as Pattengale et al. (2009), however, suggest that
a minimum of 100 or a maximum of 500 BS is gener-
ally sufficient in most cases. Bootstrapping was thus
applied to the dataset in this manner: 600 different
training, validation, testing BS sample sets were gener-
ated by perturbing the entire dataset for each model
using sampling with replacement over a uniform prob-
ability distribution. This should ensure that as many
data cases as possible get used in the training, valida-
tion or testing samples sets. With the same inputs, neu-
ral network architectures, activation functions, hidden
layers and nodes used in the case of the standard sam-
ple models developed in the previous section, 1000
neural network models were then trained and tested,
retaining the best 10 performing models just as before.
The 10 retained models were then further validated
using the 100 separate validation cases just as was done
previously.
Figure 1 shows the performance of the best 10 mod-
els from both the standard and bootstrapped models
validated with the 100 validation cases. It is obvious
that bootstrapped models far outperform the standard
models. While the bootstrapped models overestimated
actual final cost by about 4% on average, the standard
models overestimated by 8.35% on average. Further-
more, the bootstrapped models underestimated actual
final cost with an average error of about –6%, whereas
the standard models averaged about –10%. This per-
formance improvement is likely due to the fact that
by using the 600 bootstrapped sample sets, the models
were afforded a wider learning space than the standard
models. The bootstrapped models were then carried
forward for further analysis discussed below.
Ensemble network
All modelling techniques are prone to two main types
of error, bias and variance, largely because models
essentially try to reduce complicated problems into
simple forms and then attempt to solve the ‘reduced’
problem using an imperfect finite dataset. Bias is the
average error any particular model will make across dif-
ferent datasets whereas variance reflects the sensitivity
of the model to a particular choice of dataset (StatSoft
Inc., 2011). The use of ensembles can improve the
results that are produced from individual models by
combining them in a way that achieves some sort of
compromise between variance and bias. Also known
as committee methods (cf. Oza, 2006), ensembles
attempt to leverage the power of multiple models to
achieve better prediction accuracy than any of the indi-
vidual models could on their own. It is perhaps a way of
consulting a ‘committee of several experts’, the 10 dif-
ferent bootstrapped models in this case, before reaching
a final decision either by averaging, voting or by
‘winner-takes-all’, whichever is most appropriate (see
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Figure 1 Validation results (standard models vs bootstrap-
ping)





Standard models +8.35% –9.6%
Bootstrapped models +3.84% –5.81%
Ensemble model +2.33% –3.83%




































at least in theory, is a model (the ensemble) that is more
consistent in its predictions and on average, at least as
good as the individual networks from which it was built.
A weighted average algorithm was thus applied to com-
bine the 10 best bootstrapped models to trade off bias
and variance to improve performance.
Table 4 compares the performance of the ensemble
model with the bootstrapped models and the standard
models. It is obvious that significant improvement has
been achieved by applying the ensemble technique to
the 10 bootstrapped models.
In Table 5, details of a sample of 20 results out of
the 100 validation cases used to test the ensemble
model are highlighted. It shows a comparison between
the ensemble final cost prediction and the actual final
cost of the project, with a measure of the actual mone-
tary error observed.
Table 6 shows a summary the performance of the
ensemble model for all the 100 validation cases. Note
that 92% of the 100 validation predictions were within
±10% of the actual final cost of the project with 77%
within ±5% of actual final cost. Only eight out of the
100 validations had predictions beyond ±10% of the
final cost of the project case.
Conclusion
A lot of project and cost information is usually gener-
ated on any one particular construction project. If this
is done in a meaningful and retrievable manner for a
number of projects over time, a vast database of poten-
tially valuable assets results. This can be converted into
valuable decision support systems using data mining
methodologies. The possibilities are that these decision
support systems could help construction practitioners
in making better informed and reliable decisions as well
as reducing the time and resources spent in reaching
these decisions.
Cost growth, attributed to a number of causes
including the unavailability and uncertainty of neces-
sary information for reliable estimation at the early
Table 5 Sample results from ensemble model validation
Case Actual final cost (000) Ensemble prediction (000) Ensemble error (000) Ensemble absolute % error
1 4846 4990 (144) 2.97
2 1586 1590 (4) 0.25
3 24 986 23 760 1226 4.91
4 11 143 10 934 209 1.88
5 5328 5765 (437) 8.20
6 3787 3723 64 1.69
7 17 346 16 967 379 2.18
8 4136 4033 103 2.49
9 3117 2994 123 3.95
10 1000 939 61 6.10
11 1773 1674 99 5.58
12 3779 3600 179 4.74
13 209 192 17 8.13
14 3960 3810 150 3.79
15 294 300 (6) 2.04
16 2296 2220 76 3.31
17 2104 2038 66 3.14
18 248 247 1 0.40
19 208 192 16 7.69
20 201 197 4 1.99
Table 6 Summary of validation performance of ensemble model
Number of cases Percentage of total validation set
Within ±5% 77 77
±5% < x > ±10% 15 15






































stages of a project, remains one of the major problems
in the construction industry. We make a case for using
data mining in modern construction management as a
key business tool to help transform information embed-
ded in construction data into decision support systems
that can complement traditional estimation methods
for more reliable final cost forecasting. Using a combi-
nation of non-parametric bootstrapping and ensemble
modelling in artificial neural networks, cost models
were developed to estimate the final construction cost
of water infrastructure projects. It was found that
92% of the 100 validation predictions were within
±10% of the actual final cost of the project with 77%
within ±5% of actual final cost. We are now exploring
avenues of transforming the models into standalone
desktop applications for deployment within the opera-
tions of the industry partner that collaborated in this
research.
The models developed will be particularly useful at
the pre-contract stage of the partnering construction
firm that participated in this research as it will provide
a benchmark for evaluating submitted tenders. They
could further allow the quick generation of various
alternative solutions for a construction project using
‘what-if’ analysis for the purposes of comparison. The
method and approach adopted to develop the models
can be extended to even more detailed estimation so
long as relevant data can be acquired. It must be
pointed out that reliable cost planning and estimation
forms only one aspect of dealing with cost growth in
construction. A more holistic approach must include
effective project governance and client leadership,
accountability and measures of cost control. Also, an
effective data mining exercise does depend heavily on
both quantity and quality of data. Companies that want
to employ data mining techniques thus have to be
intentional in how they collect and store their data,
making sure these are relevant business and operational
data to solve the problem at hand.
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MY COST RUNNETH OVER: DATA MINING TO 
REDUCE CONSTRUCTION COST OVERRUNS 
Dominic D. Ahiaga-Dagbui
1
 and Simon D. Smith 
School of Engineering, University of Edinburgh, EH9 3JL, UK 
Most construction projects overrun their budgets. Among the myriad of explanations 
giving for construction cost overruns is the lack of required information upon which 
to base accurate estimation. Much of the financial decisions made at the time of 
decision to build is thus made in an environment of uncertainty and oftentimes, guess 
work. In this paper, data mining is presented as a key business tool to transform 
existing data into key decision support systems to increase estimate reliability and 
accuracy within the construction industry. Using 1600 water infrastructure projects 
completed between 2004 and 2012 within the UK, cost predictive models were 
developed using a combination of data mining techniques such as factor analysis, 
optimal binning and scree tests. These were combined with the learning and 
generalising capabilities of artificial neural network to develop the final cost models. 
The best model achieved an average absolute percentage error of 3.67% with 87% of 
the validation predictions falling within an error range of ±5%. The models are now 
being deployed for use within the operations of the industry partner to provide real 
feedback for model improvement. 
Keywords: artificial neural networks, cost estimation, cost overrun, data mining, 
decision support system. 
INTRODUCTION 
The business landscape is continually experiencing a growing recognition of 
information as a key competitive tool. Companies that are able to successfully collect, 
analyse and understand the information available to them are among the winners in 
this new information age (Huang et al. 2006). Available computing hardware and 
database technology allows for easy, efficient and reliable data storage and retrieval. 
Additionally, widespread use of networked computers and sophisticated database 
systems enables companies to pool their data together from across different 
geographical locations using data servers. However, the amount of data generated by 
these firms presents both a challenge and opportunity - a challenge to traditional 
methods of data analysis since the data are often complex, and of course, voluminous. 
On the other hand, construction firms stand a chance of gaining competitive edge and 
performance improvement in different areas if they are able to make their data work 
for them using data mining.  
As pointed out by Fayyad et al. (1996a), the real value of storing data lies in the 
ability to exploit useful trends and patterns in the data to meet business, operational, or 
scientific goals as well as for decision support and policy making. Present advances in 
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the fields of data warehousing, artificial intelligence, statistics, data visualisation 
techniques and machine learning  now make it possible for data to be transformed into 
valuable asset by automating laborious but rewarding knowledge discovery in 
databases (Bose and Mahapatra 2001).  Data mining, knowledge discovery in 
databases,  has been extensively used in fields such as business (Apte et al. 2002), 
finance (Kovalerchuk and Vityaev 2000) and medicine (Koh and Tan 2011). 
However, informal discussions with a number of construction companies suggest that 
very few take advantage of their data, transforming it into cutting edge business 
decision support tools. Against this backdrop, the authors have provided an overview 
of the field of data mining with some specific applications in construction 
management. The data mining methodology is then applied to the problem of cost 
estimation in the construction industry using Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). Final 
cost prediction models were developed using the vast project database of a major 
water utility provider in the UK. The aim was to convert the experience and 
knowledge imbedded in past projects into intelligence and decision support systems 
that could potentially improve the accuracy of construction cost estimation, thereby 
reducing the problem of cost overruns.  
DATA MINING  
Data mining is an analytic process for exploring large amounts of data in search of 
consistent patterns, correlations and/or systematic relationships between variables, and 
to then validate the findings by applying the detected patterns to new subsets of data 
(StatSoft Inc 2008). Data mining attempts to scour databases to discover hidden 
patterns and relationships in order to find predictive information for business 
improvement. Data mining has been applied to detect money laundry and fraudulent 
transactions by Senator et al. (1995), investigate the effectiveness of sales campaigns 
by Ngai et al. (2009), intrusion detection in computer network administration by 
Julisch (2002) and for loan repayment assessment (see Lee et al. 2006). 
Although it is yet to find extensive application in practice within the construction 
industry, construction management researchers have started investigating data 
mining’s applicability to different problems. It has been applied to improving 
construction knowledge management (Yu and Lin 2006), estimating the productivity 
of construction equipment (Yang et al. 2003), study of occupational injuries (Cheng, 
Leu, et al. 2012), alternative dispute resolution (Fan and Li in press) and prediction of 
the compressive strength high performance concrete (Cheng, Chou, et al. 2012).  
Data Mining Process 
Data mining normally follows a generic process illustrated in Figure 1. It starts with 
the selection of relevant data from a data warehouse that contains information on 
organisation and business transactions of the firm (Ngai et al. 2009). The selected data 
set is then pre-processed before actual data mining commences. The pre-processing 
stage ensures that the data are structured and presented to the model in the most 
suitable way as well as offer the modeller the chance to get to know the data 
thoroughly and avoid the curse of ‘garbage-in-garbage-out’. Pre-processing typically 
involves steps such as removing of duplicate entries, sub-sampling, clustering, 
transformation, de-noising, normalisation or feature extraction (StatSoft Inc. 2011b). 
The authors however note the issue of unavailable of relevant data as a potential 
barriers to effective data mining in the construction industry as most firms do not have 
a culture of storing detailed information about the projects they undertake.  




The next stage involves the actual modelling, where one or a combination of data 
mining techniques is applied to scour down the dataset to extract useful knowledge. 
The type of modelling approach adopted would depend on the a number of factors, 
chief of which would normally be the type and quantity of data available, the aim of 
the modelling exercise and the predictive performance required (StatSoft Inc 2008). 
This is often an elaborate process, sometimes involving the use of competitive 
evaluation of different models and approaches and deciding on the best model by 
some sort of bagging system (voting or averaging) (StatSoft Inc. 2011a). Some of the 
available modelling techniques include case-based reasoning, principal component 
analysis, regression, decision trees, machine learning, genetic algorithm, fuzzy logic, 
as well as artificial neural networks, which has been used for the experimental part of 
this paper. The results from the data mining stage are then evaluated and presented 
into some meaningful form to aid business decision making. This step might involve 
graphical representation or visualisation of the model for easy communication. The 
knowledge generated is then validated by deploying the model in a real life situation 
to test the model’s efficacy (Koh and Tan 2011).  
It is important to note however that data mining in itself does not guarantee success 
when the models are deployed. For instance, if one seeks long enough in any database, 
it is possible to find patterns and seeming interrelations between variables which are 
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Figure 1: The generic data mining process 
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actually not valid (Fayyad et al. 1996b), resulting in model failure when deployed in 
real life. Also, no amount of data will allow for accurate prediction based on attributes 
that do not capture the required information. Success from any data mining venture is 
predicated on the availability of quality and quantity of data (StatSoft Inc. 2011a). The 
data must essentially contain data attributes that are relevant to the problem under 
investigation.  
COST OVERRUNS 
Cost performance on a construction project remains one of the main measures of the 
success of a construction project (Atkinson 1999; Chan and Chan 2004). However, 
estimating the final cost of construction projects can be extremely difficult due to the 
complex web of cost influencing factors that need to be considered (Ahiaga-Dagbui 
and Smith 2012) - type of project, likely design and scope changes, ground conditions, 
duration, type of client, tendering method- the list is endless. Trying to work out the 
cost influence of most of these variables at the inception stage of a project where cost 
targets are normally set can an exhaustive task, if not at all futile. Ignoring most of 
them altogether creates a perfect recipe for future cost overruns. Also, a high level of 
uncertainty surrounds most of these factors at the initial stages of the project (Jennings 
2012).  
Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) report that 9 out 10 infrastructure projects overrun their 
budgets and that infrastructure project have an 86% likelihood of exceeding their 
budgets. The on-going Edinburgh Trams project has already far exceeded its initial 
budget leading to significant scope reduction to curtail the ever-growing cost (Miller 
2011; Railnews 2012). The recent 2012 London Olympics bid was awarded at circa 
£2.4 billion in 2005. This was adjusted to about £9.3 billion in 2007 after significant 
scope changes. The project was completed at £8.9 billion in 2010 (Gidson 2012; NAO 
2012). These statistics have often led to extensive claims, disputes and lawsuits in 
some cases within the industry (Love et al. 2010).  
Causes of overruns have been attributed to several sources including improperly 
managed risk and uncertainty (Okmen and Öztas 2010), scope creep (Love et al. 
2011), optimism bias (Jennings 2012) to suspicions of foul-play and corruption 
(Wachs 1990; Flyvbjerg 2009). Another potential root cause of overruns is the lack of 
adequate information on which to base realistic and accurate estimates. Nicholas 
(2004) points out that estimators thus have to rely largely on their own experience and 
historical cost information when preparing initial estimates. Typically, an estimate can 
only be as good as the information it is based on so that, ceteris paribus, the level of 
accuracy of the estimates produced also increases as more information becomes 
available. Data mining is thus deemed as a possible way of capturing valuable 
information within historical data to support the estimation process at the initial stages 
of project definition. 
DATA 
The data used for the models in this paper were supplied by an industry partner with 
its primary operation in the delivery of water infrastructure and utility in the UK. The 
authors were granted access to the vast database of almost 5000 projects completed 
between 2000 and 2012. The scope of these projects varied from construction of major 
water treatment plants to minor repairs and upgrade. Project values ranged from 
£1000 - £30 million and durations from a short 3 months to 5 years.  
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The initial analysis involved drilling down into the database to find what might be 
useful in modelling final cost. First, cluster analysis and purposive sampling was used 
to create groups of project cases that were similar, without significant missing data or 
extreme values and representative of the entire dataset. One of the clusters containing 
about 1600 projects completed between 2004 and 2012, with cost range of between 
£4000 -15 million, comprising newly built, upgrade, repair or refurbishment projects 
was used for the models reported in this paper. 15 project cases were selected using 
stratified random sampling to be used for independent testing of the final models. The 
remaining data was then split in an 80:20% ratio for training and testing of the models, 
respectively.  
The next stage involved deciding which predictors to use in the modelling exercise. It 
was easy to remove predictors such as project manager, project ID or year of 
completion from the set of predictors on precursory examination as they were likely 
not to be good predictors when the model is used in practice. Redundant predictors, 
those that do not add new information to the model because they basically contain the 
same information at another level with other variables, were detected using spearman 
correlations, bi-variate histograms or cross-tabulation. Further variable screening 
using scree test, factor analysis and optimal binning in Statistica 10 software was used 
to reduce the initial set of predictors to six
2
 
Cost values were normalised to a 2012 baseline with base year 2000 using the 
infrastructure resources cost indices by the Building Cost Information Services (BCIS 
2012). Numerical predictors were further standardized to zScores using  
          
    
 
       Equation 1 
where:   zScore is the standardized value of a numerical input, xi 
  µ is the mean of the numerical predictor 
  σ is the standard deviation of the numerical predictor 
Since neural networks was to be used for the actual modelling exercise, standardizing 
either input or target variable into a smaller range of variability would potentially aid 
the effective learning of the neural net whiles improving the numerical condition of 
the optimization problem (StatSoft Inc 2008). If one input has a range of 0 to 1, while 
another  has a range of 0 to 30 million, as was the case in the data that were used in 
this analysis, the net will expend most of its effort learning the second input to the 
possible exclusion of the first. All categorical variables were coded using a binary 
coding system.  
COST MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Data visualisation using scatter and mean plots in the earlier stages of the modelling 
suggested non-linear relationships between most of the variables and final cost. Also, 
most of the predictors are categorical, rather than numerical in nature. It was thus 
decided to use Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) for the actual modelling because of 
their ability to cope with non-linear relationships and categorical variables (Anderson 
1995). ANN, an abstraction of the human brain with abilities to learn from experience 
and generalise based on acquired knowledge, is also able to cope with 
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multicollinearity (Moselhi et al. 1991), a characteristic of construction data 
(Boussabaine and Elhag 1999). Neural networks has already been used to develop 
prototype models at an earlier stage of the this research (see Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 
2012) and has also been applied to forecasting tender price (Emsley et al. 2002) and 
for identification and quantification of risk by McKim (1993). See Moselhi et al. 
(1991) for a review of neural network application in construction management 
research. 
The final model was developed after an iterative process of fine-tuning the network 
parameters and/or inputs until acceptable error levels were achieved or when the 
model showed no further improvement. First, the automatic network search function 
of Statistica 10 software was used to optimise the search for the best network 
parameters, after which customized networks were developed using the optimal 
parameters identified. 5 activations functions
3
 were used at this stage in both hidden 
and output layers, training 2000 multi-layer perceptron networks and retaining the 5 
best for further analysis. The overall network performance was measured using the 
correlation coefficient between predicted and output values as well as the Sum of 
Squares (SOS) of errors. SOS is defined here as: 
            
  ……Equation 2 
Where   Oi is the predicted final cost of the ith data case (Output) 
  Ti is the actual final cost of the ith data case (Target). 
 
The higher the SOS value, the poorer the network at generalisation, whereas the 
higher the correlation coefficient, the better the network. The p-values of the 
correlation coefficients were also computed to measure their statistical significance. 
The higher the p-value, the less reliable the observed correlations. 
The retained networks are then validated using the 15 separate projects that were 
selected using stratified sampling at the beginning of the modelling exercise. See 
Figure 2 for the overall performance of 7 of the retained networks. This plot allowed 
for a quick comparison of the average error achieved by the selected models.  A 
sensitivity analysis was performed on each retained network to assess predictor’s 
contribution to network performance. To do this, the model’s predictive performance 
is measured while deleting one input factor at a time, starting from the least important, 
until the model showed no further improvement or begun to decay.  
Table 1 shows the predictions and absolute percentage errors (APE) achieved by 
model 33, which as the best overall model. The average APE achieved by model 33 
was 3.67% across the 15 validation cases. Its APEs ranged between 0.04% and 
15.85%. It was observed that the worst performances of the model were achieved on 
projects with the smallest values in the validation set (cases 13 & 15). This might 
potentially be because a majority of the projects used for the model training had 
values in excess of £5 million. However, the real monetary errors on these predictions 
were deemed satisfactory as they were relatively small (about £3500 & £2500 for 
models 13 & 15 respectively). 87% of the validation predictions of the best model 
were within ±5% of the actual cost of the project. 
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Figure 2: Performance of selected models 
Table 1: Validation results of the best model (Model 33) 
Validation 
Case 
Actual Final Cost Final Cost 
predicted 
Model  Error Model Absolute 
% Error 
1 £     4,912,649 £        5,120,943 -£         208,294 4.24% 
2 £     1,617,225 £        1,617,805 -£                580 0.04% 
3 £   11,277,470 £      10,743,624 £         533,846 4.73% 
4 £     2,110,260 £        2,136,125 -£           25,865 1.23% 
5 £     5,398,965 £        5,425,142 -£           26,177 0.48% 
6 £        180,532 £           181,214 -£                681 0.38% 
7 £     2,572,564 £        2,530,178 £           42,386 1.65% 
8 £     1,440,593 £        1,372,864 £           67,729 4.70% 
9 £     3,842,258 £        3,793,851 £           48,407 1.26% 
10 £     4,194,219 £        4,131,285 £           62,934 1.50% 
11 £        375,170 £           387,731 -£           12,561 3.35% 
12 £          50,637 £            51,502 -£                865 1.71% 
13 £          24,479 £            22,017 £             2,462 10.06% 
14 £        858,112 £           824,334 £           33,779 3.94% 
15 £          21,798 £            18,344 £             3,454 15.85% 
Average Absolute % Error 3.67% 
 
CONCLUSION 
The authors make a case for using data mining in modern construction management as 
a key business tool to improve construction performance. This could essentially help 
construction firms to transform their data into cutting edge decision support systems 
for business improvement and gain competitive advantage. An overview of data 
mining and its methodology, as well as applications have been detailed in the paper. 
The method was then applied to the problem of final cost estimation of construction 
project using artificial neural networks. Cost estimation was chosen for this study as 
one of the main reasons cited for cost overruns is the lack of information at the initial 






















Average Underestimation -5% -3% -8% -2% -11% -15% -12% 

























Performance of Retained Models 
Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 
566 
 
already existing information, in combination with what is known about the new 
project to make its forecasts of final cost. The best model in this paper achieved an 
average absolute percentage error of 3.67% with 87% of the validation predictions 
falling within an error range of ±5%. The authors are now exploring avenues of 
transforming the models into standalone desktop applications for deployment within 
the operations of the industry partner that collaborated in this research. 
The authors however identify a poor culture of data warehousing in the construction 
industry as one of the major challenges to effective data mining. For most construction 
companies, relevant data for modelling construction processes is sparse or even 
unavailable. Data mining depends heavily on the availability of business, operational 
and project data, stored in a meaningful and retrieval manner. Also, it is important to 
point out that the potential benefits of data mining are not overstated or lauded by 
researchers or practitioners as panaceas in themselves. Its limitations and potential 
pitfalls must always be clearly communicated to the end user.  
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Successfully managing large construction projects within defined budget and time 
constraints has always been a major challenge largely because crucial decisions about 
the project's ultimate fate have to be made within an environment of significant 
uncertainty at the beginning of the project. It is not surprising that cost and time 
overruns are commonplace on construction projects. Existing literature often suggests 
economical, technical, political or managerial roots to this phenomenon. A less 
explored possible cause within construction management framework is the escalation 
of commitment to a course of action. This theory, grounded in social psychology and 
organisation behaviour, suggests the tendency of people and organisations to become 
'locked-in' and 'entrapped' in a particular course of action and thereby 'throw good 
money after bad' to make the venture succeed. This defies conventional rationality 
behind subjective expected utility theory. Through a critical analysis of the literature, 
we identify different frequently cited enablers of escalation of commitment.  Using a 
hindsight constructivist approach, we then demonstrate references to some of these 
enablers on the Scottish Parliament project. We found strong evidence in support of 
possible strategic misrepresentation, confirmation bias, self-justification and optimism 
bias. We highlight the importance of setting realistic time and budget constraints to 
circumvent escalation and make several recommendations to attenuate unwarranted 
escalation of commitment, including the use of  an objective outsider to evaluate 
responses to disconfirming information and the structuring of incentive systems that 
do not punish for inconsistency in order to curb the effects of  self-justification and 
reputation management.  
Keywords: cost overruns, confirmation bias, escalation of commitment, self-
justification, strategic misrepresentation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Literature in social psychology and organisational behaviour suggests that after 
investing time, money, energy and other resources in a chosen course of action, 
individuals and decision makers often become "locked-in" or "entrapped" in that 
course of action, sometimes even if the venture is failing. Staw's (1976, 1981) seminal 
work on escalation of commitment seeks to explain why decision makers sometimes 
embark on a questionable course of action and then persist with them above and 
beyond what the objective facts suggest. The thesis of his work suggests that negative 
feedback on a previous decision often tends to rouse the feeling of self-justification 
and regret of that particular decision, thereby resulting in a reinforcement of additional 
                                               
1 D.Ahiaga-Dagbui@ed.ac.uk 
resources (money, time or effort)  to try and make the course of action pay off. 
Consider the following situations:  
1. A representative of an equity firm makes a decision to invest £5 million in a 
new IT start-up that is expected to take about 3 years to develop and 
implement. It emerges after two years that the IT firm is having liquidity issues 
and that the product might require additional funds of £2.5 million and a year's 
extension. The equity firm must decide whether to write-off the initial £5 
million investment or commit the additional funds to give the project a chance 
of success. Should they cut their losses now, risk losing a total £7.5 million, or 
stake their chance at gaining much more should the project eventually succeed? 
2. A Government proposes an grand project that will represent the essence and 
ideals of a people and be a symbol of devolution and national distinctiveness  
at £40 million. Two years later, it becomes obvious that it is impossible to 
complete the project at that cost and a new estimate was set at £119 million, 
with legislators imposing a cap of £195 million in the third year. By the 4th 
year, cost had increased to £241 million, rising twice in the 5th year to £295 
million amidst several controversies. By the 6th year the cost reaches £376 
million before project completion at £431 million in the 7th year.  
Although each of the cases above presents different decision making situations, they 
both have a common trait - sequential decision patterns with one decision being made 
based on a previous. In each case also, a considerable amount of time, money and 
effort has already been committed to the venture and the results do not seem to be 
going as initially intended. Arkes and Blumer (1985) suggested that investment of 
resources often sets in motion non-rational sequential decision making process, with 
one form of commitment begetting further commitment. They further suggest that the 
more responsibility a person has for the outcome of an initial decision, the greater is 
the inertia towards further commitment. This tendency however, as noted by 
Bazerman and Moore (2008) defies the conventional rationality behind subjective 
expected utility theory which suggests that sunk costs or past losses should not enter 
into decisions regarding future gain (Bazerman and Moore 2008). 
Using the theoretical framework described in the discourse above, this paper will 
explore the sources of escalation of commitment using the case study of the Scottish 
Parliament project. We examine official government publications and documentary 
evidence from the public enquiry that followed the controversies surrounding the 
project using a hindsight constructivist research approach. We focus on the events 
before and during the construction that created an environment for escalation and how 
these possibly led to the inevitable cost and duration overrun on the project. The next 
section of the paper explores the theory of escalation more closely, before we examine 
the Holyrood project for evidence of the locked-in syndrome. We then reveal some 
lessons learnt from the case study for construction project management with 
recommendations on how to attenuate unwarranted escalation tendencies. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ESCALATION OF 
COMMITMENT 
Decision making experiments have provided a lot of evidence that individuals have a 
systematic bias towards escalation of commitment. Some of the reasons provided 
include a failure to treat previous investments as sunk cost (Arkes and Blumer 1985), 
self-justification (Staw 1981) and anticipated regret (Sarangee et al. 2013). In some 
cases, decision makers have used escalation of investments as opportunity to redeem a 
previous sub-optimal choice (Kahneman 1994) whiles Brockner (1992) posits that 
escalation tendencies may be buoyed by personal responsibility for negative 
consequences. Traditional economic decision making models suggest that people are 
rational and would make decisions in an attempt to maximise expected utility. Sunk 
costs (past investments) must essentially therefore be considered as historical and 
irrecoverable, thus should not be considered in decisions regarding future course of 
action (Bazerman and Moore 2008). However, Barnes' (1984) work supports the 
supposition that decision making is often biased in favour of retrospective rationality- 
the sunk cost effect.  
Organisations also demonstrate escalation tendencies, albeit in a more complex 
manner, according to Guler (2007). The presence of multiple members for decision 
making in organisations normally should increase the likelihood of recognising the 
irrationality of escalating commitment to a failing course of action. Bazerman et al 
(1984) thus found that groups are less likely than individuals to escalate commitment. 
They however added that where groups do escalate, they tend to do so to a greater 
degree than individuals, possibly because group dynamics tends to increase the level 
of justification to continue to support an initial venture.  We refer to this here as the 
strength in numbers effect. 
A tale of two schools 
There are essentially two schools of thought on escalation phenomenon. Decision error 
theorists, after Staw (1976), maintain that escalation is a result of a systematic bias in 
decision making where people, especially those that have personal responsibility for 
the outcome of the project or have a vested interest in the project, interpret feedback to 
support their point of view (Caldwell and O'Reilly 1982). According to Nickerson 
(1998), this can either be intentional or that the decision maker unknowingly falls to 
the curse of a confirmation bias - the seeking and  interpretation of feedback in ways 
that are partial to existing beliefs or expectations.  
Decision dilemma theorists, after Bowen (1987), however point to uncertainty of 
information  and argue that feedback is often equivocal and that it is impossible to 
accurately predict how any venture will eventually turn out. Hantula and DeNicolis 
Bragger (1999) posit that these uncertainties could explain why it may be a prudent, at 
least at the time of making the decision, to continue to give the project a chance. 
Whether the project eventually fails or succeed is not necessarily a result of one wrong 
decision to rectify a previous sub-optimal choice, but simply a decision made amongst 
many alternatives in an environment of uncertainty.  
Sequential investment and escalation  
Sequential investment projects are particular susceptible to escalation tendencies 
because the venture does not generate intermediate financial payoffs until its complete. 
There is also some level of uncertainty over the amount and timing of the investment 
that will be required over the life of the project. Each investment stage therefore 
presents more opportunity cost as well as a milestone to either escalate commitment or 
pursue an alternative course of action. As found by Shepherd and Cardon (2009) 
however, terminating unsuccessful projects often comes with negative attending 
consequences including loss of job or losing face within an organisation. Decision 
makers often thus attempt to keep projects running by using end-gaming and using 
future-perfect strategies (Clegg et al. 2006). Strategic misrepresentation, the deliberate 
distortion or misstatement of  the amount of time or resources necessary to complete 
the venture is not an uncommon tactic either (see Jones and Euske 1991).  
Table 1 summarise some of the factors that create an environment that enable 
escalation of commitment. 
Table 1: Escalation enablers 
 Category Description Sources 
1 Sunk-cost effects Tendency to continue an endeavour because some 
amount of money, time or effort has already been 
invested in it. Investment begetting more investment.  
Arkes and 
Blumer (1985), Brockner 
et al (1986) 
2 Optimism bias Overestimating the likelihood of positive events while 
downplaying the occurrence or severity of negative 
events. 
Tversky and Kahneman 




Forward looking projection of ends with a visualization 
of the means by which that projected future may be 
accomplished 
 Weick and Kiesler 




Deliberate distortion or misstatement of  the amount of 
resources or time necessary to achieve an aim 
Jones and Euske (1991), 
Flyvbjerg (2007) 
5 Confirmation bias Tendency to seek or interpret information in ways that 
are partial to existing beliefs or expectations 
Cadwell and O'Reilly 
(1982) 
6 Norms of 
consistency 
Consistent and decisive leaders are often viewed as 
better leaders. Decisions makers tend to stick to their 
initial decisions to main this consistency. 
Staw and Ross (1980), 
Wellen et al (1998) 
7 Image/Reputation 
Management 
Not wanting to appear indecisive or incompetent 
Driven by feelings of personal responsibility 
Smith and Terry (2003), 
Shepherd and Cardon 
(2009) 
8 Self-justification Unwillingness to admit to oneself, and/or others that a 
previous decision was sub-optimal.  
Festinger (1962), 
Brockner (1992) 
9 Organisational & 
Political 
influences 
Coercive and normative pressures using institutional 
power or authority 
Pfeffer (1992), Guler 
(2007) 
Construction projects normally involve a series of sequential decisions before actual 
construction begins. Most projects will go through long feasibility and gestation 
periods before project approval and eventual delivery. These phases involve an 
iterative process of information acquisition and incremental commitment over a period 
of time, presenting a conducive environment for escalation of commitment. Where a 
project has commercial interest and is subject to sequential investment, the project 
often tends to be perceived as an end in itself according to Winch (2013), and 
therefore must be completed, no matter what, in order to recoup any initial 
investments.  
RESEARCH APPROACH  
Winch (2013) explored the three-pronged effects of future perfect strategising, 
strategic misrepresentation and escalation of commitment on the Channel Fixed Link 
project in an attempt to develop a broader organisational perspective on cost escalation 
in major projects. He proposed a hindsight constructivist or historical approach as 
research method to help fully comprehend the organisational complexities that led to 
overruns. Winch suggests that this approach will help comprehend the idiosyncratic 
embeddedness of major construction. We adopt a similar approach in this paper as it 
best helps for sense-making of the political and social construct of our case study - the 
Scottish Parliament building (Holyrood Project). We explore escalation of 
commitment using official documentary evidence from the government commissioned 
public enquiry that followed the controversies surrounding the construction of the 
Holyrood project (Fraser 2004). We also examine the Auditor General's reports (2000, 
2004) and the Spencely Report (2000) submitted to the Scottish Parliamentary 
Corporate Body.  
CASE STUDY: HOLYROOD PROJECT 
Completed 3 years late in 2004, at a cost of £431million, The Holyrood Building in 
Edinburgh houses the Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs). Its final cost is 
approximately ten times more than the headline final cost of £40million announced in 
the Government's devolution White Paper, Scotland's Parliament (1997). The 
Government commissioned the Spencely Report (2000) to investigate cost and time 
overruns on the project. This was followed by two major probes by the Auditor 
General (2000, 2004) before the defining public enquiry, chaired by Lord Fraser of 
Carmyllie (2004) after project hand-over to investigate key decisions undertaken 
throughout the project delivery. There were 66 witnesses and more than 13,000 
documents examined for the Public Enquiry (PE) alone. A full transcript of the 
transactions at the enquiry can be found at www.holyroodinquiry.org. These reports, 
as well as minutes of parliamentary proceedings, provide a rich source of documentary 
evidence to support the empirical analysis conducted in this paper.  
The Act of Union of 1707 merged the Parliaments of Scotland and England into the 
Parliament of Great Britain, housed in the Palace of Westminster in London. Scotland 
was now effectively directly governed from London as a result (Colley 1992). 
However, in September 1997, the people of Scotland voted "Yes" in a referendum that 
would see the creation of the first Scottish Parliament in almost 300 years. Donald 
Dewer was appointed Secretary of State with the mandate to oversee the construction 
of a the parliament house. He became the main project champion, a key player and 
driver of what was to represent Scottish identity and aspirations. But the euphoria 
surrounding the referendum at this time led to many ill-considered decisions that 
created a conducive environment for escalation.  
Optimism bias 
First was the unrealistic cost ceiling of £40million. This turned out to be a rather 
optimistic estimate, or better still, a guesstimate of final cost of the project by non-
construction professionals. Recall that a central theme of escalation theory is the 
increase in resources devoted to a venture in an attempt to redeem a previous sub-
optimal choice. A member of the Scottish Parliament Corporate Body, Andrew Welsh 
MSP, stated that "right from the very start, the budgets were totally unrealistic. The 
original budgets we inherited were for a fictional building" [11 February 2004]. Rusell 
Hillhouse, former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Scottish Office and a member of 
the team that estimated the cost of the project at £40million said "we couldn't possibly 
have done a thorough job, and this was very difficult because it was a time when 
people were working extremely hard on other aspects of the White Paper" [PE 30th 
October 2003]
2
. Sam Galbraith, former Under-Secretary of State at the Scottish Office 
also told the public enquiry, "the figure of £40million in the white document, was 
never for Holyrood. That was for a bog-standard building on a greenfield site." [PE 
28 October 2003 ]. When asked how he knew the figure was not for Holyrood project, 
he responded "That's what Donald [Dewer] told me" suggesting that the project 
champion at this stage may have been aware that the cost of the project announced to 
the public was unrealistic.  
Self justification, Reputation management and Norms of Consistency 
Another sub-optimal decision that was made at the beginning of the project was the 
unrealistic completion date imposed on the project. Speed to build was priority for the 
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project promoters who wanted the project completed within two years. This was 
strongly criticised by  the opposition leaders. In a letter to all MSPs, Donald Gorrie 
MSP criticised the decision of the Scottish Office and the Secretary of State, Donald 
Dewer, writing "There is no need for this haste...There has been widespread informed 
criticism of the fast timetable, for which there is no need. Professionals and 
organisations favouring the Holyrood site, favour a delay while the plans, timescale 
and budget are revised" [MS/16/042 - 043]. Alex Salmond MSP also insisted that 
there was no need to try and deliver the project within such a short duration. He wrote 
to Donald Dewer, "...it is quite impossible to have any new debating chamber of 
quality... ready by the time of the elections to the Scottish Parliament in 1999" 
[MS/1/071 – 079]. Ignoring these warnings, however, the project sponsors still 
proceeded with the 2 year duration.  
At least three enablers of escalation might have been at play at this stage - political 
reputation management, self justification and maintaining norms of consistency. 
Negative feedback on a past decisions calls the validity of the original decision into 
question and is dissonant with a decision maker’s natural desire to see himself as 
competent. Many decision makers would often escalate commitment to their previous 
decision in order to prove that the initial decision was valid. In the case of the 
promoters of the Holyrood project, choosing a fast tract delivery method suddenly 
became very appealing if they had to meet 2 year deadline. Construction management 
procurement method was thus chosen as it has the advantage of allowing both design 
and project construction to occur concurrently. Using conventional construction 
methods of design before building would have added an extra 18months to the 
duration, according to William Armstrong, the Project Manager [PE 3 December 
2003]. However, using construction management may well have been the single most 
important decision that was largely responsible for the cost and time overrun 
experienced on the Holyrood project. The client bears all financial risks associated 
with delays and design changes and final cost of the project could not be realistically 
known until all designs were completed. In addition, there is little incentive for the 
design team to keep cost low when such a method is used. Paul Grice, Clerk and Chief 
Executive of the Scottish Parliament told the public enquiry 'It is a fact of construction 
management - until you let the last tender,  and settled the last claim, you can't know 
the final amount' [PE 10 February 2004]. Robert Brown MSP, a member of the 
Scottish Parliament Corporate Body that was in charge of the project at one point aptly 
explains the source of the problems on the project. He noted, "the signature design, the 
contractual method, and the process of developing the design detail, I increasingly 
came to the view that most of our difficulties [experienced on the project] were in a 
sense inevitable once the button was pressed at the beginning by the Scottish Office 
when they let the contract in the first place."  
Strategic misrepresentation 
There was evidence of strategic misrepresentation, the deliberate distortion or 
misstatement of  the amount of time and resources necessary to achieve an aim, at 
many stages during the procurement of the project. Five weeks after their election 
1999, the new MSPs had to vote on whether or not to continue the project. At this 
stage, Alex Salmond MSP, leader of the main opposition party wrote to Sir David 
Steel MSP, the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, requesting that the project 
be suspended and that an estimate of possible cancellation cost be produced "in order 
to properly debate the future of the Holyrood project or other alternatives" 
(MS/1/083). He further wrote in a follow-up letter, "It is now possible that we may 
have to consider cancelling the Holyrood project; in the circumstances it is essential 
that no further actions should be taken which would add to the cost of cancellation if 
this were the decision which Parliament reached." [MS/1/084] 
Faced with the dire prospect of possible project cancellation, civil servants in the 
Scottish Office, led by Barbara Doig, the Project Sponsor, decided to hide the fact that 
costs were going to be significantly higher than what the MSPs were to vote upon. In a 
classic example of strategic misrepresentation, the Project Sponsor did not include an 
extra £27million for risk in the estimates submitted to the MSPs. She later insisted that 
she was 'confident the £27million could be managed out' and therefore was not to be 
included in the information given to the members of the Scottish Parliament 
The proposed vote for an amendment urging a termination of the project was defeated 
by only three votes. Alex Salmond MSP, later told the public enquiry that the vote was 
based on false information, adding, "it is inconceivable that had the proper 
information been given to the members of the Scottish Parliament, that there wouldn't 
have been at least a delay for taking stock and reassessment... the figures, the facts, 
the timeline shows that when the Parliament were told they were inheriting a project 
of £109 million, it was actually well over £200 million and was totally out of control... 
Parliamentarians being misled and misinformed is a very serious issue indeed." [PE 
13 November 2003] 
Lord Fraser himself makes a strong case for strategic misrepresentation on the 
Holyrood Project by stating "As at the point of hand-over, where there is a very tight 
vote in the Parliament on whether to proceed with this particular project or not, that 
figure was specifically kept away from them. It looks rather as though, those who were 
involved in this were determined to keep the figure down as low as possible, even to 
the point of concealing it from the Parliament, in the hope that the project would go 
ahead."  
Political end-gaming and future-perfecting strategies 
There was a lot of evidence supporting political end-gaming and future-perfecting 
strategies in the early stages of the project as well. Donald Dewer and the project team 
seem to have capitalised on the newly found nationalistic sentiments and euphoria 
around the referendum. The project was continuously presented to the public as one 
that will represent the essence of Scottish devolution and be an "important symbol for 
Scotland" that will "pay tribute to the country’s past achievements and signal its future 
aspirations" (Scotland's Parliament 1997). Riding on these sentiments, Donald Dewer 
probably felt the need to build momentum and get the project started quickly. 
Consensus regarding some key decisions was ignored as he bypassed the consent of 
MSPs at many strategic stages, including the choosing of a site of the project [See 
MS/1/071 – 079]. It emerged during the public enquiry that he felt he had to 'endow' 
the MSPs with the new building and that if the decision of location of the building was 
not made quickly enough, the MSPs will never get around to doing it themselves. He 
probably also was aware that once the first concrete was poured, the project would 
become like a moving train that could not be stopped. 
Confirmation bias 
Confirmation bias, the tendency to seek or interpret information in ways that are 
partial to existing beliefs or expectations, played a key role in escalation on the 
Holyrood project. William Armstrong, an experienced project professional was the 
First Project Manager for the Holyrood Project at the Scottish Office. He resigned 
from his role because of frustrations he experienced regarding the spiralling cost and 
time delays. He was critical of the performance and commitment of the Architect, 
Enrique Miralles writing to Project Sponsor, Barbara Doig, “There is no indication 
that Miralles [can] remedy the deficiencies in time, cost and design to meet the 
programme." [PE SE-4-044].  His resignation letter prophesied that if measures were 
not quickly taken to properly control and manage the project, the "programme will 
drift, the cost will increase, the design team will make claims, the contractors will 
make claims, and the project will become a disaster" [PE SE-4-044].  As indicated by 
Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) and Kahneman (2011), confirmation bias leads a 
decision maker to underplay, and in some cases, even ignore disconfirming feedback 
on performance of any venture. William Armstrong's strong warnings were blatantly 
ignored by the project sponsor, who later stated that 'I was comfortable that a great 
deal was being done to ensure that we continue to be on program, that we got the cost 
sorted out and that we got the design to the quality required" [PE 4 December, 2003]. 
She decided instead that it was better that William Armstrong be removed from his 
post. He resigned before he could be fired. 
Political and organisational influences 
There were very strong political and organisational influences at many stages of the 
project as well. For example, opposition MSPs requested a two month delay in the 
project to examine the whole project more closely and explore other possible options. 
Margo MacDonald MSP insisted during a parliamentary debate that "too many 
questions are unanswered at this stage, and we plead with you [Donald Dewer] for 
the time to find adequate answers" [17 June 1999]. As is usually the case, those 
responsible for the negative outcome of a particular decision tend to maintain the 
norms of consistency in order not to appear indecisive or appear politically weak. 
Donald Dewer thus responded that such a delays requested by the opposition parties 
would "cost more than £3million in contract penalties". He added, "this Parliament 
would look like a laughing stock" if the opposition party got its way during the debate 
in Parliament. When it became apparent that the opposition might be fighting a lost 
cause, Donald Gorrie MSP said in reference to Donald Dewer, "it is a despotism, we 
have one man says what happens and we all obediently follow him" [17 June 1999)]. 
There were other sources of problems on the Holyrood project including significant 
scope changes, the death of the architect Enric Miralles, shortly followed by the death 
of project champion Donald Dewer. However, we have only concerned ourselves with 
some of the factors that may have contributed to escalation of commitment with its 
attending significant cost and time overruns.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The present study concerns the escalation of commitment to a particular course of 
action in decision making. We identified different enablers of escalation from the 
literature including sunk costs, self-justification, confirmation bias and strategic 
misrepresentation. We then examined official documentary evidence on the Holyrood 
project using a hindsight constructivist approach for possible causes of escalation that 
ultimately resulted in the cost and time overruns experienced on the project. We found 
overwhelming evidence in support of the use of strategic misrepresentation, self-
justification and reputation management during the project. The study also uncovered 
evidence of optimism bias on the part of project sponsors in defining the budget and 
time constraints for the project.  
The case study suggests that escalation of commitment is a complex phenomenon with 
additive causes from different sources. We also highlight the importance of the early 
stages of a project, as decisions taken at this stage become increasingly difficult to 
reverse. In general, it is important for project sponsors and decision makers to be 
aware of the fact that their decisions will tend to be biased by previous decisions, and 
that we all tend to have a natural inertia towards escalation of commitment, 
particularly after receiving negative feedback. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Knowing why and when escalation occurs can help managers avoid this common 
decision bias. However, as escalation may not always be readily obvious, it is 
important to put in place organisational structures that will help attenuate unwarranted 
escalation. The use of an objective outsider to evaluate our responses to disconfirming 
information, especially in situations of sequential decision making can be helpful in 
reducing escalation tendencies. It might be helpful to structure incentives so that 
decision makers are not punished for supposed inconsistency in order to curb the 
effect of self-justification. Increased monitoring, accountability, budget controls and 
scrutiny might also be helpful especially on large and complex projects.  
While this paper deals with the sources of escalation and how it might be curbed, it is 
important to mention that escalation should not necessarily be considered as a negative 
tendency. There are situations where it might be economically rational to escalate 
commitment to keep options open or maintain personal and future business 
relationships. On cursory examination, this might sound divergent to the core of the 
foregone discussions in this paper. However, what is proposed in this paper instead is 
that decision makers should be aware of the difficulty of separating initial decisions 
from related future decisions. It might be prudent to actively search for disconfirming 
information to provide a balanced perspective on confirming information that we are 
more likely to intuitively seek.  
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Producing reasonably accurate cost estimates at the planning stage of a project 
important for the subsequent success of the project. The estimator has to be able to 
make judgement on the cost influence of a number of factors including site 
conditions, procurement, risks, price changes, likely scope changes or type of 
contract. This can shroud the estimation process in uncertainty, which has often 
resulted in project cost overruns. The knowledge acquisition, generalisation and 
forecasting capabilities of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are explored in this pilot 
study to build final cost estimation models that incorporate the cost effect of some of 
the factors mentioned above. Data was collected on ninety-eight water-related 
construction projects completed in Scotland between 2007-2011. Separate cost 
models were developed for normalised target cost and log of target costs. Variable 
transformation and weight decay regularisation were then explored to improve the 
final model’s performance. As a prototype of a wider research, the final model’s 
performance was very satisfactory, demonstrating ANN ability to capture the 
interactions between the predictor variables and final cost. Ten input variables, all 
readily available or measurable at the planning stages for the project, were used 
within a Multilayer Perceptron Architecture and a Quasi-Newton training algorithm.  
Keywords: Cost Estimation, Cost Modelling, Neural Networks. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cost estimation is a heavily experience-based process, and involves the evaluation of 
several complex relationships of cost-influencing factors, largely based on 
professional judgement (Alex et al. 2010). A thorough cost estimation exercise would 
involve the evaluation of the cost effect of factors such as site restrictions, ground 
conditions, contract type, location of the project, procurement method, etc. However, 
preliminary investigations show that this is rarely the case, most likely due to the 
difficulties of quantifying the cost implications of these factors. The classical way of 
accounting for the cost effect of these variables is using the so-called contingency 
fund (Baccarini 2005), which unfortunately has mostly failed to keep construction 
projects within budget.  
Traditional cost estimation i.e. estimating the cost of labour and materials and making 
allowance for profits and overheads for individual construction items, is deterministic 
by nature (Okmen et al. 2010) and largely insufficient in reaching the actual final cost 
of a project. The approach largely neglects and poorly deals with uncertainty and their 
correlation effects on cost (Oztas et al. 2005). It is also difficult to account for the cost 
effect of some of the variables mentioned above using the traditional cost estimation 
method.  





The aim of this experimental research, which is part of a larger research in integrating 
risk and cost modelling, is to explore the use of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), as 
a data mining technique for developing cost forecast models of construction projects. 
ANN is employed to model the relationships between qualitative factors that have an 
impact on construction cost and quantifiable items that represent different cost centres 
in the bills of quantities. The paper provides an overview of cost estimation, 
estimation accuracy and cost models as well as neural network theory and 
applications. Details about the development of a predictive model for final target cost 
of water projects are detailed, with conclusions and recommendations for further 
research. 
 
COST PLANNING AND ESTIMATION 
Effective cost planning relates the design of construction projects to their cost, so that 
while taking full account of quality, risks, likely scope changes, utility and 
appearance, the cost of a project is planned to be within the economic limit of 
expenditure (Kirkham et al. 2007). This stage in a project life-cycle is particularly 
crucial as decisions made during the early stages of  the development process carry 
more far-reaching economic consequences than the relatively limited decisions which 
can be made later in the process. This initial process may also influence the client’s 
decision on whether or not to progress with the project. The cost planning process 
leads to the generation of a reliable initial project budget that sets up a cost control 
system to ensure that client expectations are met. For many clients, completing the 
project within this initial budget is a paramount determinant of client satisfaction. 
Despite the great importance of cost estimation, it is undeniably not simple nor 
straightforward because of the lack of information in the early stages of the project 
(Hegazy 2002).  
Cost estimation, the determination of quantity and cost required to construct a facility 
or to furnish a service (Westney 1992), forms the crux of the cost planning exercise.  
The approach used for cost estimation normally varies from the early strategic phase 
of a project to the construction phase and will depend on a number of other factors 
including level of accuracy required, the speed estimation required, experience level 
of the estimator and the level of information available at the time of estimate. 
Accurate estimation of future cost however, is a difficult task (Nicholas 2004), if not 
an elusive aim. This can mostly be attributed to the fact that cost estimation, which 
must not be confused with budgeting, occurs at the conception phase of the project, 
before many of the cost influencing factors about the project are available even to the 
client (Hegazy 2002).  
 
COST MODELS 
Ferry et al (1999) also describe cost models as the symbolic representation of a 
system, expressing the content of that system in terms of the factors which influence 
its costs. The models may be in the form of mathematical equations (eg. Regression 
models) or a set of defined steps to estimate the cost of a particular item (eg. Storey 
enclosure method). Cost models can be very useful in strategic level decisions such as 
bid/not to bid decisions, with potential saving of time and effort on non-viable 
projects. They are furthermore appealing because of current harsh economic climate 
with tough competition and limited resources. However, the production of reasonably 
accurate, acceptable and timely parametric cost estimates can be a difficult task. For 
example, using only 4 different parameters for a project and considering three 
alternative values for each, and varying one at a time will produce 81 different project 
solutions or alternatives. This can be done rather rapidly using an computer-based 
model but will undoubted be a laborious task using traditional cost estimation 
(Sequeira 1999). The time, effort and resource level required for this task would 
mostly be unjustifiable at planning stages of a project, perhaps a strong suggestion that 
detailed cost estimates at strategic level are often far from the optimal solutions 
because of time and resource constrains.  
ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 
Artificial neural networks, henceforth referred to as neural networks (NN) with 
artificial implied, is an analogy-based, non-parametric information-processing system 
that has performance characteristics similar to a biological neural network of the brain 
(Anderson et al. 1992). They retain two features of the biological neural network: the 
ability to learn from experience and make generalisations based on this acquired 
knowledge (Haykin 1994). 
Neural networks are structured to provide the capability to solve problems without the 
benefits of an expert and without the need of programming. They can seek patterns in 
data that are not obvious (Anderson and McNeill 1992) and are particularly suited for 
complex, hard-to-learn problems where no formal underlying theories or classical 
mathematical and traditional procedures exist (Adeli 2001). NNs are fundamentally 
different from algorithmic computing and statistical methods like regression in one 
way- they learn inductively by examples and then are able to generalise solutions 
(Flood et al. 1994). Modelling techniques including regression analysis, case-based 
reasoning and fuzzy logic analysis find it difficult dealing with problems such as 
imprecision, incomplete and uncertainty of data and other variables affecting costs and 
implicit combinatorial effects and inter-relationships of cost variables (Flood and 
Kartam 1994), areas where NN is often at its best. 
Applications of neural networks 
Neural network has been used successfully for foreign exchange prediction  (Shi et al. 
2011, Khashei et al. 2012); medical diagnosis (Dreiseitl et al. 2009); flight and robot 
control (NASA 2003, Lee et al. 2010); and loan applicant assessment (Malhotra et al. 
2003). Earliest construction industry application of neural networks can be traced back 
to 1989 by Adeli and Yeh (1989) on engineering design and machine learning. It has 
since been used in construction management for estimating the cost of highway 
projects (Wilmot et al. 2005, Pewdum et al. 2009); predicting the cost of water and 
sewer installations (Alex et al. 2010) and building projects (Emsley et al. 2002); 
mark-up estimation (Li et al. 1999); risk quantification (McKim 1993); and tender 
price forecast (Boussabaine et al. 1999). Neural Network application bibliographies 
have been provided by Adeli (2001) for Civil Engineering and Moselhi et al (1991) 
for construction management research. 
Training the Neural Network 
A neural network, like the human brain, learns from experience (Hinton 1992). 
Experience here refers to past data within the domain of the problem under study. The 
aim of any training regime is to help the network to continuously reduce the error of 
its predictions by varying the weights between its connections (Setyawati et al. 2003). 
Examples of the training set are presented to the network in its input layer. These are 
then transferred to the hidden layer by some form of activation function, normally a 
linear activation function. Random weights are applied to these input values in the 
hidden layer and then their cumulative weighted values transferred to the output layer. 
If the training algorithm adopted is a supervised one, the result of the training, called 
the output, is compared to the target (the expected real value) at the output layer and 
the error (difference between the output and the expected value, normally measured as 
the root mean squared error RMSE) is computed. This is then sent as feedback to the 
network and an error function is used to try and minimize the value of the error in the 
next cycle of training. The most common form of learning is the back propagation 
method, which is a supervised learning method (Setyawati, Creese and Sahirman 
2003). 
Neural Network Problems 
Neural networks do exact their own demands however. NN are data-hungry, and 
performance is largely dependent on plenteous, representative and reliable data 
(Anderson and McNeill 1992). Another  major criticism of the NN approach to 
data modelling is that it offers little explanation on the relationships between the 
variables it is modelling (Boussabaine et al. 1997, Hair et al. 1998). The 
technique is still disregarded by some researchers, referring to it as a ‘black-box’ 
technique because the network parameters do not offer casual explanations, 
making it difficult to elucidate what is learnt from the neural network model 
(Paliwal et al. 2011). To these criticisms, some have argued that it might be 
preferable to focus on how well a neural network model produces its results, 
rather than how it produces it (Hair et al. 1998). It is envisaged that further 
research into framework and internal processes within the neural network will 
offer better explanatory insight into the influence of independent variables in the 
modelling process.  
DATA 
Data was collected on ninety-eight water projects completed in Scotland between 
2007 and 2011. The nature of the projects were rather varied, ranging from 
construction of water mains, water treatment plants, Combined Sewer Overflows 
(CSOs), installation of manholes or water pumps and upgrades and repairs to sewers. 
All the projects were target cost contracts with values between £9,000-£14million and 
durations from 1-22months.  
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The modelling process involved investigating the performance of different network 
topologies and parameters in predicting the final cost of the projects. It was carried out 
using the Statistica 10 software, in the stages detailed below: 
Data Pre-processing 
The aim of data pre-processing is to structure and present the data to the model in the 
most suitable way as well as offer the modeller the chance to get to know the data 
thoroughly. For this research, extreme values and outliers were either re-coded or 
deleted from the sample set and missing values replaced with the mean or mode. Input 
errors were corrected and all cost values were normalised to 2010 with the base year 
1995 using the BIS cost indices. Invariant variables, such as procurement option, 
payment method, fluctuation measure and type of client, were removed from the 
variable set as they would only increase the model complexity and yet offer no useful 
information for model performance. Finally, categorical variables such as type of 
project, need for project, etc. were coded using the one-of-N coding, resulting in 4 
sub-variables for type of soil for example (Good, Moderate, Poor, Not Applicable). 
Twenty-eight sub-variables resulted out of the initial 11 input variables. This coding 
allowed the model to infer importance on its own without the modeller imposing 
weightings or subjective ratings to the variables. Ninety project cases remained after 
the pre-processing stage and were then passed on for the modelling proper. 
Phase One: TC and FTC 
At this stage, the model was developed using the raw normalised estimated target cost 
(TC) and final target cost (FTC). Two different network architectures, the Multilayer 
Perceptron (MLP) and the Radial Basis Function (RBF), were experimented initially. 
RBF models the relationship between inputs and targets in a 2 phases: it first performs 
a probability distribution of the inputs before the searching for relationships between 
the input and output space in the next stage (StatSoft Inc. 2011a). MLPs on the other 
hand model using just the second stage of the RBF. As expected, the MLP models 
were superior to the RBF networks for this regression problem and so the rest of the 
modelling was carried out using just MLPs. 
The network was set to train 200 different models, iterating between 1-50 nodes in a 
single hidden layer using a data split of 75:15:10% for training, testing and validation 
sample sets respectively. The three best networks were retained and examined for 
further improvement. The validation set was not used in the training of the model so 
can be considered as an independent verification of the model’s ability to generalise 
on new data. Five different transfer functions- logistic, tanH, negative exponential, 
identity and sine were each tested. These transfer functions are used to squash the data 
range of the processing signals to values normally between 0 to 1 or -1 to +1 since the 
neural network algorithms are most sensitive to inputs within a small range. Gradient 
descent, Conjugate descent and Quasi-Newton (BFGS) training algorithms were also 
experimented for all the models. Early stopping, the process of halting training when 
the test error stops decreasing, was used to prevent memorising or over-fitting the 
dataset in order to improve generalization. Over-fitted models perform very well on 
training and testing data, but fail to generalise satisfactorily when new ‘unseen’ cases 
are used to validate their performance.  
Overall performance of the network is measured using the correlation coefficient 
between predicted and output values as well as the Sum of Squares (SOS) of errors. 
SOS is defined here as: 
SOS= ∑ (Oi – Ti)
2
……………………..(eqn. 1) 
Where  Oi is the prediction (network outputs) 
             Ti is the target (actual value) of the ith data case. 
The higher the SOS value, the poorer the network at generalisation, whereas the 
higher the correlation coefficient, the better the network. The p-values of the 
correlation coefficients were also computed to measure their statistical significance as 
a test of whether the observed correlations were achieved by fluke. The higher the p-
value, the less reliable the correlations observed. 
The results from the best network for this phase was rather unsatisfactory as the errors 
observed were very high (See table 1.0), most likely due to the use of the raw data for 
the modelling.  The best network at this stage was an MLP with 25 input variables, 31 
nodes in the hidden layer. It was trained using a BFGS training algorithm, tanH and 
logistic activation functions in the hidden and output layers respectively. 
Table 1: Network Performance: TC and FTC 








1A MLP 25-31-1 0.917 0.990 8.830E+10 2.096E+10 
2A MLP 25-37-1 0.928 0.988 8.163E+10 8.964E+09 
3A MLP 25-50-1 0.921 0.987 8.555E+10 1.348E+10 
 
Phase two: LogTC and logFTC 
The common log values of TC and FTC were then used for the next phase as it has 
been suggested that data transformation can significantly improve performance of NN 
models (Shi 2000). The 3 best networks were retained after training 200 different 
networks using the same parameters as above. The results showed significant 
improvement in the error values but slightly deteriorated in correlation (see table 2.0). 
This can be attributed to the fact that log of TC and FTC reduced the cost inputs to a 
smaller range, making them more sensitive to the training algorithms of neural 
networks. The common log of the target costs most likely made it easier for the 
network to learn the relationships between the variables than in the previous phase. 











1B MLP 25-29-1 0.925 0.933 0.091 0.131 
2B MLP 25-48-1 0.918 0.932 0.100 0.125 
3B MLP 25-16-1 0.893 0.936 0.174 0.134 
 
Phase three: log FTC and logTC with Weight Decay 
The effect of using weight decay regularisation in the hidden and output layers was 
then investigated. This was an attempt to encourage the network to develop smaller 
weights to further reduce the problem of over-fitting, thereby potentially improving 
generalization performance of the network. Weight decay modifies the network's error 
function to penalize large weights - the result is an error function that compromises 
between performance and weight size (StatSoft Inc. 2011b). The results showed a 
further improvement in both the error and correlation coefficient for the validation 
samples. The validation performance of the best network was now 0.968 with a p-
value of 0.00 and an SOS of 0.062. The number of neurons in the hidden layer had 
also reduced from 29 in the best model to 19 when weight decay was applied. 
Evidently, the model was getting better in predicting the final cost of projects based 




Table 3: Network Performance with Weight decay regularisation 












1C MLP 25-19-1 0.983 0.968 0.00 0.092 0.062 BFGS 89 
2C MLP 25-22-1 0.929 0.958 0.00 0.065 0.064 BFGS 26 
3C MLP 25-22-1 0.948 0.949 0.00 0.066 0.098 BFGS 56 
 
A relative importance table below shows each variable’s contribution to the model’s 
generalisation abilities. At this stage, table four is indicative of the relative influence of 
the various inputs on the outturn cost. It gives the contractor important information on 
which factors need most attention during the tendering stage, especially in terms of 
final cost. The client/contractor would then be able to simulate the effect of changing 
these factors within the model to see its direct likely impact on the final cost. The SOS 
of residuals for the full model is computed and compared to that of the reduced model 
when each predictor is removed from the neural network. The variables are then 
arranged in order of importance according to the change in performance noticed when 
they were removed. The initial estimated target cost was the most important factor, as 
could be expected, and site access contributed very little to the model. Duration of the 
projects was unexpectedly ranked 7th in the relative importance table. In general, 
longer project durations tend to cost more than shorter ones. The observation here 
might be due to the poor representation of the number of projects across the range of 
durations used in the model building. More than 65% of the project cases were 
completed within four (4) months which would make the model biased towards projects 
within this class. This may mean that the model in its current form might not be a good 
predictor for projects with durations in excess of 4 four months. The high ranking of 
project frequency, tendering strategy and contractor’s need for the project indicates the 
attention that has to be given these factors when preparing tender documents. 
Factor Weighting Ranking 
logTC 5.91 1 
Project Frequency 2.55 2 
Tendering Strategy 2.52 3 
Need for Project 2.00 4 
Ground Condition 1.45 5 
Project Type 1.38 6 
Duration 1.20 7 
Location 1.16 8 
Soil Type 1.05 9 
Site Access 1.00 10 
Table 4: Relative Importance of Variables 
CONCLUSIONS 
Artificial Neural Network is used to develop a cost estimation model for water 
projects in this paper. Their ability to capture and generalise non-linear relationships 
are exploited to detect the interactions in qualitative variables like tendering method, 
contractors need for the project, location, site access and project type in developing 
cost models to predict the final target cost of water projects. The use of weight decay 
regularisation to encourage the development of a parsimonious network to improve 
the model’s performance and reliability was also investigated. This showed significant 
promise for future analysis if combined with other techniques like pruning and 
sensitivity analysis of predictor variables. As a prototype of a wider research, the 
results achieved are very satisfactory and will potentially be improved with a larger 
dataset in this on-going research 
The developed models have several potential applications in industry and construction 
management. The model can easily be converted to a desktop package that 
construction professionals could use in rapid prediction of final cost of projects using 
only factors that are readily available or measurable at planning stage of the project. It 
is also very useful at the design stage of a project when information is incomplete and 
detailed designs are not available. The use of the model could also greatly reduce the 
time and resources spent on estimation as well as provide a benchmark to compare 
detailed estimates. It will further allow the generation of various alternative solutions 
for a construction project using ‘what if’ analysis for the purposes of comparison.  
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Nine out of ten infrastructure projects exceed their initial cost estimates. Accuracy of 
construction cost estimates remains a contentious area of debate within both academia 
and industry. Explanations for this have ranged from scope changes, risk and 
uncertainty, optimism bias, technical and managerial difficulties, suspicions of 
corruption, lying and insufficient required information for accurate estimation. The 
capacity for tolerance and imprecise knowledge representation of fuzzy set theory is 
combined with the learning and generalising capabilities of neural networks to 
develop neuro-fuzzy hybrid cost models in this paper to predict likely final cost of 
water infrastructure projects. The will help to increase reliability, flexibility and 
accuracy of initial cost estimates. Neural networks is first used to develop relative 
numerical weightings of cost predictors extracted from primary data collected on 98 
completed projects. These were then standardised into fuzzy sets to establish a 
consistent framework for combining the effect of each variable on the overall final 
cost. A three-point fuzzy lower, upper and mean estimate of likely final cost is 
generated to provide a tolerance range for final cost rather than the traditional single 
point estimate. The performance of the final models ranged from 3.3% 
underestimation to 1.6 % overestimation. The best models however averaged an error 
of 0.6% underestimation and 0.8% overestimation of final cost of the project. The 
results are now being extended to a larger database of about 4500 projects in 
collaboration with an industry partner. 
Keywords: artificial neural network, cost estimation, cost modelling, cost overrun, 
fuzzy set theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
Infrastructure projects have an 86% likelihood of exceeding the initial cost estimates 
and 9 out of 10 of them exceed their budgets (Flyvbjerg et al.   2002). A key example 
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is the case of the stadiums built for the 2010 FIFA World Cup games in South Africa. 
With overruns ranging between 5 to 94% of original cost, none of the 10 stadiums 
were completed within budget (Baloyi and Bekker 2011). There is overwhelming 
evidence in literature, and practice, which support the conclusion that cost overrun is 
endemic within the construction industry, irrespective of size, type, sector or 
geographical location of the project (see Jackson 2002; Flyvbjerg et al.  2004; Odeck 
2004; Baloyi and Bekker 2011). Cost remains arguably one of the most important key 
performance indicators on most projects (Chan and Chan 2004; Yeung et al.  2008) so 
that statistics, such as the ones above, leaves most clients grossly dissatisfied, giving 
the industry a poor reputation regarding budget reliability (Agyakwa-Baah 2009).  
Despite its importance, cost estimation is undeniably not simple, nor straightforward, 
largely due to the dearth of information required for detailed estimation. It is even 
made worse by the cloud of uncertainty that shrouds cost drivers in the early stages of 
the project (Hegazy 2002) and the changes that occur in scope and design of the 
project once construction actually begins (Love et al.  2011; Gil and Lundrigan 2012). 
It is an inexact science and estimators have to make decisions within an environment 
of uncertainty. Moreover, even though it is accepted that factors such as tendering 
method, type of client, location of project, procurement method, size of project etc. 
have an effect on final cost of a project, it is difficult to establish their measured 
financial impact (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2012). This complex web of cost 
influencing variables would make it seem that the decision-to-build, for most projects, 
is based on a somewhat unrealistic cost estimate that will inevitably be exceeded.  
Against this backdrop, debates have not waned on causes and measures of cost 
overruns. A recent discussion on the Construction Network of Building Researchers 
(CNBR) left a number of unresolved questions. How accurate can estimates be? Is 
there an acceptable way to compare final cost of project to cost estimates? What is the 
most acceptable measure of cost performance on a construction project? Is it even 
possible to achieve certainty of cost estimates, when the very estimates are made in an 
environment of uncertainty? (see the Nov 2012 CNBR archive online).While the 
answers to these can be varied; even sometimes strongly opposing; it is difficult to 
disagree that clients and project financiers still require some form of reasonably 
accurate estimate of their likely financial commitment for a project before the project 
begins. 
In this paper, the authors attempt to model the final cost of water infrastructure 
projects using gathered cost data and other project details such as location, 
procurement method, size of project, type of client, etc of 98 water infrastructure 
projects. This paper, a sequel to a previous that uses only neural networks for 
modelling final cost (see Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2012) employs Neuro-Fuzzy (NF) 
hybrid models - a combination of neural networks and fuzzy set theory, drawing on 
synergies from the two techniques in an attempt to develop more accurate, reliable and 
consistent final cost models. The next section of the paper provides an overview of the 
two modelling techniques used in the paper- neural networks and fuzzy set theory, and 
then proceeds to develop a neuro-fuzzy cost estimation hybrid model before 
concluding with results achieved and potential extensions of this research. 
NEURAL NETWORKS 
Work on artificial neural networks stemmed from the curiosity to understand how the 
brain processes information. Haykin (1994) described the brain as a highly complex 
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and parallel information processing system, capable of performing very complex 
computations many times faster than many types of computer processors. Artificial 
neural network (ANN) is thus just a simplistic abstraction of the biological neural 
networks of the brain, endowed with the capability to learn from experience (or 
examples) and then generalise for new cases using the acquired knowledge even 
within sparse or incomplete data (Anderson 1995). They are able to adapt to changing 
environments (or datasets) and are often referred to as universal approximators 
because of their ability to closely map input to output spaces in different types of 
problem domains (Fausett 1994). They essentially seek underlying relationships 
between variables and are particularly suited for complex, hard-to-learn problems, 
where no formal underlying theories or classical mathematical and traditional 
procedures exist (Adeli 2001). Neural networks are very sophisticated modelling 
techniques capable of modelling extremely complex functions. In particular, neural 
networks are non-linear (Denton and Hung 1996). For many years linear modelling 
(Regression), has been the commonly used technique in most modelling domains 
since they have well-known optimization strategies. Where the linear approximation 
was not valid, which was frequently the case (Boussabaine and Kirkham 2008), the 
models suffered accordingly.  
Arguably, the strongest argument against the use of ANN is its supposed ‘black-
boxness’(Olden and Jackson 2002)- it is difficult to extract knowledge from the neural 
network model or fully understand how it reaches its conclusions. In regression, for 
example, an equation with explainable physical properties is produced. This is not the 
case in ANN modelling - no equation results out of the model and the network 
weights and connections make little sense. How the inputs interact to produce the 
output is at best, only known to the model. In a previous model using the same data, 
only neural network is used to model final cost projects (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 
2012). In an attempt to illuminate the black-box of ANNs, the authors combine the 
learning and generalisation abilities of neural networks with the capacity for tolerance 
and imprecise knowledge representation of fuzzy set theory to develop a hybrid neuro-
fuzzy cost model for cost prediction. 
FUZZY SET THEORY 
Fuzzy set theory is an aspect of contemporary mathematics which focuses on the 
ambiguities in describing events or classes. It is an attempt to formalise human 
abilities of conversation, reasoning, and decision-making in an environment of 
imprecision, uncertainty as well as conflicting and/or incomplete information (Zadeh 
2008). It incorporates ‘matter of degree’ rather than crisp boundaries into decision 
variables (Tokede and Wamuziri 2012). Fuzzy set theory allows an approximate 
interpolation between observed inputs and output situations (Ross 2009) and provides 
a means for modelling human vagueness in judgment. It  basically requires encoding 
certain decision parameters as fuzzy sets (Zadeh 2008).  
The defining characteristic of a fuzzy set is embodied in its membership function 
(MF). According to Kim et al. (2006), an MF provides an effective way to translate 
subjective terms into mathematical measures. A variable in fuzzy logic could have a 
set of values, characterised in linguistic terms, such as short, medium or long duration 
of project, or poor, moderate and good ground conditions. MFs can be generated in a 
number of ways either using intuition or some other algorithmic or logical operations 
(see Ross (2009) on how to use genetic algorithm, neural networks, rank ordering or 
inductive reasoning in developing MFs).  
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Ross (2009) stipulates that fuzzy relations are analogous to classical mathematical 
functions and basically represent mappings for sets. Fuzzy relations share the mapping 
potentials exhibited by neural networks and hence provide a compatible interphase in 
problem solving. Relations exhibit mathematical properties such as reflexivity, 
transitivity and symmetry which ultimately helps in interpreting attributes in fuzzy 
systems (Zadeh 1994). Chen and Huang (2007) used fuzzy relations in estimating the 
possibility-of-meeting the completion time of a construction project.  
Fuzzy relations could be also employed in establishing the strength and possible 
association between different pairs. This can be achieved through the composition 
operator - a mathematical operation that seeks to establish the relationship between 
similar elements in different universe of discourse (Zimmermann 2001). Two 
common variants of the composition operator are the max-product and max-min. 
According to Zimmermann (2001), the most frequently used composition operator is 
the max-min; though both procedures produce comparable results in many instances. 
The max-min composition operation basically implements the strength of one chain as 
equal to the strength of its weakest link; the maximum of this then represents the 
overall chain strength in the fuzzy system (Ross 2009). Applications in civil 
engineering and construction research have been reported in Ayyub (1997). For cost 
and risk evaluation, fuzzy sets helps in quantification of variables, whose nature could 
be considered as complex and fit for description within a range of options (Tokede 
and Wamuziri 2012). An overview of fuzzy logic applications in construction 
management is provided by Chan et al. (2009) 
NEURO-FUZZY 
Neural networks solves problems by identifying the underlying patterns between the 
variables in the data it receives (Ross 2009) and then makes predictions based on the 
knowledge acquired (Adya and Collopy 1998). They are powerful, easy to use 
(StatSoft Inc. 2011) and can deal with large number of variables and non-linear 
relationships (Denton and Hung 1996). Yet, they are limited by their ‘black-box’ 
nature (Patterson 1996; Olden and Jackson 2002). They also perform best when using 
numerical or continuous data (StatSoft Inc. 2011). The majority of the data used in 
this research happen to be categorical in nature - location, type of client, procurement 
method, etc. Fuzzy sets represent composition of graded categories using mathematics 
based on logical reasoning (Belohlavek et al.  2009). It attempts to formalise decision 
making in an environment of uncertainty and incomplete information (Zadeh 2008), 
the kind that aptly describes cost estimation of construction projects.  
Tokede and Wamuziri (2012) suggest that fuzzy set theory may not function at its 
optimal best as a stand-alone mathematical framework. Its practicality and utility is 
enhanced by combining its logic with pre-existent mathematical formulations. NF 
hybrid models thus have the potential to effectively represent modes of reasoning and 
decision making that are approximate rather than exact (Zadeh 1994), the case of 
construction cost estimation. Yu and Lin (2006) present an NF model for mining 
information from incomplete construction databases whilst Bilgehan (2010) uses NF 
models predict concrete compressive strength. Boussabaine (2001) similarly presents 
NF models for modelling the likely duration of construction projects 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The NF models reported in this paper have been developed in three main stages - the 
first using statistical methods to pre-process the collected data, the second using 
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neural networks to develop relative final cost weightings of predictors and lastly using 
fuzzy sets to predict final cost. These stages are detailed below. 
Stage One: Data and Data Pre-processing 
Details on 98 water infrastructure projects completed in Scotland between 2007 and 
2011were collected. The nature of the projects ranged from construction of water 
mains, water treatment plants, Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs), installation of 
manholes or water pumps and upgrades and repairs to sewers. All the projects were 
target cost contracts with values between £9,000-£14 million and durations from 1-22 
months.  
The collected data is processed so as to structure and present the data to the model in 
the most suitable way. For this research, extreme values and outliers were either re-
coded or deleted from the sample set and missing values replaced with the mean or 
mode. Input errors were corrected and all cost values were normalised to 2010 with 
the base year 1995 using the infrastructure resources cost indices by the Building Cost 
Information Services (BCIS 2012). Screening of variables to the smallest number is 
desirable because simpler models are easier to deploy - a model with 15 variables 
means information has to be known about all these variables before the model can be 
used for prediction. Redundant predictors - variables that do not add new information 
to the model because they basically contain the same information at another level with 
other variables were detected using spearman ranking, bi-variate histograms or cross-
tabulation. Further variable screening using scree test, mean plots and optimal binning 
in Statistica 10 software, suggested the optimal number of variables for predicting 
final cost to be between 5-7 predictors. 
Stage Two: Neural Network Modelling  
The neural network stage of the model developed was to determine a consistent 
numerical weighting for all the predictors depending on their relative contribution to 
determining the final cost of the project. Ten initial predictors
2
 were used as inputs in 
a 3-layered feed-forward back-propagation neural network architecture with Final 
Target Cost as output of the model. The 98 project cases were split in a 75:15:10% 
ratio for training, testing and validation respectively. The best model was developed 
through an iterative procedure of continually tweaking the neural network parameters 
i.e. hidden nodes and activation functions, to produce improved model performance. 
Model performance was measured using the correlation coefficient between predicted 
and output values as well as the Sum of Squares (SOS) of errors below: 
              
    Eqn. 1 
Where Oi is the prediction (network outputs) 
Ti is the target (actual value) of the ith data case. 
The ten best networks were retained and further tested using the validation set to 
produce Figure 2. The validation set was not used in the training of the model so can 
be considered as an independent verification of the model’s ability to generalise on 
new data. This gave a quick indication of the average error level of each of the 
models. 
                                               
2 Initial list of predictors for the neural network model: Type of Soil, Site Access, Type of Location, 
Contractor's Need for the Project, Frequency of Project, Type of Deadline, Awarded Target cost 
(transformed as logTC), Type of project, Tendering Strategy, Duration (transformed as logD) 
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Figure 2: Performance of the ten best models 
A sensitivity analysis was then carried out using the three best validated models in 
order to determine the contribution of each predictor to the model’s performance. This 
was partly based on a test for parsimony using Ockham’s Razor principle - one should 
not increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities required to explain 
anything and that all things being equal, preference should be given to the simplest 
hypothesis (Chase et al.  1996). This principle of simplicity is used to prune down the 
number of variables required in the model to predict the final cost, thus reducing 
inconsistencies, ambiguities and potential redundancies in the model. An initial 
ranking of all the predictors was generated based on their contribution to the model’s 
performance. Then starting from the least important, one predictor was removed from 
the model at a time whilst measuring the performance of the model without that 
predictor. This was done until the model showed no further improvement or began to 
decay. The best set of predictors of final target cost after this stage are tendering 
strategy, site access, location, type of project, contractor’s need for the project, type of 
soil, as well as estimated initial cost and duration (the common log of these were used 
in the model) 
Table 1: Sensitivity analysis to determine relative ranking of predictors 













15. MLP 18-5-1 4.80 2.22 8.44 2.04 1.50 3.80 1.22 1.09 
19. MLP 18-3-1 7.71 9.08 8.91 11.82 7.93 4.77 7.07 0.68 
20. MLP 18-3-1 8.21 9.18 2.64 3.24 1.89 2.55 2.56 1.21 
Average Weighting 6.90 6.83 6.66 5.70 3.77 3.71 3.61 0.99 
 
Stage Three: Fuzzy Sets Modelling 
Fuzzy set theory is applied at this stage of the modelling exercise to evaluate the 
subjective measures for each of the cost predictors in order to predict final cost. Using 
                    
  
  
=1  Eqn. 2. 2, the average weighted 
ranking for each of the variables from Table was normalized to unity in order to 
generate a standardised index for the subsequent fuzzy set computations (see Table 4) 
                     
  
  
     Eqn. 2 
Where wi is the average relative weighting of the ith predictor 
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0.22 0.21 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.04 
With mean target cost to predictor plots, all predictors were fuzzified using the range 
set below: 
       ,  Influence is Rather High 
              Influence is High 
              Influence is Medium 
        ,      Influence is Low 
The next stage of the fuzzy modelling involved developing membership functions. In 
developing these, the tolerance index is particularly relevant in evaluating and 
constraining the range of possibilities subject to a complex set of influencing 
variables, quantitatively and/or qualitatively defined. The tolerance index is vital in 
order to model the uncertainty in the cost values within a realistic continuum as 
opposed to a single figure-of-merit. For this study, the tolerances, β, were adapted to 
follow those indicated by Ayyub (1997) and reported in the table below. 
Table 5: Values of tolerance. Source: adapted from  Ayyub (1997) 
β 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Poor/Low 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.4 0 0 
High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.9 0 
Rather High 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 
Each of the project variables in the validation set was converted into fuzzy set 
variables using Table 5. According to Ross (2009), the fuzzy relation,    of two sets,    
and     can be defined by the set-theoretic and membership function-theoretic, 
mathematically expressed as:  
                Eqn. 3 
                                       Eqn. 4 
In Eqn. 3 above, R is a fuzzy relation on the Cartesian space X x Y. S is a fuzzy 
relation on Y x Z, and T is fuzzy relation on X x Z. In this cost estimation problem, R 
represents the set of cost predictors and S refers to the set of standard values of 
tolerance for linguistic descriptors of project attributes. The max-min composition 
operator is employed to deduce the strength and degree of relationship between 
specific relational pairs, which in this case, depicts the overall project cost as a fuzzy 
relationship of the normalised cost predictor weightings in Table 4, and based on the 
associated fuzzified project attributes deducible from Table 5.  
The tolerance of each of the cost values in the validation set was computed, using 
Eqn.4 and defuzzified to obtain a 3-point estimate representing the fuzzy mean, fuzzy 
upper and fuzzy lower values as shown in Table 6. These three values provided a range 
of likely final cost rather than the customary single value estimate. Table 6 shows the 
performance of the NF hybrid models in predicting the final cost of 10 different 
projects used in the validation set. This is summarised in  
 
Table 7 along with the average model performance of the neural network model only.   
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The Fuzzy Upper best predicts the final cost and have the smallest percentage errors, 
ranging from 0.6% average underestimation to 0.8% overestimation of the likely final 
cost of the project. This represents an appreciable improvement in the results achieved 
using the neural network models only, also shown in  
 
Table 7. The best three models at the neural network stage averaged a 1.2% under-
estimation and 4.6% over-estimation of the actual final cost of the projects in the 
validation dataset. These results show significant promise in using neuro-fuzzy hybrid 
models to learn the underlying relationships between variables such as tendering 
strategy, site access, project location, type of soil or type of project and final cost of 
construction project.  






















1 5.78 5.65 2.4% 5.68 1.8% 5.75 0.5% 
2 6.90 6.75 2.2% 6.77 1.9% 6.86 0.7% 
3 5.41 5.35 1.1% 5.39 0.5% 5.46 -0.9% 
4 5.22 5.09 2.6% 5.12 1.9% 5.20 0.5% 
5 6.51 6.38 2.0% 6.41 1.6% 6.48 0.4% 
6 5.95 5.85 1.7% 5.87 1.4% 5.95 -0.1% 
7 6.91 6.78 1.9% 6.80 1.6% 6.89 0.4% 
8 4.67 4.58 1.8% 4.62 1.1% 4.69 -0.5% 
9 5.00 4.97 0.6% 4.99 0.1% 5.07 -1.6% 
10 4.49 4.34 3.3% 4.36 2.9% 4.45 0.9% 
 
 
Table 7: Summary of results from neuro-fuzzy model validation 










Average % Under-estimation 2% 1.50% 0.60% 1.2% 
Average % Over-estimation N/A N/A 0.80% 4.6% 
As already stated, even though it is agreeable that these factors affect the final cost on 
a project, it is difficult to assign cost measures to them as their relationship to cost are 
not thoroughly understood. The neuro-fuzzy hybrid models are possibly a step in the 
right direction in producing more accurate and realistic cost estimates at the initial 
stages of a construction project in an attempt to alleviate the problem of cost overruns 
CONCLUSION 
The research reported in this paper combines the learning and generalisation 
capabilities of artificial neural networks with fuzzy logic’s ability to formalise human 
reasoning and decision making within an environment of uncertainty and incomplete 
information to develop neuro-fuzzy hybrid cost models for predicting the final cost of 
small water infrastructure projects. In particular, the research attempts to use some 
non-traditional cost predictors such as site access, location, tendering strategy, project 
and soil type to estimate likely final cost. The authors present a three-point range of 
possible likely final cost outcomes instead of the classical single point estimate. This 
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might allow estimators and clients to more accurately estimate likely contingency 
needs for their projects. In their extended form, these models can readily be converted 
into stand-alone desktop applications that can allow quick simulation of what-if 
scenarios and also allow the easy generation of different cost estimates should project 
parameters change. As a sequel to a previous paper that used only neural networks, the 
results here show an improvement in the predictive performance and thus the results 
are now being extended to a database of 4500 projects with an industry partner. 
REFERENCES 
Adeli, H (2001) Neural networks in civil engineering: 1989-2000. Computer-Aided Civil and 
Infrastructure Engineering, 16(2), 126-42. 
Adya, M and Collopy, F (1998) How effective are neural networks at forecasting and 
prediction? A review and evaluation. Journal of Forecasting, 17(5-6), 481-95. 
Agyakwa-Baah, A B (2009) Risk Management in the Ghanaian Construction Industry Master 
thesis Unpublished Thesis, Sheffield Hallam University, UK. 
Ahiaga-Dagbui, D D and Smith, S D (2012) Neural networks for modelling the final target 
cost of water projects. In: Smith, S D (Ed.), Procs 28th Annual ARCOM Conference, 
3-5 September 2012, Edinburgh, UK. Association of Researchers in Construction 
Management,  307-16. 
Anderson, J A (1995) An Introduction to Neural Networks. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press. 
Ayyub, B M (1997) Uncertainty modeling and analysis in civil engineering.  CRC. 
Baloyi, L and Bekker, M (2011) Causes of construction cost and time overruns: The 2010 
FIFA World Cup stadia in South Africa. Acta Structilia, 18(1). 
BCIS (2012) BIS Construction Price and Cost Indices. In, http://www.bcis.co.uk: Building 
Cost Information Services, UK. 
Belohlavek, R, Klir, G J, Lewis III, H W and Way, E C (2009) Concepts and fuzzy sets: 
Misunderstandings, misconceptions, and oversights. International journal of 
approximate reasoning, 51(1), 23-34. 
Bilgehan, M (2010) A comparative study for the concrete compressive strength estimation 
using neural network and neuro-fuzzy modelling approaches. Nondestructive Testing 
and Evaluation, 26(1), 35-55. 
Boussabaine, A H (2001) Neurofuzzy modelling of construction projects’ duration I: 
principles. Engineering Construction and Architectural Management, 8(2), 104-13. 
Boussabaine, A H and Kirkham, R (2008) Artificial Neural Network Modeling Techniques 
for Applied Civil and Construction Engineering Research. In: Knight, A and 
Ruddock, L (Eds.), Advanced research Methods in the Built Environment. London: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Chan, A P and Chan, A P (2004) Key performance indicators for measuring construction 
success. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 11(2), 203-21. 
Chan, A P, Chan, D W and Yeung, J F (2009) Overview of the application of “fuzzy 
techniques” in construction management research. Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 135(11), 1241-52. 
Chase, S, Weiss, M, Gibbs, P, Hillman, C and Urban, N. The Physics and Relativity FAQ 
1996 [cited 19th November, 2012. Available from 
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/occam.html. 
Denton, J W and Hung, M S (1996) A comparison of nonlinear optimization methods for 
supervised learning in multilayer feedforward neural networks. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 93(2), 358-68. 
Fausett, L V (1994) Fundamentals of neural networks: architectures, algorithms, and 
applications.  Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Flyvbjerg, B, Holm, M K and Buhl, S L (2002) Understanding costs in public works projects: 
Error or lie? Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(279-295). 
Ahiaga-Dagbui, Tokede, Smith and Wamuziri 
190 
 
Flyvbjerg, B, Holm, M K S and Buhl, S (2004) What Causes Cost Overrun in Transport 
Infrastructure Projects? Transport Reviews, 24(1), 3-18. 
Gil, N and Lundrigan, C (2012) The Leadership and Governance of Megaprojects. In: CID 
Technical Report No. 3/2012: Centre for Infrastructure Development (CID), 
Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester, 18. 
Haykin, S (1994) Neural networks: a comprehensive foundation.  Prentice Hall PTR Upper 
Saddle River, NJ, USA. 
Hegazy, T (2002) Computer-based construction project management. Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Prentice Hall Inc. 
Jackson, S (2002) Project cost overruns and risk management. In: Greenwood, D (Ed.), 
Proceedings 18th Annual ARCOM Conference, 2-4 September 2002 Newcastle, 
Northumbria University, UK. Association of Researchers in Construction 
Management,  (Vol. 1) 99–108. 
Kim, J, Lee, S, Hong, T and Han, S (2006) Activity vulnerability index for delay risk 
forecasting. Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 33(10), 1261-70. 
Love, P E D, Edwards, D J and Irani, Z (2011) Moving beyond optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation: An explanation for social infrastructure project cost overruns. 
Odeck, J (2004) Cost overruns in road construction—what are their sizes and determinants? 
Transport Policy, 11(1), 43-53. 
Olden, J D and Jackson, D A (2002) Illuminating the “black box”: a randomization approach 
for understanding variable contributions in artificial neural networks. Ecological 
Modelling, 154(1-2), 135-50. 
Patterson, D W (1996) Artificial Neural Networks: Theory and Applications. Singapore: 
Prentice Hall. 
Ross, T J (2009) Fuzzy logic with engineering applications. 3ed. Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
StatSoft Inc. (2011) Electronic Statistics Textbook. In, OK Tulsa: StatSoft, . 
Tokede, O and Wamuziri, S (2012) Perceptions of fuzzy set theory in construction risk 
analysis. In: Simon, S (Ed.), Procs 28th Annual ARCOM Conference, 3-5 September 
2012, Edinburgh, UK. Association of Researchers in Construction Management,  
1197-207. 
Yeung, J F, Chan, A P and Chan, D W (2008) Establishing quantitative indicators for 
measuring the partnering performance of construction projects in Hong Kong. 
Construction Management and Economics, 26(3), 277-301. 
Yu, W-d and Lin, H-w (2006) A VaFALCON neuro-fuzzy system for mining of incomplete 
construction databases. Automation in Construction, 15(1), 20-32. 
Zadeh, L A (1994) Fuzzy Logic, Neural Networks, and Soft Computing. Communications of 
the ACM, 37(3), 77-84. 
Zadeh, L A (2008) Is there a need for fuzzy logic? Information Sciences, 178(13), 2751-79. 


















School of Engineering and the Built Environment, Edinburgh Napier University, 
Edinburgh, EH10 5DT, UKPH (44) 131-455-2837; email: O.Tokede@napier.ac.uk
  
2 









Significant improvements are achievable in the accuracy of cost estimates if 
cost models adequately incorporate issues of flexibility and uncertainty. This study 
evaluates the relational efficiencies of the fuzzy composition operators – the max-min 
and max-product, in establishing the final cost of water infrastructure projects. Cost 
and project data was collected on 1600 water infrastructure projects completed in 
Scotland between 2000 and 2011. Neural network is first used to develop relative 
weightings of relevant cost predictors. These were then standardized into fuzzy sets to 
establish a consistent effect of each variable on the overall target cost.  The strength 
and degree of relationship of the normalized cost predictor weightings and the 
fuzzified project attributes were combined using the max-min and max-product 
composition operators to obtain project cost predictions. The predictions from the two 
composition operators are compared with the actual cost figures.  Results show 
comparable performance in the efficiency of the composition operators. Based on 
statistical correlations, the max-product composition operator achieved on average a 
deviation of 1.71% while the max-min composition had an average deviation of 
1.86%. Improvements in the relational efficiency of neuro-fuzzy hybrid cost models 




One of the major challenges of forecasting is dealing with uncertainty 
(Hüllermeier 1997) - the broad range of variability of likely outcomes of any event. 
One approach to uncertainty analysis that allows for some degree of flexibility is the 
fuzzy sets framework.  To a reasonable extent, fuzzy sets basically imply the 
inclusion of degree of belonging in evaluating variables (Zadeh, 2008). They help to 
capture irreducible uncertainty as well as model vagueness in human reasoning 
abilities. Fuzzy relations are special cases of fuzzy sets.  Fuzzy relations can be 
defined as a vague relationship between some fixed numbers of variables (Chan et al., 
2009; Zimmerman, 2001). Relations in this case are normative structures that help to 
interpret the attributes of fuzzy systems. The composition operation is however one 
class of similarity relation that seeks to establish the relationship between similar 
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elements in different universe of discourse (Zimmermann, 2001). Two common 
forms of composition operations are the max–product and max–min compositions. 
Zimmerman (2001) opines that the max – min composition is the most frequently 
used and that the operations of fuzzy relations can be well defined using the 
Extension principle. This paper provides an evaluation of the max-min and max-
product composition operator in neuro-fuzzy hybrid cost models. The paper briefly 
discusses construction cost estimation and neuro-fuzzy modelling before detailing the 
mapping strategies in neuro-fuzzy hybrid cost models. The paper then proceeds to 
evaluate the relational efficiencies of two composition operators in a neuro-fuzzy 
hybrid cost estimation model and concluding with results achieved and their 
implications for research using the two mapping strategies.  
 
COST ESTIMATION 
Effective cost estimation relates the design of constructed facilities to their 
cost, so that while taking full account of quality, risks, likely scope changes, utility 
and appearance, the cost of a project is planned to be within the economic limit of 
expenditure (Kirkham and Brandon 2007). This stage in a project life-cycle is 
particularly crucial as decisions made during the early stages of  the development 
process carry more far-reaching economic consequences than the relatively limited 
decisions which can be made later in the process. As noted by Hegazy (2002), in spite 
of the importance of cost estimation, it is undeniably neither simple nor 
straightforward because of the lack of information in the early stages of the project. 
Cost estimation is so vital; it can seal a project’s financial fate (Nicholas 2004). 
Rightly, or wrongly, cost estimates produced at the beginning of a project are used by 
the client to build their budget which often becomes ‘the baseline’ on which actual 
project performance may be measured and compared.  
Cost estimation techniques range from model-based methods to model-free 
methods. In between these spectra, lies a variety of techniques available to estimate 
the cost of a project including traditional bills of quantity, activity schedule and 
detailed estimation. Model-based techniques consist of static sets of relationships 
which systematically handle inputs and methodologically translate them into output 
(Smit 2012).  In situations where such relationships are analytical, they mimic some 
form of mathematical function (Ross 2009). Model-free techniques are more dynamic 
and adaptive and include fuzzy systems and neural networks (Lee & Lin, 1992). 
 
NEURO-FUZZY COST MODELS 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), henceforth referred to as neural networks 
(NN) with artificial implied, is an analogy-based, non-parametric information-
processing system that has performance characteristics similar to a biological neural 
network of the brain (Anderson and McNeill 1992). They retain two features of the 
biological neural network: the ability to learn from experience and make 
generalisations based on this acquired knowledge (Haykin 1994). Neural networks 
are structured to provide the capability to solve problems without the benefits of an 
expert and without recourse to programming (Boussabaine and Elhag 1999) 
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Neural networks are promising tools when used in conjunction with fuzzy sets 
for developing adaptive systems (Kosko and Isaka 1993). Adaptive systems can 
generally identify rule patterns in incoming data. Neural network and fuzzy logic 
systems are both numeric model-free estimators and dynamic systems (Lee and Lin 
1992). Neural networks provide a platform for classifying patterns without having to 
provide explanations on the possible sophistications employed by the classification 
machinery (Eklund 1994). The disadvantage in the neural network technique is that 
they often increase nodes sporadically or swap network structure arbitrarily (Lee and 
Lin 1992); a variability that puts to question its reliability.  Besides, the blackbox-
ness of neural networks, more or less consigns it to the realm of magical arts. Fuzzy 
models, on the other hand deteriorate significantly where data sets used for 
identification are highly heterogeneous (Pedrycz 1996). Moreso, its procedures do not 
seem easily understandable to many cost and construction professionals (Tokede and 
Wamuziri 2012). Synergizing neural network and fuzzy systems therefore provides 
promising potentials for intelligent hybrid systems (Lee and Lin 1992). Lin and Lee 
(1992) pointed out that hybrid learning algorithms perform better than supervised 
learning algorithm alone. In a more recent study by Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2012), 
it was discovered that the best neural network models for 98 water infrastructure 
projects had an average underestimation and overestimation of 1.2% and 4.6% 
respectively. In comparison, the neuro-fuzzy hybrid cost model using the same 
dataset achieved an average performance of 0.6% and 0.8% (Ahiaga-Dagbui et al. 
2013). Neuro-fuzzy techniques are one of the most common hybrid techniques 
employed in cost estimation problems. According to Chan et al (2009), such 
techniques are highly competent in handling pattern recognition and automatic 
learning. Ahiaga-Dagbui et al., (2013) also suggest that fuzzy sets and neural 
networks both provide excellent mapping interphases which when combined could be 
invaluable in pattern recognition. 
Mapping Strategies in Neuro-Fuzzy Cost Models 
Fuzzy sets are useful in mapping non-empty sets to partially ordered sets 
(Sanchez 1976). They can be used to bridge the gap between mathematical models 
and their associated physical reality (Demicco and Klir 2003). This is mainly 
achieved by representing the vagueness associated with the linguistic description.. 
Fuzzy relations are essentially the means of modelling the intensity between elements 
of a fuzzy set.  Fuzzy relations emerge from Cartesian representation of two or more 
sets on a universal scale (Belohlavek and Klir 2011).  
A composition is a common mathematical operation that seeks to establish the 
relationships between similar elements in different universe of discourse 
(Zimmermann 2001). The compositionality assumption is a sort of logical 
generalization presupposing that the degree of membership of a compound fuzzy set 
is a function of the membership degrees of each component. Effectively, this implies 
the whole is summarily a sum and/or product of its parts (Belohlavek and Klir 2011). 
There have been contention on the possibility of a single non-parametric operator to 
appropriately model the meaning of ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ context independently. The 
composition method is commonly used in applications of artificial neural network for 
mapping between parallel layers in a multi-layer network. 
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According to Ross (2009), the fuzzy relation,  of two sets, and  can be defined by 
the set-theoretic and membership function-theoretic, mathematically expressed as:  
= ∘       Eqn. 1 
Where R is a fuzzy relation on the Cartesian space X x Y. S is a fuzzy relation 
on Y x Z, and T is fuzzy relation on X x Z. In this cost estimation problem, R 
represents the set of cost predictors and S refers to the set of standard values of 
tolerance for linguistic descriptors of project attribute 
 
Max-min Composition 
The max-min composition is commonly used when a system requires a 
conservative solution. Loetamonphong and Fang (2001, pp6) explains this approach 
as when the  “goodness of one value cannot compensate the badness of another 
value”.  Figure 1 shows a graphical illustration of the max-min composition. Ross 
(2009) pointed out the max-min composition is analogous to approximate reasoning 
using the IF-THEN rules. 
 
Mathematically, the max-min composition can be represented as: 




























Figure 1 – Graphical illustration of the max-min composition (Dubois & Prade, 2000) 
Max-Product Composition 
The max-product composition is touted by some researchers as yielding better 
equivalent results (Loetamonphong and Fang 2001; Ross 2009). One possible 
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explanation is that conventional risk calculus is presumed to have a combinatorial 
character. 
Mathematically, the max-product composition can be represented as: 
  Eqn. 3 
 
The max-product composition is a fuzzy calculus that expresses the relationship 
between similar elements. Figure 2 shows a graphical illustration of the max-product 
composition .Ross (2009) illustrated the max-product composition to relate the rain 





























Figure 2 – Graphical illustration of the max-product composition (Dubois & Prade, 
2000) 
Other possible variants of composition include the max-max, min-min, max-average 
and sum-product (Ross 2009).  Essentially, the composition involves employing 
hybrid formulations of min, max, average and product to arrive at some relationship 
formation; thereby specifying a range of mathematical values that could be tolerated 
by a category (Carpenter et al. 1992). Yager and Filev (1994) mentioned that the 
MAX operator ignores reinforcement inherent in the overlapping in the output fuzzy 
sets. Carpenter et al., (1992) also stated that the MIN operator helps highlight features 
that are critically present, whilst the MAX operator flags-off features that are 
critically absent.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The findings reported in this experimental paper were achieved using the 
following steps. Approximately 1600 projects completed between 2004 and 2012, 
with cost range of between £4000 to £15 million, comprising newly built, upgrade, 
repair or refurbishment projects were used for the study. One hundred cases were 
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selected using stratified random sampling to be used for independent testing of the 
final models. The remaining data were then split in an 80:20% ratio for training and 
testing of the neural network model. All cost values were normalized to a 2012 
baseline with base year 2000 using the infrastructure resources cost indices by the 
Building Cost Information Services (BCIS 2012). The nature of the projects ranged 
from construction of water mains, water treatment plants, Combined Sewer 
Overflows (CSOs), installation of manholes or water pumps and upgrades and repairs 
to sewers. 
The data was then pre-processed to structure and present the data to the model in the 
most suitable way. For this research, extreme values and outliers were either re-coded 
or deleted from the sample set and missing values replaced with the mean or mode. 
Input errors were corrected and all cost values were normalized to 2011 with the base 
year 1995 using the infrastructure resources cost indices by the Building Cost 
Information Services (BCIS 2012). Invariant variables, such as procurement option, 
payment method, fluctuation measure and type of client, were removed from the 
variable set as they would only increase the model complexity whiles offering little to 
no useful information for model’s performance. Categorical variables such as type of 
project, need for project, etc. were coded using a binary coding (0, 1) format. Data 
screening using scree test and optimal binning allowed for the selection of five initial 
predictors (primary purpose of project, project scope, project delivery partners,  
estimated target cost and project duration) to be used for the actual ANN modelling. 
Several neural network models were then developed with the 20 best models used to 
estimate the relative contribution to model performance of each factor used. These 
values, as shown in Table 1 were then standardized into fuzzy sets in the next phase 
of the study to establish a consistent effect of each variable on the overall target cost.   
Fuzzy Sets Modelling 
Fuzzy set theory is applied at this stage of the modelling exercise to evaluate the 
subjective measures for each of the cost predictors in order to predict final cost. Using 
Eqn.4 the average weighted ranking for each of the variables from Table 1was 
normalized to unity in order to generate a standardised index for the subsequent fuzzy 
set computations (see Table 2) 
   Eqn. 4 
Where wi is the average relative weighting of the ith predictor 
∑W is the sum of relative weighting of all predictors 












0.22 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.63 
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With mean target cost to predictor plots, all predictors were fuzzified using the range 
set below: 
 ,    Influence is Rather High 
   Influence is High 
   Influence is Medium 
 ,        Influence is Low 
The next stage of the fuzzy modelling involved developing membership functions. In 
developing these, the tolerance index is particularly relevant in evaluating and 
constraining the range of possibilities subject to a complex set of influencing 
variables, quantitatively and/or qualitatively defined. The tolerance index is vital in 
order to model the uncertainty in the cost values within a realistic continuum as 
opposed to a single figure-of-merit. For this study, the tolerances, β, were adapted to 
follow those indicated by Ayyub (1997) and reported in theTable 2 
Table 2: Values of tolerance. Adapted from Ayyub (1997) 
β 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Poor/Low 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.4 0 0 
High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.9 0 
Rather 
High 
0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 
 
Each of the project variables in the validation set was converted into fuzzy set 
variables using Table 2 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 3 reports the performance of the NF hybrid models in predicting the final cost 
for 5 of the 99 different projects used in the validation set. The tolerance of each of 
the cost values in the validation set was computed using Eqn.4 and defuzzified to 
obtain a 3-point estimate representing the fuzzy mean, fuzzy upper and fuzzy lower 
values as illustrated in Table 4. These three values provided a range of likely final 
cost rather than the customary single value estimate..  The overall results for the 
performance of the validation cases have been represented in Figure 3.  








turn Cost value 
  Project Case 9 6.685 6.672 6.691 
Project Case 204  5.592 5.572 5.670 
Project Case 901 5.262 5.279 5.385 
Project Case 505 5.877 5.934 5.980 
Project Case 824 5.575 5.633 5.674 
Based on statistical correlations, the max-product composition operator achieved on 
average a deviation of 1.71%; while the max-mean composition had an average 
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deviation of 1.86%. The Max-Product composition performed consistently better in 
both the fuzzy mean and fuzzy lower values but did not show any significant 
advantage in the fuzzy upper cost values. This might indicate that the benefit of the 
max-product operator is situated within the fuzzy mean and lower cost target 
predictions.   





























Mean max-product cost predictions
Actual cost values
Mean max-min cost predictions
 Figure 3 – Graphical plot of the project validation cases and the relational 
efficiency of composition operators 
The corresponding percentage differences in the cost target were also estimated for 
all the 99 project validation cases. Table 4 provides a summary of the overall result 
obtained for all the validation cases. 
 
Table 4: Summary of Results from Neuro-fuzzy Model Validation 






Max-Min Operator 2.59% 2.07% 0.94% 
Max-Product Operator  2.59% 1.74% 0.78% 
 
The volatility measures considered for the range of values for the composition 
operators were fairly consistent. The standard deviation of the cost values of the 
max-product was £161,715, while that of the max-min was £188,506. This implies 
that the range of fluctuation in the max-min composition measure was higher than 






The research reported in this paper combines the learning and generalization 
capabilities of artificial neural networks with fuzzy logic’s ability to formalise human 
reasoning and decision making within an environment of uncertainty and incomplete 
information. This paper develop a neuro-fuzzy hybrid cost model for predicting the 
final cost of small water infrastructure project and then evaluates the efficiency of the 
max-product and max-min composition operators in predicting the final target cost. 
Based on 99 project validation cases, it was found that the max-product composition 
operator achieved an average a deviation of 1.71% while the max-mean composition 
had an average deviation of 1.86%.  
It is however noteworthy that this two composition operators are not an 
exhaustive treatment of the relational capabilities of fuzzy sets. However, they 
currently represent the most popular calculi employed in fuzzy set evaluations. There 
might be need to improve on the framework of the existing mathematical 
formulations of fuzzy sets in order to fully realize the potentials of fuzzy sets in 
modelling the vagueness in human reasoning and capturing irreducible uncertainties 
in water infrastructure projects. Improvements in the relational efficiency of neuro-
fuzzy hybrid cost models will in no little way assist in developing a robust framework 
for realistic cost targets in water infrastructure projects. 
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APPENDIX B1 - WATER TYPE PROJECTS 
    Category 
  Type of data 1 2 3 4 
  Project Information         
1 Project Start Date         
2 Tender Price (£)         
3 Cost at Completion (£)         
4 Number of Estimates, Nr          
5 Estimated Duration (Years, Months)         
6 Actual Duration (Years, Months)         
  Site Information         
1 Ground Condition Contaminated Non-contaminated Made-Up   
2 Type of Soil1 Good Moderate Poor   
3 Site Access Unrestricted Restricted Highly Restricted   
4 Type of Location Remote City Outskirts City Centre   
  Other Information      
1 Type of Client Public Private -   
2 Contractor's Need for the project Low Medium High   
3 Frequency of Project2 One-off Repetitive -   
4 Type of Deadline Normal Strict Fast-track   
5 Fluctuation Measure Fixed Formula -   
6 Type of Project Repair Upgrade New Order   
  Procurement/Contract Information         
1 Tendering Strategy Open Competitive Selective Competitive Negotiated Serial 
2 Procurement Option Design-bid-build Design and Build Management types Partnering 
3 Payment Method Lump Sum Ad-measurement Cost Reimbursement Target Cost 
 
 
APPENDIX B2 - BUILDING-TYPE PROJECTS 
PROJECT INFORMATION SHEET  
(Building Type Projects) 
  Project Name/Code   
  Project Information   
  PART A 
(Please enter the required information in the 
cells below) 
1 Year of Completion   
2 Tender Price (£)   
3 Cost at completion (£)   
4 Project Start Date   
5 Estimated Duration (Years, Months)   
6 Actual Duration (Years, Months)   
7 Number of Storeys (Nr):   
  a) Below ground   
  b) Above ground   
8 Ground Floor Area (m2)   
9 Typical GIFA (m2)3   
10 Number of Elevators, Nr   
  PART B: Building-Type Projects  
    Category 
  Building Information             
1 Type of Structure Steel concrete Masonry Timber Other   
2 Intended function of project Hospital Residential Office Educational Leisure Industrial 
3 Type of Project New Order Renovation4 Demolition       
4 Type of foundation Pad Strip Raft Pile Combined N/A 
                
  Site Information             
5 Ground Condition Non-Contaminated Contaminated Made-Up N/A   
6 Type of Soil1 Good Moderate Poor N/A   
 
7 Site Access Unrestricted Restricted Highly Restricted       
8 Type of Location Remote City Outskirts Urban Area       
                
  Other Information             
9 Type of Client Public Private         
10 Frequency of Project One-off Repetitive         
11 Type of Deadline2 Normal Strict Fast-track       
                
  Contract Information             
12 Tendering Strategy5 Open Competitive Selective Competitive Negotiated Serial     
13 Procurement Option Design-Bid-Build Design and Build Management type Partnering6     
 
 
 1 Type of Soil is classified according to the load bearing capacity  as indicated in the table below 
Type of Soil Good Medium Poor 
Bearing Capacity (KN/m2) >600 200-600 <200 
 2 Type of Deadline -  Speed of construction was noted as one of the possible causes of cost escalation in the literature. Three classifications, i.e Normal, Strict and 
Fast-track have been used here to try and capture the effect of type of deadline used for the project. Strict deadlines usually have an immovable deadline due to a 
scheduled use of the built facility for an event like the World Cup or Olympic Games.  
Fast track projects, like the Scottish Parliament project, are usually scheduled to be built within a shorter time-frame than would normally be required. In case of 
the Scottish Parliament, design and construction occurred concurrently due to the fast track nature of the project. 
 
3 Gross Internal Floor Area (GIFA): Area between enclosing walls without deduction for internal partitions or openings 
 
6 Tendering Strategy - Open tendering is open to all contractors and requires that the contract is advertised publicly by the client. This may involve some level of 
prequalification.  
In selective competitive, contractors are invited from a pre-selection list based on known track record and suitability for the contract in terms of its size, nature and 
complexity. The bid is usually awarded based on lowest evaluated tender cost.  
 
Negotiated tenders are usually used for specialist works, to extend the scope of an already existing contract or for emergency works. It usually involves negotiations 
with a single contractors.  
Serial tenders usually are based on either a schedule of works or bill of quantities. The accepted rates are then used to value works over a series of similar projects, 
often for a fixed period of time following which the tendering procedure may be repeated. 
 







Choosing the software  
The software package to be used for the data modelling was chosen using the 
following criteria: 
1. Ease of use, preferably with a graphical user interface.  
2. Cost (annual, initial licence cost, academic licence) 
3. Availability of learning support/tutorials 
4. Model deployment options (e.g. Html, C++, excel, PMML, SAS) 
5. Flexibility (ability to try different alternative network topologies) 
A fully functional “demo” of the following neural network programs 
were evaluated using sample data that was to be used for the actual 
modelling later in the thesis.  
a) Tiberius, Version 7.0.3  
This package was a relatively easy to learn software, available for free on an 
academic license. It had a wide range of deployment options including Excel, 
Visual Basic and HMTL. Tiberius can read data from a wide variety of sources 
including Excel, SPSS, Access, text files, SQL Server and Oracle.  
Its major drawback was the inflexibility in dealing with categorical factors as its 
neural network engine could only cope with numerical predictors.  
b) Matlab’s Neural Network Toolbox, Version R2011b 
Matlab’s Neural Network Toolbox runs within the framework of the Matlab 
computing environment. It is widely available within the University of Edinburgh 
computing systems, therefore would be at no extra cost. It also comes with the 
benefit of being a powerful data modelling platform with an abundance of 
learning resources online and in text books.  
However, using Matlab requires learning of the Matlab programming language to 
be able to write scripts. With very little programming skills, this was not a 
plausible option within the three year timescale of the PhD.  
Also, the Neural Network Toolbox was not easily customizable to accommodate 
different types of learning algorithms and activations functions. 
APPENDIX C 
c) Alyuda NeuroIntelligence by Alyuda Research Company 
NeuroIntelligence (NI) boasts of a sophisticated automated ‘best’ network search 
as well as highly customisable design of neural network models. It can train an 
infinite number of networks, algorithms, topologies, at the same time and retain 
the best performing networks after testing. Retained networks can then be 
retrained with tweaks to their topology to produce even more superior results. 
NI includes the ability to perform classification, regression, time series analysis, 
and clustering problems.  
It allows model saving options either within the NI framework or as XML codes 
output. At a single user cost of $497, NI has a very pleasing graphical user 
interface and offers enhanced features to visualise the neural network 
architecture search as well plot graphs of network error, error distribution and 
network comparisons. 
d) Statistica by Statsoft. Inc, Version 10 
Statistica 10 is a comprehensive data processing and visualisation software by 
Statsoft Inc. With advanced quality graphical user interface and a rather 
extensive choice of analysis available from classical statistics to fraud detection 
in insurance companies as well as six sigma and quality control in manufacturing 
industry. Statistica provides the framework for running neural network models, 
support vector machines, genetic algorithm, multiple regression, etc.  
Like NI, its neural network engine allows for the development of highly 
customisable models using a comprehensive list of available network algorithms, 
activations functions and network architectures. It also incorporates advanced 
features for data bootstrapping, ensemble modelling, network pruning and 
weight decay regularisation and training momentum.  
The complete single user license however costs £25,000 and allows exporting of 
developed models in different forms including SAS, HTML, C++, etc.  Statsoft 
however offered the academic licence for this research at only £65. This however 
came with the limitation of not being able to export the final models out of 
Statistica after training.  
APPENDIX C 
Statistica 10 was however chosen for the modelling in this research because of 
its power, the extensive list of options available to experiment with, the relatively 
low cost of the academic license, its intuitive graphical user interface, ease of 
integration with Microsoft Suite and the readiness of the software developers to 











1e:\All Edinburgh Files\Research Work\Thesis\Viva\C sharp\SANN_CS_Code_Cost Modelling-1.cs
/**C# deployment code of Neural Networks Model**/
/**==========================================================================
Before running the C# deployment code please read the following.
 STATISTICA variable names will be exported as-is into the C# deployment script;
please verify the resulting script to ensure that the variable names follow the C#





   public static void Cost_Model_MLP_12_7_1( double[] ContInputs, string[] CatInputs )
   {
     //"Input Variable" comment is added besides Input(Response) variables.
     int Cont_idx=0;
     int Cat_idx=0;
     double zscores (TC) = ContInputs[Cont_idx++]; //Input Variable
     double zScoreD = ContInputs[Cont_idx++]; //Input Variable
     string Delivery Partner = CatInputs[Cat_idx++]; //Input Variable
     string Primary Purpose = CatInputs[Cat_idx++]; //Input Variable
     string Project Scope = CatInputs[Cat_idx++]; //Input Variable
    double[] __statist_max_input = new double[2];
    __statist_max_input[0]= 8.11505087458973e+000;
    __statist_max_input[1]= 3.85401568326401e+000;
    double[] __statist_min_input = new double[2];
    __statist_min_input[0]= -3.67929873414288e-001;
    __statist_min_input[1]= -1.47002847543739e+000;
    double[] __statist_max_target = new double[1];
    __statist_max_target[0]= 7.81817078097809e+000;
    double[] __statist_min_target = new double[1];
    __statist_min_target[0]= -3.66057073069406e-001;
    double[,] __statist_i_h_wts = new double[7,12];
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    __statist_i_h_wts[0,0]=6.10055491663783e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,1]=-9.00972477126112e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,2]=-3.33284518737462e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,3]=1.33521888728242e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,4]=-7.97095096756099e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,5]=7.74460245945113e-003;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,6]=1.38225161760593e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,7]=2.58369627399478e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,8]=-4.60467768382143e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,9]=-1.26530985813679e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,10]=4.39882491380093e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[0,11]=1.54680076500557e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,0]=6.27440133242177e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,1]=6.83694167293472e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,2]=3.88968243134368e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,3]=4.04882370941243e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,4]=-7.15758652960895e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,5]=4.74529478973639e-003;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,6]=8.43968467935806e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,7]=4.03982710658986e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,8]=-3.42393892604500e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,9]=1.45222033503073e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,10]=-3.32770527874177e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[1,11]=5.04437710826594e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,0]=2.49868449644580e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,1]=1.10664796381584e+000;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,2]=2.77178941395611e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,3]=-2.96398302172497e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,4]=-3.79932921247878e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,5]=-4.72844806928609e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,6]=-4.95942542229320e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,7]=7.47916931474163e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,8]=4.55203571106139e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,9]=1.90816788710656e-001;
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    __statist_i_h_wts[2,10]=-5.52385545144320e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[2,11]=-2.68756551841026e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,0]=3.02266802032769e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,1]=-6.98225789278918e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,2]=-5.04665053972154e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,3]=3.54414687155054e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,4]=2.83227398405789e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,5]=1.93515508871481e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,6]=-1.86803602618070e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,7]=-1.19402899041314e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,8]=-2.17788004608143e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,9]=-3.99544482827499e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,10]=1.41799945313141e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[3,11]=2.98152008015934e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,0]=1.70332262296414e+000;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,1]=-4.45278570986640e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,2]=4.71980700692331e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,3]=-5.61471080283562e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,4]=-1.43967443000545e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,5]=4.22522889623698e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,6]=1.61571557721163e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,7]=-3.98401318134162e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,8]=2.07133097825445e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,9]=5.11421161308927e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,10]=-8.80934161539714e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[4,11]=-8.58878454445226e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,0]=-2.99001956571505e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,1]=-7.58160322104295e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,2]=2.45732161474987e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,3]=2.63716263798594e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,4]=-4.52811644304255e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,5]=1.06761349175363e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,6]=3.85985335722588e-003;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,7]=4.29562594409285e-002;
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    __statist_i_h_wts[5,8]=-7.33927726395723e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,9]=-5.58912058926934e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,10]=4.01575249383282e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[5,11]=1.30642597104837e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,0]=7.00450325945085e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,1]=-4.17094331074114e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,2]=4.17885284201890e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,3]=-3.87113634738378e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,4]=-1.39886083479381e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,5]=-1.13066359051156e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,6]=-1.35192016624967e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,7]=1.18273653382723e-001;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,8]=-4.54577204692083e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,9]=-8.09074573683310e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,10]=-4.82791368359781e-002;
    __statist_i_h_wts[6,11]=3.61311055362202e-002;
    double[,] __statist_h_o_wts = new double[1,7];
    __statist_h_o_wts[0,0]=7.56888846091610e-001;
    __statist_h_o_wts[0,1]=3.32137071440306e-001;
    __statist_h_o_wts[0,2]=2.41848324122223e-001;
    __statist_h_o_wts[0,3]=1.53626552809784e-001;
    __statist_h_o_wts[0,4]=3.86585621330931e-002;
    __statist_h_o_wts[0,5]=-6.02101745772497e-001;
    __statist_h_o_wts[0,6]=1.08390122143369e-001;
    double[] __statist_hidden_bias = new double[7];
    __statist_hidden_bias[0]=6.26313425097254e-002;
    __statist_hidden_bias[1]=8.52788624793290e-002;
    __statist_hidden_bias[2]=-8.93609753819305e-002;
    __statist_hidden_bias[3]=1.02705157732035e-001;
    __statist_hidden_bias[4]=-2.09456901774407e-001;
    __statist_hidden_bias[5]=3.46305548973789e-002;
    __statist_hidden_bias[6]=-1.30136072417104e-001;
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    double[] __statist_output_bias = new double[1];
    __statist_output_bias[0]=-3.76993539230292e-002;
    double[] __statist_inputs = new double[12];
    double[] __statist_hidden = new double[7];
    double[] __statist_outputs = new double[1];
    __statist_outputs[0] = -1.0e+307;
    __statist_inputs[0]=zscores (TC);
    __statist_inputs[1]=zScoreD;
    if( Delivery Partner=="CID")
    {
     __statist_inputs[2]=1;
    }
    else
    {
     __statist_inputs[2]=0;
    }
    if( Delivery Partner=="SWD")
    {
     __statist_inputs[3]=1;
    }
    else
    {
     __statist_inputs[3]=0;
    }
    if( Delivery Partner=="SWS")
    {
     __statist_inputs[4]=1;
    }
    else
    {
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     __statist_inputs[4]=0;
    }
    if( Primary Purpose=="GENERAL")
    {
     __statist_inputs[5]=1;
    }
    else
    {
     __statist_inputs[5]=0;
    }
    if( Primary Purpose=="WASTEWATER")
    {
     __statist_inputs[6]=1;
    }
    else
    {
     __statist_inputs[6]=0;
    }
    if( Primary Purpose=="WATER")
    {
     __statist_inputs[7]=1;
    }
    else
    {
     __statist_inputs[7]=0;
    }
    if( Project Scope=="NEWBUILD")
    {
     __statist_inputs[8]=1;
    }
    else
    {
     __statist_inputs[8]=0;
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    }
    if( Project Scope=="REFURB")
    {
     __statist_inputs[9]=1;
    }
    else
    {
     __statist_inputs[9]=0;
    }
    if( Project Scope=="REPLACE")
    {
     __statist_inputs[10]=1;
    }
    else
    {
     __statist_inputs[10]=0;
    }
    if( Project Scope=="UPGRADE")
    {
     __statist_inputs[11]=1;
    }
    else
    {
     __statist_inputs[11]=0;
    }
    double __statist_delta=0;
    double __statist_maximum=1;
    double __statist_minimum=0;
    int __statist_ncont_inputs=2;
    /*scale continuous inputs*/
    for(int __statist_i=0;__statist_i < __statist_ncont_inputs;__statist_i++)
    {
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     __statist_delta = (__statist_maximum-__statist_minimum)/(__statist_max_input
[__statist_i]-__statist_min_input[__statist_i]);
     __statist_inputs[__statist_i] = __statist_minimum - __statist_delta*
__statist_min_input[__statist_i]+ __statist_delta*__statist_inputs[__statist_i];
    }
    int __statist_ninputs=12;
    int __statist_nhidden=7;
    /*Compute feed forward signals from Input layer to hidden layer*/
    for(int __statist_row=0;__statist_row < __statist_nhidden;__statist_row++)
    {
      __statist_hidden[__statist_row]=0.0;
      for(int __statist_col=0;__statist_col < __statist_ninputs;__statist_col++)
      {
       __statist_hidden[__statist_row]= __statist_hidden[__statist_row] + 
(__statist_i_h_wts[__statist_row,__statist_col]*__statist_inputs[__statist_col]);
      }
     __statist_hidden[__statist_row]=__statist_hidden[__statist_row]+__statist_hidden_bias
[__statist_row];
    }
    for(int __statist_row=0;__statist_row < __statist_nhidden;__statist_row++)
    {
      if(__statist_hidden[__statist_row]>100.0)
      {
       __statist_hidden[__statist_row] = 1.0;
      }
      else
      {
       if(__statist_hidden[__statist_row]<-100.0)
       {
        __statist_hidden[__statist_row] = -1.0;
       }
       else
       {
        __statist_hidden[__statist_row] = Math.Tanh(__statist_hidden[__statist_row]);
       }
      }
9e:\All Edinburgh Files\Research Work\Thesis\Viva\C sharp\SANN_CS_Code_Cost Modelling-1.cs
    }
    int __statist_noutputs=1;
    /*Compute feed forward signals from hidden layer to output layer*/
    for(int __statist_row2=0;__statist_row2 < __statist_noutputs;__statist_row2++)
    {
     __statist_outputs[__statist_row2]=0.0;
    for(int __statist_col2=0;__statist_col2 < __statist_nhidden;__statist_col2++)
      {
       __statist_outputs[__statist_row2]= __statist_outputs[__statist_row2] + 
(__statist_h_o_wts[__statist_row2,__statist_col2]*__statist_hidden[__statist_col2]);
      }
     __statist_outputs[__statist_row2]=__statist_outputs[__statist_row2]+
__statist_output_bias[__statist_row2];
    }
    /*Unscale continuous targets*/
    __statist_delta=0;
    for(int __statist_i=0;__statist_i < __statist_noutputs;__statist_i++)
    {
     __statist_delta = (__statist_maximum-__statist_minimum)/(__statist_max_target
[__statist_i]-__statist_min_target[__statist_i]);
     __statist_outputs[__statist_i] = (__statist_outputs[__statist_i] - __statist_minimum +
 __statist_delta*__statist_min_target[__statist_i])/__statist_delta;
    }
      for(int __statist_ii=0; __statist_ii < __statist_noutputs; __statist_ii++)
      {
        Console.WriteLine(" Prediction{0} = {1}", __statist_ii+1, __statist_outputs
[__statist_ii]);
      }
   }
10e:\All Edinburgh Files\Research Work\Thesis\Viva\C sharp\SANN_CS_Code_Cost Modelling-1.cs
   public static void Main (string[] args) {
     int argID = 0;
     double[] ContInputs = new double[2];
     int contID = 0;
     string[] CatInputs = new string[3];
     int catID = 0;
     if (args.Length >= 5)
     {
       ContInputs[contID++] = Double.Parse(args[argID++]);
       ContInputs[contID++] = Double.Parse(args[argID++]);
       CatInputs[catID++] = args[argID++];
       CatInputs[catID++] = args[argID++];
       CatInputs[catID++] = args[argID++];
     }
     else
     {
       string Comment = "";
       string Comment1 = "*****************************************************************
*********\n";
       Comment += Comment1;
       string Comment2 = "Please enter at least 5 command line parameters in the following 
order for \nthe program to Predict.\n";
       Comment += Comment2;
       Comment += Comment1;
       string Comment3 = "zscores (TC)  Type - double (or) integer\n";
       Comment += Comment3;
       string Comment4 = "zScoreD  Type - double (or) integer\n";
       Comment += Comment4;
       string Comment5 = "Delivery Partner  Type - String (categories are { \"CID\"  \"SWD\
"  \"SWS\" } )\n";
       Comment += Comment5;
       string Comment6 = "Primary Purpose  Type - String (categories are { \"GENERAL\"  \
"WASTEWATER\"  \"WATER\" } )\n";
       Comment += Comment6;
       string Comment7 = "Project Scope  Type - String (categories are { \"NEWBUILD\"  \
"REFURB\"  \"REPLACE\"  \"UPGRADE\" } )\n";
       Comment += Comment7;
       Comment += Comment1;
       System.Console.WriteLine(Comment);
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       System.Environment.Exit(1);
     }
     Cost_Model_MLP_12_7_1( ContInputs, CatInputs );
   }
}
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